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In" recent" years" development" aid" (also" commonly" referred" to" as" Overseas"
Development" Assistance" or" ODA)" has" increasingly" been" allocated" for" the"
mitigation"of"climate"change,"often"diverting"funding"from"more"traditional"
development" purposes" such" as" poverty" alleviation." To" the" author’s"
knowledge" no" other" study" identifies" the" determinants" of" the" increasing"
provision" of" official" mitigation" finance" and" the" patterns" of" its" allocation"
across" 180" developing" countries." This" PhD" thesis" includes" three" empirical"
studies"and"a"theoretical"discussion"and"seeks"to"fill"this"gap"in"the"academic"
literature."The"analysis"makes"use"of"fixedJeffect,"randomJeffect"and"twoJpart"






significantly" influence" their" allocation" of" mitigation" finance" and" the"
proportion" of" their" total" ODA" that" they" designate" to" it," and" that" recipient"
developing" countries’" potential" for"mitigation," such" as" their" environmental"
assets" and" emission" problems," and" their" institutional" and" economic" factors"
affect" how"mitigation" finance" is" allocated" to" them." The" findings" show" that"
donors"tend"to"provide"loans"to"recipients"with"large"emission"problems"and"
grants" to" those" with" large" environmental" assets." Across" donors," the"
determinants"of"mitigation"finance"tend"to"be"heterogeneous."These"findings"
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Intensifying" and" unprecedented" climate" extreme" events" have" promoted" the"
global"provision"of"public"financial"resources"aimed"at"mitigating"the"problems"they"
cause." Overseas" Development" Assistance" (ODA)," as" a" form" of" international"
development" aid" which" was" originally" designed" to" alleviate" chronic" poverty" and"
improve" the" welfare" of" developing" country" populations," has" been" increasingly"
allocated"to"and"used"for"climate"mitigation."In"the"report"of"the"Intergovernmental"
Panel" on" Climate" Change" (IPCC)" (IPCC," 2007;" 2013)," the" scientific" community"
stresses"that"the"world’s"changing"climate,"caused"by"anthropogenic"interference,"i.e."
industrial" activities," will" be" disastrous" if" the" world" is" too" late" in" stabilising"
greenhouse"gases"(GHG)"emission"levels"that"hold"the"global"temperature"increase"to"
below"2°C"above"preindustrial"levels."Existing"economic"and"market"systems"are"not"
fully" compatible" with" the" global" need" to" have" economic" growth" that" is"
environmentally" sound" and" sustainable." These" systems" also" have" not" been" able" to"
immediately" respond" to" finance" the" enormous" global" scale" of" climate" action"
required." In" this"unprepared"situation,"donor"governments"have"agreed" to"allocate"
part" of" their" foreign" aid" –"more" specifically,"ODA1"–" as" fastXstart" finance" for" early"
action"to"mitigate"climate"change."
                                            
1"The" Development" Assistance" Committee" (DAC)" defines" ODA" as" those" flows" to" countries" and"
territories"on"the"DAC"List"of"ODA"recipients"and"to"multilateral" institutions"which"are"(i)"provided(
by(official(agencies," including" state" and" local" governments," or" by" their" executive" agencies;" and" (ii)"




Allocating" part" of" aid" to"mitigate" climate" change" has" extended" its" impact" beyond"
national"boundaries"and"territories."Unlike"the"alleviation"of"poverty,"which"mainly"




However," allocating" aid" to"mitigate" climate" change"may"have"no"overall" impact" if"
other"countries"fail"to"control"their"own"emission"levels."There"is"therefore"a"degree"










However," despite" the" competing" objectives" of" emission" mitigation" and" poverty"
alleviation" in" the" short" run" (Tol," 2007)," mitigating" emissions" is" not" a" goal" that"
opposes"the"reduction"of"poverty"in"the"long"run"(Halverson"&"McNeill,"2008,"p."3)."
Figure" 1.1" contrasts" two" scenarios." In" the" first," the" level" of" global" emissions" is"
stabilised;" although"development"may"progress" at" a" slower" rate," as" indicated"by" a"
slower" alleviation" of" poverty," it" does" so" without" significant" interruption" (Stern,"





2008a)." In" the" second," extreme" events" such" as" floods" or" tsunamis" interrupt" and"






















for" the"mitigation" of" climate" change." In" 2009," the" Secretary"General" of" the"OECD,"
Angel"Gurria,"asserted"that"ODA"has"an"important"role"in"financing"climate"action,"
including" mitigation," in" the" short" and" medium" term" until" global" mechanisms" to"
finance"such"activity"are" fully"operational" (OECD,"2011a)."Following"his"statement,"
donors"committed"to"providing"US$30"billion"in"climate"finance,"for"both"mitigation"
and" adaptation" in" 2010X2012" (Ciplet" et' al.," 2010)." This" policy" preference" and"
international" support" increases" the" permeability" of" ODA," accelerating" the"
mainstreaming"of" climate" change" into" the"development" agenda" (Klein" et' al.," 2005),"





Scenario 1 - GHG 
emission is stabilised 
Scenario 2 - GHG 














However," despite" the" urgent" need" for" climate" change" mitigation," scholars" and"
development"practitioners"have"expressed"concern"about" the"potential"diversion"of"
ODA" from" tackling" current" challenges" to" stabilising" the" future" climate." Lomborg"
(2007)"acknowledges"the"anthropogenic"cause"of"climate"change"but"argues"that"the"
catastrophic" point" (as" shown" in" scenario" 2" of" Figure" 1.1)" may" not" necessarily" be"
associated" with" climate" change" and" is" only" another" natural" phenomenon." He"
therefore"emphasises"that"aid"should"focus"on"financing"poverty"reduction"activities"
such" as" combating" malnutrition," whose" social" rate" of" return" is" higher" than"




Two"main" reports"promote" the"mitigation" strategies" of" increased" energy" efficiency"
and"combating"deforestation."The"Stern"Report" (Stern,"2008a)"shows"that"one"rapid"
and" costXefficient" solution" to" mitigating" emissions" is" to" transform" fossilXfuel"
dependent"countries"with"high"economic"growth"into"lowXemission,"climateXresilient"
countries." The" Eliasch" report" (Eliasch," 2008)" shows" that" climate" finance" is" able" to"
effectively"reduce"emissions"by"reducing"deforestation"rates"and"preserving" forests"
as" a" natural" form" of" global" carbon" storage." These" recommendations" imply" that"
funding" to" mitigate" carbon" emissions" (hereafter" ‘mitigation" finance’)" is" allocated"
effectively"if"it" is"given"to"developing"countries"that"still"rely"heavily"on"fossil"fuels"
and/or"have"considerable"natural"carbon"storage"capacity."However,"there"is"limited"

















Mitigation" finance" is" part" of" climate" finance." Climate" finance" is" a" product" of" the"
United"Nations" Framework"Convention" on"Climate" Change" (UNFCCC)2," a" formal"
framework" through" which" all" consequent" climate" change" negotiations" are"
administered" and" regulated." To" date," there" is" no" internationallyXacknowledged"
definition"of" climate" finance" (Buchner" et'al.," 2011,"p." 1)."To" clarify" the"definition"of"





sources' of' financing.' Climate' finance' is' critical' to' addressing' climate' change' because' large@scale'
investments'are'required'to'significantly'reduce'emissions,'notably'in'sectors'that'emit'large'quantities'
of'greenhouse'gases.'Climate'finance'is'equally'important'for'adaptation,'for'which'significant'financial'




private" finance" with" two" main" objectives:" mitigation" and" adaptation." Unlike"






mitigation" finance," which" funds" exXante" activities" to" prevent" the" global" climate"










mitigate" its" emissions." This" implies" that" both"developed" and"developing" countries"
are" responsible," although" it" does" not" specify" whether" the" responsibility" includes"
historical" cumulative" emissions." Climate" finance" received" little" attention" until" the"
2008" Conference" of" Parties" (COP)" 13" in" Bali" that" resulted" in" the" Bali" Action" Plan,"
which"states"that"‘funding"must"be"adequate,"predictable,"and"sustainable"as"well"as"
new" and" additional’" (Art." 1(e)(i))." This" is" echoed" in" the" Cancun" Agreements;"




Respective' capability" is" associated" with" the" level" of" wealth" of" each" country" and"
national"economic"and"development"performance."New'and'additional" is"understood"
as" funding" in" addition" to" the" existing" target" of" 0.7%" ODA" from" Gross" National"
Income" (GNI)."This" 0.7%" target" is" set" to"maintain" the" focus"of"ODA"on"alleviating"
poverty."However,"most"developed"countries"have"not"fulfilled"the"0.7%"target"and"
in" the"absence"of"a" cap"on"how"much"ODA"can"be"used"as"mitigation" finance," the"
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amount"of"ODA"allocated" to"climate"mitigation" is" increasing"much"faster" than" that"
allocated" to"poverty"aid" (Figure"1.2)." Figure"1.3" shows" that" the" share"of"mitigation"
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Following" discussions" about" climate" finance" at" COP13" the" landscape" of" climate"
finance" has" been" changing" dramatically." A" comprehensive" and" detailed" report"






taken" from"ODA"and"mainly"originates" from" taxpayers" in" the"donor" countries."As"
voters," taxpayers" have"given" their" government" the" right" to" take"decisions" on" their"
behalf" about" the" distribution" and" allocation" of" government" revenue" from" tax" and"
other" sources" such" as" net" export" and" import," FDI" inflow," levies," etc." Part" of" these"
revenues"is"used"as"foreign"aid"and"recorded"as"government"spending"in"the"form"of"
foreign" financial" transfers." Based" on" the" priority" sectors," such" as" energy," forestry,"
agriculture," transportation," and" industry," the" funding" is" allocated" and" delivered"
through" various" intermediaries," instruments," and" channels" depending" on" the"
government’s" objectives," interests" and" areas" of" focus." Major" donors" can" allocate"
mitigation" finance" through" intermediaries" such" as" development" banks" and" their"
lines"of"ministries."
"
Donor" intermediaries," then," channel" the" funds" to" developing" countries" using"
instruments" such" as" grants," concessional" loans,"market" rate" loans," equity," and" risk"
management." Specific" intermediaries" also" directly" administer" or" facilitate" climate"
projects" in"developing"countries,"such"as"the"United'Nations'Development'Programme'









More" recently" a" number" of" vertical" funds" have" focused" on" specific" issues" and"
provided" funding" as" project" aid," such" as" shortX" to" mediumXterm" projects" under"
specific" government" ministries," and" subXcontract" agreements" with" local" and"
international" NonXGovernmental" Organisations" (NGOs)" or" local" companies."
Complementing" the" GEF’s" work," in" 2009" the" Green" Climate" Fund" (GCF)" was"
established"specifically"to"channel"climate"finance"toward"mitigation"and"adaptation"
activities." These" vertical" funds" allocate" and" distribute" climate" finance," including"
mitigation" finance" given" by" donor" governments," private" companies," NGOs," and"
individuals" to" recipient" governments," or" directly" to" projects" managed" by" the"
government,"the"private"sector"or"NGOs"in"developing"countries."Private"companies"
receive" climate" finance" as" an" incentive" for" their" carbon" emission"mitigations" (IFC,"
2011)."NGOs"such"as"the"Nature"Conservancy"and"Greenpeace"also"receive"funding"
for"mitigation"projects"(Virgilio"et'al.,"2009)."These"channels"transfer"climate"funding"




environmental" aid" into" two" categories:" brown" aid," which" produces" local" benefits,"
and"green"aid,"which"provides"global"benefits"(Figure"1.4)."The"study"by"Hicks"et'al."
(2008)" does" not" specifically" refer" to" climate" finance." Implicitly,"mitigation" finance,"
foreign" assistance" with" global" environmental" benefits," would" be" classified" under"
green" aid," alongside" biodiversity" aid." Therefore," according" to" Hicks" et' al." (2008),"
mitigation" finance" is" only" one" of" the" two" subXcategories" under" the" green" aid."
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Global" Environmental" Facility" (GEF)" also" has" a" mandate" from" the" UNFCCC" to"
facilitate" funding" mechanisms" for" climateXrelated" activities." GEF" classifies" its"
environmental"aid"into"seven"focal"areas:"biodiversity,"climate"change,"international"
waters,"ozoneXdepleting"substances," land"degradation,"persistent"organic"pollutants"




This" thesis" focuses" on" analysing" official" mitigation" finance," which" is" a" small" but"
increasing"element"of"overall"ODA"as"shown"in"Figure"1.3."While"other"categories"of"
climate"finance"such"as"private"climate"finance"and"finance"for"adaptation"activities"
(hereafter" ‘adaptation" finance’)" are" also" relevant" here," the" scope" of" this" thesis" is"
limited"to"official"mitigation"finance"for"reasons"of"time"and"data"availability."
Environmental aid 
Green aid Brown aid 
Biodiversity aid Mitigation finance Land degradation aid Water aid 







is" a" data" platform" for" DAC" donors" to" report" details" of" development" projects" in"
developing" countries" funded"by" foreign" aid."The"CRS" is"managed" separately" from"







Summit" at" which" the" three" Rio" Conventions" were" established." The" Rio" Marker"
system" is" a" feature" specifically" designed" and" added" to" track" the" level" of" each"
project’s" contribution" to" the" objectives" of" the" Rio" conventions" that" are" categorised"




























Under" the" Rio" Marker" coding" system" an" activity" can" independently" and"
simultaneously"contribute"to"all"the"objectives"of"the"Rio"conventions."For"example,"
Table" 1.1" shows" a" hypothetical" example" of" three" projects" that" are" all" marked" as"
contributing" to"climate"change"mitigation."Projects"A"and"C"have"mitigation"as" the"
‘principal’"(primary)"objective."Project"A"also"has"biodiversity"and"desertification"as"
‘significant’" (secondary)" objectives," but" Project" C" does" not" have" these" other"
objectives."Project"B,"by"contrast,"has"all"three"conventions"as"‘significant’"objectives,"
but"none"is"the"‘principal’"objective."Double"counting"occurs"if"one"compiles"the"total"
financial" inflows" to"more" than"one" convention," such" as" adding"up" the" amounts" of"
funding"pledged"for"climate"change"and"biodiversity,"so"then"projects"A,"B"and"C"are"
counted" twice." The" total" is" supposedly" US$600" for" commitment" and" US$350" for"
disbursement,"but"instead,"one"can"double"count"and"result"in"total"of"US$1,100"for"
commitment" and" US$650" for" disbursement." The" extra" US$500" and" US$300" for"















" Commitment" Disbursement" Mitigation" Biodiversity" Desertification"
Project"A" 300" 200" 2" 1" 1"
Project"B" 200" 100" 1" 1" 1"





OECD"did" not" explicitly" address" this" problem"until" 2013,"when" it"made" reporting"
more"explicit"by" specifying" the"amount"allocated" to"unmarked"projects" in" the"data"
interface."According" to" data" taken" from"OECD"CRS" project" level" data" set" (OECD,"
2012a),"the"total"number"of"unmarked"ODA"projects"has"fallen"from"32.3%"in"2002"to"
less" than" 1%" after" 2007" (see" Table" 1.2)." Similarly" the" absolute" amount" of" ODA"
allocated" to" projects" that" are" unmarked" or" whose" contribution" to" mitigating"





















































1998" 3920" 361" 9.2" 3296.6" 352.9"
1999" 4719" 651" 13.8" 3407.3" 543.7"
2000" 5532" 1072" 19.4" 2421.6" 391.5"
2001" 5338" 1228" 23.0" 3800.0" 443.8"
2002" 5150" 1662" 32.3" 4706.0" 673.8"
2003" 6223" 1078" 17.3" 7301.4" 387.8"
2004" 12493" 1072" 8.6" 11816.8" 402.0"
2005" 31353" 1095" 3.5" 39821.5" 940.9"
2006" 62106" 1215" 2.0" 43046.3" 716.2"
2007" 65535" 94" 0.1" 43118.1" 87.4"
2008" 65535" 121" 0.2" 47195.6" 192.9"
2009" 65535" 158" 0.2" 49600.9" 67.9"





finance" was" provided" for" mitigation" or" adaptation." In" terms" of" overall" amounts,"
mitigation" finance" is"more" dominant" than" adaptation" finance," although" since" 2010"
the" latter"has"gradually"been" increasing." In" 2010" the" share"of"mitigation" finance" in"
ODA"was"four"times"larger"than"the"share"of"adaptation"finance"(Figure"1.6)."Before"
2010,"projects"recorded"as"addressing"climate"change"had"‘climate"change"mitigation’"


















To" differentiate" mitigation" from" adaptation" finance," the" specific" criteria" for"




emissions' of' GHGs,' including' gases' regulated' by' the' Montreal' Protocol;' or' (2)' the'
protection' and/or' enhancement' of' GHG' sinks' and' reservoirs;' or' (3)' the' integration' of'
climate' change' concerns' with' the' recipient' countries’' development' objectives' through'




The"activities" funded"by"mitigation" finance" involve"many"sectors" such"as"water,"














































adaptation finance (principal only) without any mitigation element 
Mitigation finance (principal only) with adaptation (principal and significant) element  
Mitigation finance (principal only) without any adaptation element 
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• GHG' emission' reductions' or' stabilisation' in' the' energy,' transport,' industry' and'
agricultural'sectors'through'application'of'new'and'renewable'forms'of'energy,'measures'
to' improve' the' energy' efficiency' of' existing' generators,' machines' and' equipment,' or'
demand'side'management.'
• Methane' emission' reductions' through' waste' management' or' sewage' treatment.'
Development,' transfer' and' promotion' of' technologies' and' know@how' and' building' of'
capacities'that'control,'reduce'or'prevent'anthropogenic'emissions'of'GHGs,'in'particular'
in'waste'management,'transport,'energy,'agriculture'and'industry.'
• Protection'and' enhancement' of' sinks' and' reservoirs' of'GHGs' through' sustainable' forest'




administrative" management," biosphere" protection," biodiversity" and"
environmental" education" and" training," and" environmental" research." Typical"
activities" from"group" that"are" considered" from"none"of" the" sector"above"such"as"
(ibid):"
• Protection'and'enhancement'of'sinks'and'reservoirs'through'sustainable'management'and'
conservation' of' oceans' and' other' marine' and' coastal' ecosystems,' wetlands,' wilderness'
areas'and'other'ecosystems.'
• Preparation' of' national' inventories' of' greenhouse' gases' (emissions' by' sources' and'
removals'by'sinks);'climate'change'related'policy'and'economic'analysis'and'instruments,'
including' national' plans' to' mitigate' climate' change;' development' of' climate@change@
related' legislation;' climate' technology' needs' surveys' and' assessments;' institutional'
capacity'building.'










this" is" likely" to" be" limited" to" mitigation" activities" indirectly" related" to" GHG"
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emission" reduction" or" stabilisation," namely" in" projects"marked" ‘significant’" and"
not" ‘principal’." For" example," according" to" the" criteria" for" mitigation" finance,"
above," and" the" examples" given" in" the" Rio" Marker" Handbook' (ibid)," mitigation"
finance" covers" activities" such" as" education," training" and" oceanographic" and"
atmospheric" research" and" monitoring." Although" these" activities" may" not" be"
designed"specifically"for"the"purpose"of"adaptation,"they"may"contribute"to"it"or"be"
carried" out" in" combination"with" adaptation" activities." For" adaptation" finance," a"
range" of" activities" are" categorised" as" having" adaptation" as" the" “principal”"
objective." Examples" include" enhancing" information" system" to" disseminate"
weather" related" information," capacity"building"of"national"ministries," improving"
coordination" and" planning" of" national" adaptation" activities," tracking" and"
monitoring" the" stocks" of" variety" of" fish" species," coral" reefs" and" mangrove"
conservation," and" protecting" the" rights" of" indigenous" people" related" to" the"
utilisation"of"forest."
 
To" date," the"OECD"Rio"Marker" database" has" been"widely" used" by" donors" and"
recipients"to"monitor"activities"related"to"the"Rio"Conventions."However,"there"are"




coincidental."Their"study"defines"projects"contributed" to"climate"change" if" in" the"
project"descriptions," it" contains" the"keywords"namely"cogeneration,"composting,"
efficient"stoves,"efficiency"improvements"(power"plant"rehabilitation),"gas"flaring"
reduction,"industrial"gas"reduction,"landfill"gas"and"methane"recovery,"renewable"
energy" (including" biomass" power," geothermal," hydro," solar"
photovoltaics/thermal," and" wind)," solid" waste" management" in" large" cities,"
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transport" (including" rail," public" transport" and" river/inland" shipping" activities),"
waste" to" energy," and" waste" water." ForestryXrelated" keywords" such" as" forest"
protection,"afforestation"and"reforestation"were"also"included"(see"Appendix"A"in"
Michealowa" and"Michaelowa" (2011))." Projects" with" project" descriptions" that" do"
not"include"these"words"are"considered"‘misaligned’"or"‘irrelevant’"but"are"coded"
as" contributing" to" the" Rio" Marker" objectives," while" those" without" project"
descriptions"are"classified"as"‘unclear’."They"demonstrate"that"these"coding"errors"
can" be" influenced" by," inter' alia," donor" governments’" ideological" motives" and"
national" voters’" environmental" preferences," which" are" measured" by" the"
percentage"of" the"population" in"every"donor"country"considering" the"severity"of"
the"greenhouse"effect"and"alternatively"by"the"share"of"green"party’s"seats" in"the"





So" far" the" OECD" has" not" set" a" standard" format" for" project" descriptions." This"
would" improve" the" uniformity" of" reporting" across" projects" and" donors" and"
improve" the" overall" Rio" Marker" dataset." There" is" also" an" absence" of" formal"
verification"by," for" instance," independent"data"auditors,"who"could"evaluate" the"
coding" errors" and" explain" how" they" occurred." It" is" not" the" aim"of" this" thesis" to"
conduct" such"an" investigation"and" therefore" the"author"assumes" that" the"coding"
errors"are"coincidental"and"could"occur"due"to"several"reasons"such"as:"(1)"lack"of"
systematic"and"compulsory"education"about"the"implementation"of"the"system;"(2)"






The" second" concern" is" that" climate" finance" tends" to" be" underreported." This"
argument"part"of"the"findings"in"this"thesis"and"this"is"presented"and"analysed"in"
the" next" chapter." As" previously" discussed," a" small" number" of" projects" are" not"
marked."These"unmarked"projects"may"contribute"to"the"mitigation"objective,"but"
we"cannot"be"sure."To"avoid"a"false"inference"based"on"insufficient"grounds,"in"this"
thesis" these"projects" are" classified"differently" from"zero" allocation" and" excluded"
from"the"data"in"use."In"addition"some"ODAXfunded"climate"change"projects"may"
be" unreported." Donors" might" not" report" such" a" project" for" several" reasons:" its"
insignificant" size;" lack" of" capacity" to" record" and" report" the" data;" and" national"




As" a" result" of" the" existence" of" these" two" grey" areas" researchers" and" nonX
governmental" institutions"have"to"expend"considerable"effort" to" tracking"climate"
finance"projects"(Buchner"et'al.,"2011)."Many"institutions"offer"alternative"datasets,"
such" as" Aid" Data" 2.0" and" Climate" Funds" Update." However," many" of" these"
alternatives" are" still" in" their" infancy;" the" former" has" been" found" to" have"many"
instances"of"double"counting"and"the"latter"does"not"indicate"whether"the"volume"




Therefore," in" evaluating" the" allocation" of" mitigation" finance" this" thesis" mainly"
relies"on"the"OECD"Rio"Marker"system"as"the"only"formal"source"of"data"available"
on" official"mitigation" finance," even" though" it" is" very"difficult" to" remove" invalid"
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In" response" to" this"potential" for"underXreporting"mitigation" finance"data," in" this"
thesis"uncoded"data"are"treated"cautiously"and"are"not"simply"assumed"to"refer"to"
a" zero" allocation" of" mitigation" finance." To" unveil" the" unexplained" reasons" for"































































were"made" to" the" Rio"Markers." The" 1998X2009" data"were" obtained" through" the"
OECD" CRS" interface," which" classifies" projects" funded" by" ODA" into" seven"
categories" depending" on" the" purpose" of" the" ODA" provided:" (1)" only" climate"
change," (2)" only" biodiversity," (3)" desertification," (4)" biodiversity" and" climate"
change," (5)" desertification" and" climate" change," (6)" biodiversity," desertification,"
and" climate" change" and" (7)" others." In" Chapter" 2" the" term" ‘official" mitigation"
finance’" refers" to" the" first" category,"which" is"ODA"provided" for" climateXchange"
mitigation"only"but"not"biodiversity"or"desertification."Thus,"in"Chapter"2"‘official"
mitigation" finance’"corresponds" to" the"annual"amount"of" funds" transferred" from"
the" individual"22"DAC"donor" countries" (Luxembourg" is" excluded"as" it"does"not"
contribute)" solely" for" the" purpose" of" climate" change" mitigation" activities" to" all"
developing"countries,"or"regions"in"the"case"of"financial"allocations"not"designated"








finance’)." While" the" data" availability" is" slightly" higher" for" mixed" mitigation"
finance" than" for" ‘mitigation" finance’" (215" compared" to" 199" observations)," the"
analysis" in" Chapter" 2" primarily" focuses" on" the" determinants" of" the" ‘mitigation"
finance’" variable" that" correspond" to" exclusive" commitment" to" climate" change"
mitigation" which" covers" elements" of" adaptation" to" some" extent." This" approach"





countries" in" 2012," the"OECD"CRS" interface"was"under" construction" and" the"Rio"
Marker" option" was" deXactivated." Instead," the" OECD" data" administrator"
encouraged" the" use" of"OECD"CRS" projectXlevel" data" to" access" the"Rio"Markers."
The"projectXlevel" data" allow"more" flexibility" in" the"use" of" the" coding" system:" in"








objective" (projects"with"mitigation" objective"marked" ‘2’)." These" projects" are" still"








was"done" in" the" following"chapters"may"give"an" impression"of" inconsistency." In"
conducting"three"standXalone"studies,"this"research"followed"the"rapid"changes"in"
the" global"mitigation" climate" finance" system" in" response" to" the" urgent" issue" of"
climate"change."The"way"the"system"accommodates"climate"mitigation"affects"how"
the"data"are"collected"and"used."Therefore"the"differences"should"not"be"seen"as"a"
lack" of" consistency" but" as" development" and" progress" in" how" this" research"
evolved," following" the" evolution" of" climate" mitigation" data." This" evolution"
process" shows" the" considerable" implications" of" the" changes" of" the" OECD’s"
reporting"system"for" the"ways" in"which"climate" finance"data"can"be"utilised"and"
defined."
"
When" Chapter" 2" adapts" the" data" collection" approach"applied" in" Chapter" 3" the"
statistical" significance" of" certain" variables"may"be" affected"while" the" sign" of" the"
coefficient"remains"consistent."It"is"likely"that"variables"such"as"emission"variables"










of" the" evaluation" inform" how" donors’" strategic" implementation" reflects" their"
strategic"formulation,"as"stated"in"the"UNFCC"Conventions.""
"
Lack" of" transparency" acts" as" a" barrier" to" understanding" whether" actual"
implementation" has" attained" its" intended" objective," indicating" success." Thus" the"
results" and" findings" of" this" thesis" are"highly" relevant" to" a" better"understanding"of"
how"donors"allocate"mitigation"finance"to"achieve"the"objectives"of" their"mitigation"
finance"and" to" reduce"global"GHG"emissions." It" is"widely"accepted" that"mitigation"
finance" is"most" effective"when" it" is" allocated" at" the" appropriate" time" to" countries"




impact" on" global" GHG" emissions." Information" on" the" determinants" of" mitigation"
finance"allows"policyXmakers"to"evaluate"the"existing"global"allocation"of"mitigation"

























This" thesis" also" makes" a" significant" contribution" to" the" aid" and" climate" finance"
literature."A"number"of"studies"look"at"aid"allocation"more"broadly,"such"as"those"of"
Alesina" and" Dollar" (2000)" and" Hoeffler" and" Outram" (2011)," but" the" categories" of"
ODA"based"on"specific"objectives"are"still"under"research."This" thesis"examines" the"
allocation"of"ODA"for"climate"change"mitigation"and"provides"insights"into"whether"









OECD"Development"Assistance"Committee" (DAC)"and"asks" two"subXquestions:" (1)"
What"characteristics"of"donors"influence"the"amount"of"mitigation"finance"that"they"





of" developing" countries" determine" the" inflow" of"mitigation" finance?" (2)" Are" there"
any"differences" between" the"determinants" of"mitigation" finance" and"overall"ODA?"
(3)" Do" developing" countries’" environmental" commitments," shown" through" their"





pledges" on" international" climate" change" related" treaties," affect" the" amount" of"






loans?" (2)"Do" the"determinants" of"mitigation" finance" commitments"differ" from" the"
determinants" of" mitigation" finance" disbursement?" Chapter" 4" also" looks" at" the"
existing" allocation" of" financial" resources" by" multilateral" institutions" and" vertical"
funds,"and"its"implications."
"
Chapter" 5" addresses" two" questions" using" the" institutional" and" development"
framework" as" a" guidance." The" first" question" asks" what" qualities" or" aspects" of"
mitigation" finance" act" as" incentives" for" mitigating" GHG" emissions" in" developing"
countries." It" particularly" considers" whether" mitigation" finance" offers" a" perverse"
incentive."The"second"question"asks"about"the"foreseeable"arrangement"of"mitigation"













This# chapter# examines# the# links# between# donor# country# characteristics# and# official#
mitigation# finance.# FixedNeffect# and# randomNeffect# models# and# robustness# checks# are#
used# to# evaluate# the# impact# of# donor# characteristics# on# the# proportion# and# volume# of#




checks#across# two#models# show# that#donor# countries’# institutional# and#a# share#of# clean#
energy#in#energy#mix#significantly# influences#how#much#of# their#ODA#they#allocated#to#
tackling# climate# change# mitigation;# and,# unexpectedly,# wealthier# donors# with# greater#
economic# capacity# appear# to# be# slower# to# disburse# allocated# funds.# The# proportion# of#
environmental#expenditure#in#the#governmental#budget#negatively#affects#the#amount#of#








supply# of# ODA.# It# is# commonly# argued# that# donors’# motives# extend# beyond# the#
altruistic#objective#of#improving#the#economy#and#wellNbeing#of#people#in#developing#
countries# (Alesina# &# Dollar,# 2000;# Berthelemy,# 2006;# Hoeffler# &# Outram,# 2011;#
Maizels#&#Nissanke,# 1984;#McKinlay#&#Little,# 1977;#Trumbull#&#Wall,# 1994).#Lewis#
(2003)#argues# that# this#also#applies# to# the#case#of# environmental#aid.#The#economic#
and# political# interests# of# donors# are# often# much# stronger# determinants# of#
environmental# aid# than# the# environmental# needs# of# the# recipient# countries.# In# the#
past# decade# there# has# also# been# a# significant# increase# in# bilateral# ODA# aimed# at#








With# a# more# specific# focus# than# environmental# ODA,# official# mitigation# finance#
largely#aims#at#minimising#GHG#emissions.#To#date#there#is#no#literature#empirically#
investigating# the# linkages# between# donors’# economic,# political# and# institutional#
characteristics#such#as#their#GHG#emission#levels#and#provision#of#official#mitigation#
finance.#This#chapter#contributes#to#the# literature#by#empirically#examining#the#role#
of# several# characteristics# of# the# 22# DAC# donors# in# their# provision# of# mitigation#
finance#over#the#last#12#years#(1998N2009).#The#DAC#donors#included#in#this#chapter#
are# Australia,# Austria,# Belgium,# Canada,# Denmark,# Finland,# France,# Germany,#
Greece,#Ireland,#Italy,#Japan,#the#Republic#of#Korea,#the#Netherlands,#New#Zealand,#
Norway,#Portugal,#Spain,#Sweden;#Switzerland,#the#United#Kingdom#and#the#United#
States.# Luxembourg# is# not# included# due# to# the# limited# number# of# observations#
available.#
 
To#develop#an#empirical# framework# for# the# case#of#mitigation# finance,# this# chapter#
draws#on# the#wider# literature# investigating# the# links#between#donor# characteristics#
and# general# development# or# environmental# aid,# such# as# the# study# by# Chong# and#
Gradstein# (2008)#which# finds# that# countries#whose# citizens# are# satisfied#with# their#
governments’# performance# and# with# higher# levels# of# income# per# capita# tend# to#
provide#more#general# foreign# aid.#Hicks# et( al.# (2008)# investigate# environmental# aid#
provision#and#donor#characteristics#using#data#from#the#ProjectNLevel#Aid#Database#
(PLAID,# now# renamed# Aid# Data# 2.0).# They( find# that# wealthy# bilateral# donor#
countries# are# likely# to# allocate# their# aid# to# green# projects#with# global# benefits,# but#
when#they#control#for#fixed#effects#they#find#no#evidence#that#bilateral#donors’#level#
of#wealth#determines# their#allocation#of#aid#to#environmental#projects.#Their#results#
are# not# robust# to# alternative# empirical# models;# they# find# no# evidence# that#
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reflected# in# the# 1992# UNFCCC# principles# and# seeks# to# identify# what# donor#
characteristics# determine# their# provision# of# mitigation# finance.# The# findings# are#
expected#to#directly#contribute#to#international#policymaking.#These#findings#inform#
international# negotiators# in# the# UNFCCC# COP# about# which# donor# characteristics#
determine#the#actual#provision#of#mitigation#finance.#The#identified#determinants#can#
be#a#useful# reflection#of# the#extent# to#which#developed#countries#are# responding# to#
the#normative#principles#of#tackling#climate#change#stated#in#the#1992#UNFCCC.#The#
findings# also# contribute# to# the# broader# study# of# environmental# aid# and#ODA.# The#




The# analysis# in# this# chapter# follows# the# methodology# employed# by# Hicks# et( al.#
(2008b)# who# apply# panel# regressions# and# in# particular# the# fixedNeffect# model# to#
investigate# the# political,# economic# and# institutional# characteristics# of# donors# in#
shaping#the#provision#of#environmental#aid.#Their#study#is#the#closest#to#the#subject#
of# this# research,# although# its# focus# on# environmental# aid# is# broader.# A# set# of#
determinants#similar#to#those#used#in#Hicks#et(al.’s#(2008)#study#is#used#here#with#the#
inclusion# of# some# additional# regressors# (e.g.# the# proportion# of# donor# government#
budget# spent# on# national# environmental# projects# from# its# total# budget,# hereafter#
‘donor#environmental#budget’)#and#the# level#of#carbon#dioxide#(CO2)#emissions#per#







the# literature# by# considering# and# highlighting# the# possibility# of# a# selection# bias#
arising# from# donors’# underNreporting# of# their# mitigation# finance# data.# This# study#
describes# the# patterns# behind# such# underNreporting# and# identifies# the# donor#
characteristics#that#determine#underNreporting#behaviour.##
 





characteristics# and# the# provision# of# the# absolute# amount# of#mitigation# finance# and#
the# proportion# of# mitigation# finance# in# total# ODA,# using# different# estimation#







Donor# countries# vary# with# respect# to# their# provision# of# ODA# for# climateN
mitigation# related# activities.# Although# Japan# only# started# to# report# data# on# its#
commitment# to# providing# mitigation# finance# in# 2002,# it# has# made# the# largest#
contribution#to#mitigation#finance#both#in#absolute#values#and#as#a#proportion#of#total#
ODA# (see# Figure# 2.1).# It# allocated# 12.5%# of# its# total# ODA# from# 2002# to# 2009# to#
mitigation#finance#with#a#cumulative#value#close#to#US$20#billion.#Japan#is#followed#















has# been# consistently# lower# than# commitment,# although# the# former# has# increased#
over#time.#Donors#take#several#years#to#meet#the#amount#of#mitigation#finance#they#
have# committed# to# provide.# Interestingly,# the# disbursementNcommitment# gap#




























Accumulated mitigation finance in million US$ constant 2009 prices 
































#Between# 1998# and# 2009,# commitment# of# mitigation# finance# rose# from# US$1.2# to#
US$9.2#billion#(i.e.#by#7.6#times),#while#between#2002#and#2009#there#was#a#nineNfold#
































# C# D# C# D# C# D# C# D# C# D#
1998# 1249.7# # 499.8# # 213.1# # 286.3# # 250.5# #
1999# 1682.4# # 1055.7# # 214.6# # 88.4# # 323.7# #
2000# 867.9# # 346.9# # 225.0# # 28.0# # 268.0# #
2001# 2200.9# # 1490.4# # 208.2# # 52.5# # 449.7# #
2002# 2020.3# 668.5# 1121.8# 287.2# 474.1# 105.5# 24.8# 44.7# 399.6# 231.1#
2003# 3955.9# 1033.0# 2941.5# 646.1# 210.4# 150.8# 38.0# 48.6# 766.1# 187.4#
2004# 3480.6# 1474.1# 2731.8# 968.8# 155.1# 124.0# 47.6# 67.6# 546.0# 313.7#
2005# 4438.6# 1440.9# 3324.7# 1096.4# 186.0# 105.6# 58.6# 19.0# 869.3# 219.9#
2006# 4119.6# 2022.7# 2794.5# 1423.4# 264.4# 116.2# 112.3# 24.7# 948.4# 458.4#
2007# 4061.9# 2619.8# 2703.7# 1780.2# 313.0# 200.9# 48.6# 35.0# 996.6# 603.6#
2008# 7919.8# 5138.3# 6308.3# 3890.8# 258.8# 266.6# 215.4# 71.7# 1137.2# 909.2#














possible# causes# for# the# implications# of# this# underreporting# during# the# voluntarily#
period# of# the# OECD# CRS# (1998N2006).# It# does# not# evaluate# how# well# the# donors’#
reporting#matches#the#OECD’s#criteria;#Michaelowa#and#Michaelowa#(2011)#point#out#
the# mismatch# between# some# reported# activities# and# their# selfNdefined# criteria# for#
climateNrelated#aid.#Instead#this#section#and#the#entire#thesis#assume#that#all#reported#






DAC# donors# funded# projects# which# can# be# categorised# under# climate# mitigation.#
Potter# (1994)# shows# that# Japan# funded# environmentalNaid# projects# that# fitted# the#
mitigation#category#of# the#Rio#Markers#even#before#1998.#However,# the#OECD#data#
shows#that#Japan#has#only#engaged#in#funding#mitigation#activities#since#2002,#when#
it# started# to# record# its# disbursements# under# the# climate# mitigation# objective.#
Similarly,#Lewis# (2003)#points# that#USAID#provided#aid# for#pollution#prevention# in#






year,# this# piece# of# data# is# shown# as# an# ‘empty# cell’# and# is# treated#differently# from#
zero.#When#donors#report#not#providing#any#money#to#fund#mitigation#activities,#this#
is# recorded#as# ‘0’# (zero).#This#assumption# is#made#based#on# the# fact# that#before# the#





reported# it.# For# example,# Japan# has# only# nine# years# of# available# data# on# projects#
purely# addressing# emission# mitigation# and# projects# whose# objective# is# mitigation#






















































contribution# to#mitigating# global# emissions.#While# the# extent# of# this# bias# is# not#






relative# to# those# of# Japan# and# Germany.# Despite# their# small# average# annual#
contribution# in# absolute# terms,# donors#who# have# fully# reported# their#mitigation#
finance# contribution# from# 1998N2009# are# those# whose# ODA/GNI# targets# are# the#




























Only mitigation finance Biodiversity and mitigation finance 
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of# perceptions# of# what# can# and# should# be# categorised# as# climate# change#
mitigation#are# some#of# the# factors# that#may#cause#underreporting.#The# latter#
may# also# be# a# cause# of# possible# misalignment# of# reporting,# where# the# true#
objective# of# a# development# activity# does# not# fully# match# the# OECD# CRS#
criteria.#Michealowa#and#Michaelowa#(2011)#discuss#this#overNreporting#due#to#
the# high# number# of# the# mismatched# reports# according# to# Michealowa# and#
Michaelowa’s#selfNdefined#criteria.#
#
The# donors# and# OECD’s# level# of# readiness# to# report# and# facilitate# data#
collection#on#ODA#activities#based#on#the#Rio#objectives#is#a#major#issue#in#the#
early#years#of#the#OECD#CRS#data.#The#OECD’s#guidelines#are#not#sufficiently#
specific:# for# instance,# there# is# no# example#of#what#mitigation# finance# should#




The#voluntary#arrangement# for#ODA#and#voluntary# reporting#under# the#Rio#
Marker# system,# together# with# the# heterogeneity# of# donor’s# perspectives#
(Berthélemy,#2006),#may#result#in#donor’s#wide#deviations#from#the#normative#
practice# parameters# of# ODA# and# the# criteria# of# the# OECD# Rio# Markers.#




influence# their# allocation# of# funding# to# mitigating# emissions.# The# analysis#
following#the#next#section#uses#the#imperfect#underreported#data#discussed#in#
here#with# the#caveat# that# it#may#not#accurately#estimate# the#degree# to#which#
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Several# factors# representing# donor# characteristics# have# been# accounted# for#
having# possible# influence# on# the# proportion# of# mitigation# finance# in# total# ODA.#
These#factors#are#donors’#carbon#emission#levels,#income#per#capita,#good#governance,#
dominant# political# views,# domestic# spending# on# environmental# issues,# total#




A# country’s#GHG#emissions# are# central# to# the#UNFCCC#and#need# to# be# limited# in#
order# to#mitigate# climate# change.#The#provision#of# finance# to#mitigate#global#GHG#
emissions# and# a# country’s# associated# responsibilities# remain# debatable# and#
contentious# within# international# climate# change# negotiations.# The# UNFCCC#
underpins# these# negotiations# and# indicates# which# factors# determine# the#
responsibility# of# a# country# for# financing# GHG# emission# reduction# activities.# The#
preamble#to#UNFCCC#(1992)#states:#
…the( largest( share( of( historical( and( current(global( emissions( of( greenhouse(gases(has(
originated(in(developed(countries,(that(per(capita(emissions(in(developing(countries(are(
still( relatively( low( and( that( the( share( of( global( emissions( originating( in( developing(
countries(will(grow(to(meet(their(social(and(development(needs.(
(
Developed# countries# and# their# emission# levels# appear# to# be# one# of# the# causes# of#
current# climate# problems.# The# statement# above# also# acknowledges# that# there# is# a#
need# to# address# developing# countries’# increasing# GHG# emissions# caused# by#





basis( of( equity( and( in( accordance(with( their( common(but( differentiated( responsibilities( and(
respective(capabilities’((UNFCCC,#1992).#
#
The#UNFCCC# (1992)# guides# its# parties# especially# developed# countries,# to# consider#
per# capita#GHG#emissions#as#one#of# the#key#measurements#guiding# their# efforts# to#
protect# climate# systems.# Article# 3# to# some# certain# extent# provides# a# general#
framework# for# a# burdenNsharing# mechanism# that# is# weighted# based# on# countries’#
responsibilities#and#capabilities.#While#both#developed#and#developing#countries#are#
responsible# for# protecting# climate# systems,# developing# countries# often# argue# that#
they#are#not# capable#of# taking# the# lead#due# to# their# lack#of# capacity# to# finance#and#
implement#emission#mitigation#activities#(den#Elzen#&#Höhne,#2008).##
#
Developed# countries# have# taken# action# to# provide# finance# for# climate# projects# in#
developing# countries.# The# UNFCCC# provide# a# general# framework# to# guide# this#
action,#but#nevertheless#the#convention#is#not#expressed#in#a#way#that#can#regulate,#
for# example,# how#much# each# country# should#pay# for# overseas#mitigation# activities#
according# to# their# GHG# emission# levels.# To# date,# discussion# of# the# incremental# or#
additional# costs# of# reducing# GHG# emissions# in# developing# countries# to# which#




the#UNFCCC# statements# guiding# its# provision,# this# chapter# tests# the# effect# of# CO2#
emissions,# the# major# component# of# GHG# emissions,# on# mitigation# finance.# For#
consistency# with# the# UNFCCC# convention# statement,# donors’# emission# levels# are#
measured#on#a#per#capita#basis.#The#data#on#per#capita#CO2#emissions#were#produced#








is# one# of# important# factors# in# the# global# effort# of# mitigating# GHG# emissions.# The#
UNFCCC’s# Article# 3# (UNFCCC# 1992)# acknowledges# that# a# country’s# respective#
capabilities# is# an# important# variable# that# should# be# considered# in# determining# a#
country’s# responsibility# for# contributing# to# global# emission# reductions.# Per# capita#
income#indicates#a#country’s#general#economic#conditions#and#capabilities.#A#country#








per# capita# used# for# the# analysis# in# this# chapter# are# provided# by# the#World# Bank’s#
World#Development# Indicators#database# (WDI,#2011).# In# reporting#climate#projects,#
wealthy# donors# are# also# more# capable# than# less# wealthy# donors# of# paying#
administrative# costs# such# as# those# related# to# the# measurement,# reporting# and#
verification# (MRV)# of# climate# finance.# To# identify# whether# developed# countries’#









on# economic# capability# alone# to# mitigate# global# emissions;# some# other# factors# are#
relevant# to# support# its# implementation.# The# preamble# of# the# UNFCCC# (1992)#
paragraph#6#acknowledges#that#
…the( global( nature( of( climate( change( calls( for( the(widest( possible( cooperation( by( all(
countries( and( their( participation( in( an( effective( and( appropriate( international(
response…#
#
To# achieve# an# ‘effective# and# appropriate# international# response’,# donors’# other#





capacity# for#measurement# and# reporting# at# home#may#motivate#donors# to#provide#
mitigation# finance# and# to# transfer# knowledge# and# assistance# to# implement# this# in#
overseas# countries.# For# example,# the# UK# has# a# domestic# climate# mitigation#
programme#for#measuring#and#estimating#future#emissions.#The#country#has#created#




and# functioning# regulatory# framework# and# enforcing# law,# are# capable# of# assisting#
developing# countries# to#develop# and# implement# sound#policies.#Mitigation# finance#
can#be#used#to#pay#for#providing#technical#assistance#and#relevant#experts#to#transfer#
knowledge# in# building# good# administration# practices# (Meehl# et( al.,# 2007# p.# 1393).#
Donor# countries# with# effective# administration# also# have# the# ability# to# fulfil# the#
administrative# requirements# for# funding# climate# mitigation# projects,# such# as#






more#mitigation# finance,# this#chapter# tests# the#relationship#between#donors’# supply#
of# mitigation# finance# and# the# average# of# six# of# Kaufmann’s# institutional# indices#
(Kaufmann#et(al.,#2011).#These# indices#are#regulatory#quality,#rule#of# law,#voice#and#
accountability,# corruption# control,# political# stability,# and# government# effectiveness.#
All#six#indices#capture#all#the#broader#dimensions#of#the#quality#of#governance.#Each#
index#ranges#from#N2.5#to#2.5,#with#higher#values#corresponding#to#higher#quality.#All#
of# these# institutional# variables# are# strongly# correlated# with# one# another# (see#
Appendix# 2.3).# To# avoid# multicollinearity,# the# variables# are# not# inserted# into# the#
same# specification# simultaneously# and# their# impact# on#mitigation# finance# is# tested#
separately.( Testing# all# six# of# Kaufmann’s# indices# separately# is# a# significant#
contribution#of# this#chapter.#Some#might#argue#that# they#vary# less#across# time,# in#a#
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Donor# governments’# main# political# views# tend# to# influence# their# strategic# and#
political#decisions,#such#as#decisions#about#the#relative#importance#of#environmental#
issues# like#climate#mitigation# in# their#national#and# international#agenda.#Neumayer#
(2004)# finds# that# leftNwing# parties# and# individuals# are#more# proNenvironment# than#





Hicks# et( al.’s# (2008)# study# unexpectedly# finds# that# leftist# party# strength# in# donor#
governments#has#little#relevance#in#decisions#about#the#allocation#of#green#aid.#They#
argue#that#this#unexpected#outcome#is#possibly#due#to#legislatures#being#pressurised#
by# local# and# national# environmentalists# to# spend# money# at# home.# This# chapter#
includes# more# recent# data# than# that# used# by# Hicks# et( al.# (ibid)# and# tests# for# the#
positive#influence#of#the#strength#of# leftist#governments#on#the#donor#government’s#
provision# of# mitigation# finance# to# developing# countries.# The# data# on# the# political#
orientation#of#the#government#are#obtained#from#the#Database#of#Political#Institutions#
(DPI)# (Keefer,# 2010),#which#uses# a# coding# system# to# classify#party# orientation#with#
respect# to# economic# policy:# (1)# denotes# governments# defined# as# conservative,#
Christian#democratic#or# rightNwing;# (2)#denotes#centrist#governments#and# (3),# those#
that# are# communist,# socialist,# social# democratic# or# otherwise# leftNwing.# Leftist#
governments#might#also#allocate#an#environmental#budget#to#tracking#environmental#
activities.#The#supply#of#mitigation#finance#is#expected#to#increase#with#the#stronger#
leftist#government# that# is# shown#by#a#positive# relationship#between# the#DPI# coded#
data#and#mitigation#finance#provisions.#






of# funding# for# overseas# environmental# projects.# Hicks# et( al.# (2008)# argue# that#
developed#countries#with#strong#leftist#governments#can#be#pressured#by#labour#and#
environmentalists# to# spend# their#environmental#budget#at#home.#To#control# for# the#
funding#division#between#home#and#overseas#mitigation#spending,#the#proportion#of#
environmental# spending# at# home# out# of# total# government# national# spending# is#








of# tax#as# foreign#aid#and#as#mitigation# finance,# the#amount#of#ODA#and#mitigation#
finance# provided# by# donors# is# supposedly# reflecting# the# volume# of# the# financial#
contributions#of#their#population#and#taxpayers.#The#size#of#the#population#is#tested#
and# included# in# the# main# econometric# model# as# a# control# variable.# Data# on#
population#are#taken#from#World#Development#Indicators#(WDI)#(WDI,#2011).#
Hypothesis( #6:( The( larger( the( population( of( a( DAC( country,( the( higher( the( proportion( of(
mitigation(finance(in(its(total(ODA.(
#
Democratic# governments# are# found# to# exhibit# stronger# commitment# to# the#
environment# than# nonNdemocratic# governments# (Neumayer,# 2002).# Level# of#
democracy#is#likely#to#be#a#determining#factor#in#the#provision#of#mitigation#finance#
as#part#of#total#ODA#and#is#tested#in#the#robustness#checks.#Democracy#is#measured#







This# study# includes# several# additional# variables# to# conducted# robustness# checks,#
namely#CO2# intensity#per#unit#of#GDP#(hereafter# ‘CO2# intensity’),# the#proportion#of#
alternative# energy# use# from# total# energy#mix,# and# the# ratification# status# of# Kyoto#
Protocol.#CO2#intensity#is#not#included#in#the#main#specification#because#it#is#not#one#
of#six#official#emission#measurements#(CO2,#N2O,#SF6,#CH4,#PCFs,#HFCs)#listed#under#










The# countries#with# better# implementation# of# green# energy# policy#will# have# higher#
incentive#to#motivate#other#developing#countries#for#following#their#actions.#Donors#
might# see# their# increasing# investments# in# alternative# energy# at# their# home# country#
will# not# be# effectual# globally# if# the# emissions# of# other# developing# countries# keep#
increasing#without#any#preventive#action.#Overseas#mitigation#finance#can#be#used#as#










to# provide# a# higher# proportion# of# mitigation# finance# in# total# ODA,# a# 0N1# dummy#
variable#(kyotoprot)#for#the#year#after#the#respective#donor’s#ratification#of#the#Kyoto#
Protocol# is# included# to# capture# this# dimension.# Data# are# taken# from# the#
Environmental#Treaties# and#Resource# Indicators# (CIESINNSEDAC,# 2011).#Due# to# its#
invariant#characteristic,#this#variable#is#only#included#in#the#estimation#using#random#
effect#model.(






characteristics# influence# mitigation# finance# provision.# Multivariate# regression#
analysis# is# relevant# for# identifying# whether# there# is# a# relationship# between# donor#
characteristics# and# their# provision# of# mitigation# finance.# Although# the# UNFCCC’s#
(1992)# framework# and#principles# set# out# how#developed# and#developing# countries#
should#respond#to#negative#effects#of#climate#change,#most#of#its#terms#that#determine#
a#country’s#responsibility#for#paying#for#global#emission#reduction,#such#as#‘common#
but# differentiated# responsibilities’# are# not# operationalised# or# measured.# To# date,#
developed# and# developing# countries# have# not# yet# agreed# upon# common#
measurements# for# weighing# a# country’s# responsibility# to# pay# for# its# national# and#
global#GHG#emission#reduction.#
 






characteristics# on# the# proportion# of# mitigation# finance# in# their# total# provision# of#




The# fixedNeffect# model# (FEM)# estimates# the# relationships# between# variables#
representing# donor# characteristics# and# the# provision# of# mitigation# finance# in# total#
ODA#commitment#and#disbursement,#!!"! .#These#donor#characteristics#are#the#level#of#
CO2#emissions#per#capita,#!!",#the#level#of#wealth,#measured#by#income#per#capita,#!!",#
governance,#!!" ,# the# composition# of# left# or# right# representative# in# the# national#
parliament,#!!" ,# the# proportion# of# environmental# expenditure# in# the# government#
budget,#!!",# and# a# vector# list# of# other# explanatory# variables,#!!"#as# seen# in# Eq.# (1)#
below.##
 !!"! =∝!+∝! !!" + ∝! !!" +∝! !!" +∝! !!" +∝! !!" +∝! !!" + !! + !!"# # (1) 
#
The#superscript#j(of#the#dependent#variable#!!"! #on#the#leftNhand#side#denotes#different#
measures# of# mitigation# finance;# namely# the# proportion# of# mitigation# finance# in# a#
country’s#total#aid#commitment,# the#proportion#of#mitigation#finance#in#its#total#aid#
disbursement,# the# logarithm# of#mitigation# finance# commitment# and# disbursement,#ln!!#ln!!,#the#disbursementNcommitment#ratio#!!!!,#the#logarithm#of#mixed#mitigation#
finance# commitment#ln!!"#,# and# the# proportion# of# mixed# mitigation# finance# in# a#
country’s# total# aid# commitment.# The# period# of# analysis# for# the# commitment#




unobserved# and# timeNinvariant# variables.# For# example,# these# variables# can# be# a#
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country’s# geographic# location# or# the# existence# of# climate# change# sceptics# in# a#
country’s#population.#These#country#characteristics#tend#to#be#fixed#and#unchanging#
over# time.# The# inclusion# of# timeNinvariant# variable# in# the# main# specification# is#
unnecessary,# since# STATA# will# automatically# drop# it# when# the# estimation# is#
performed.#For#robust#and#unbiased#results#the#FEM’s#idiosyncratic#error,#!!",#should#
not# correlate#with# each# of# the# regressors,# but# FEM# allows# for# arbitrary# correlation#





dependent# variables# tend# to# vary# over# time.# Unlike# FEM,# which# controls# for#
unobserved# fixed# effects,#!! ,# REM# controls# for# unobserved# random# and# variant#
variables,#denoted#by#!!#(Baltagi,#2003,#pp.#12N16).#The#Hausman#test#is#often#used#to#
compare#FEM#and#REM#and#to#make#a#value#judgment#on#which#of#the#two#is#an#apt#




null# hypothesis# suggests# that# FEM# is# the# appropriate# estimator,# as#REM#makes# an#
assumption# that# unobserved# random# effects# are# orthogonal# to# the# explanatory#
variables,#and#the#violation#of#this#assumption#leads#to#biased#estimation#results.#
 








period.#For#example,#FEM#allows# for#unobserved# fixed#effects# such#as# the# fact# that#
the# existence# of# climate# change# skeptics# in# the# country# influences# government#
decisions# about# the# allocation# of# mitigation# finance.# The# Hausman# test# does# not#
allow# for# testing# the# specification# using# robust# option,# therefore# the# results# of# the#
FEM#and#REM#are#presented#in#a#comparable#format#to#facilitate#analysis#of#the#sign#




to# the# collinearity# test.# The# correlation# between# total# ODA# and#GDP# per# capita# is#








Earlier# empirical# analyses# have# adopted# a# similar# empirical# framework# for#
other# types# of# aid.# Chong# and# Gradstein# (2008)# employ# donor# fixedNeffects# panel#
regressions# and# crossNcountry# regression# analysis# to# identify# the# impact# of# donor#
characteristics#on# the# total#amount#of#aid#given.#Hicks#et(al.# (2008)#use#both#pooled#
ordinary#least#squares#(OLS)#and#fixedNeffects#panel#regressions#to#estimate#the#effect#
of# donors’# political# and# economic# characteristics# on# the# amount# of# environmental#
and# nonNenvironmental# aid# given.# This# chapter# compares# the# results# of# FEM# and#
REM#to#identify#what#determines#the#proportion#of#mitigation#finance#in#total#ODA.#
This#is#a#major#improvement#on#the#study#by#Hicks#et(al.#(2008),#which#only#applies#
pooled# OLS# and# FEM# and# tests# the# absolute# amount# as# the# dependent# variable.#
Additionally,# later# in# the#chapter#some#alternative#estimations#are#performed#using#
different#dependent#variables,#namely# the#amount#of#mitigation# finance# committed#
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and# disbursed,# the# disbursementNtoNcommitment# ratio# and# the# volume# of# total#
mitigation# finance# that# includes# biodiversity# and# desertification# coNbenefits.# These#
alternatives# offer# a# range# of# information# on# how# each# component# of# a# donor’s#
characteristics# that# is# statistically# significant# determines# its# provision# of#mitigation#
finance.#
 
Table# 2.2# presents# the# estimation# results# of# the# explanatory# variables# that# may#
influence# the# proportion# of# mitigation# finance# in# total# ODA# provision.# Column# 1#
(hereafter# ‘c1’)#has#a#number#of#explanatory#variables.# lnco2pc#and# lngdppc#measure#
the# logarithm# of# CO2# emissions# per# capita# and# GDP# per# capita# respectively.# CO2#
emissions# representing# donors’# emission# level# (lnco2pc)# which# is# an# important#
measurement# of# controlling# and# limiting# climate# change# stated# in# the#UNFCCC,# is#
statistically# significant.# When# the# variables# democracy# (democracy),# CO2# intensity#
(co2inten),# alternative#energy# (altenergy)#and#Kyoto#Protocol# (kyotoprot)#are# included#
in# the# robustness# checks# (c2)# the# coefficient#of# lnco2pc# becomes# insignificant.#These#




When# lnco2pc( is# insignificant# in# the# robustness# checks,# emissions# per# capita#
representing#the#‘differentiated#responsibility’#of#individual#emissions#or#perNcapitaN
emissions#do#not#have#a#consistent#influence#on#the#allocation#of#mitigation#finance#in#
total# aid# provision.# Instead,# economic# output# is# a# more# relevant# indicator# of#
differentiated# responsibility.#CO2# intensity#per#unit# of#GDP# significantly# influences#
the#provision#of#mitigation# finance# at# the# 1%# level;# the#higher# the#CO2# intensity#of#
donor# countries,# the# higher# the# proportion# of# mitigation# finance# in# their# aid#
provision,#ceteris(paribus.#Mitigation#finance#provision#also#positively#correlates#with#

















(1)# (2)# (3)# (4)#
lnco2pc# 0.019**# 0.001# 0.019***# 0.001###
# (2.947)# (0.077)# (2.819)# (0.074)###
lngdppc# N0.004# N0.002# N0.004# N0.002###
# (N0.315)# (N0.094)# (N0.301)# (N0.090)###
govern# 0.031***# 0.055***# 0.031***# 0.055***#
# (4.755)# (7.138)# (4.549)# (6.819)###
leftgov# N0.003**# N0.004**# N0.003**# N0.004***#
# (N2.373)# (N2.891)# (N2.270)# (N2.762)###
environexpen# N0.024**# N0.028**# N0.024**# N0.028**##
# (N2.405)# (N2.445)# (N2.301)# (N2.336)###
lnpop# 0.009***# 0.009**# 0.009***# 0.009***#
# (3.322)# (2.867)# (3.178)# (2.739)###
democracy# # 0.000# # 0.000###
# # (0.019)# # (0.018)###
co2inten# # 0.040***# # 0.040***#
# # (5.228)# # (4.994)###
altenergy# # 0.001**# # 0.001***#
# # (3.071)# # (2.934)###
kyotoprot# # # 0.066***# 0.068***#
# # # (12.924)# (10.435)###
RNSquared#(overall)# 0.112# 0.156# 0.441# 0.520###
RNSquared#(between)# 0.436# 0.350# 1.000# 1.000###
RNSquared#(within)# 0.256# 0.361# 0.256# 0.361###
N# 113# 113# 113# 113###





mitigation# finance,#although# this# relationship# is#not# statistically# significant# in#Table#
2.2#(c1).#This#indicates#that#level#of#wealth#does#not#motivate#some#donors#to#allocate#









(2008)# point# that# there# is# a# positive# relationship# in# the# case# of# green# aid# that# is#
significant# at# 5%.# However,# their# estimation# is# based# on# pooled# OLS# and# is# not#
controlled#for#fixed#effects.##
#
A# measure# of# good# governance# that# captures# a# donor# government’s# institutional#





the# donors’# level# of# governance,# indicating# their# institutional# capability,( strongly#
influences# the# allocation# of# mitigation# finance# as# a# proportion# of# total# ODA#
provision.# There# is# a# positive# trend# of# donors# that# perform# better# in# managing#
different# aspects# of# governance# at# home# paying# more# attention# to# solving# global#
climate#problems.#
 
An# index# capturing# the#political# orientation# of# the#donor# government,#with#higher#
values#corresponding#to#more#leftNwing#government#orientation#(leftgov)# is#negative#
and#significant#at#5%.#This#is#significant#and#robust#across#the#robustness#checks#and#








environmental# spending# in# total# expenditure# and# the# proportion# of# mitigation#
finance# allocated# in# total# ODA.# This# new# variable# controls# for# environmental#
spending# between# a# donor’s# homelands# and# overseas,# using# the# proportion# of#
environmental# expenditure# in# the# government# budget.# OneNunit# decrease# in#
environexpen# tends# to# cause# a# 1%# drop# in# the# proportion# of# donor# environmental#
expenditure,# corresponds# approximately# to# a# 2.4%# rise# in#mitigation# finance.# This#
result# indicates# that# a# donor’s# domestic# environmental# spending# may# involve# a#
tradeNoff.# Competition# between# domestic# and# overseas# green# projects# for# financial#
resources# and# increasing# pressure# from# domestic# environmental# NGOs#may# deter#
leftish#governments#from#spending#money#on#overseas#green#projects#that#will#have#
little#and#indirect#effect#on#their#electorates.#Mitigation#finance#can#also#be#seen#as#a#
policy# instrument# that# supports# the# internationalisation# of# the# domestic#





Population# (lnpop)# is# included#as#a# control#variable.#Table#2.2# shows# that# there# is# a#
statistically# significant# positive# correlation# between# donor# population# (lnpop)# and#
mitigation#finance#commitment,#as#expected#(i.e.#the#more#taxNpayers#and#consumers#










Table# 2.3# shows# the# relationships# between# the#GHGs# listed# by# the#UNFCCC#other#
than#carbon#dioxide#(lnco2pc),#namely#methane#(lnch4pc),(perfluorocarbons((lnpfcspc),#
hydrofluorocarbons# (lnhfcspc)# sulphur# hexafluoride# (lnsf6pc)# and# nitrous# oxide#
(lnn2opc).#They#are#all# in# logarithmic#form#and#measured#on#a#per#capita#basis.#The#
carbon#dioxide# is# included# in# the# estimation# since# it# is# the#main# component# of# the#
GHG.#The#results#show#that#the#highest#global#warming#potential#emissions,#namely#
hydrofluorocarbons,# perfluorocarbons( and( sulphur# hexafluoride,# appear# to# be#
negative# determinants# of# donors’# supply# of# mitigation# finance.# The# coefficients# of#













lnco2pc# # 0.017*# 0.020**# 0.013*# 0.017*# 0.016*##
# # (2.175)# (2.694)# (1.970)# (2.179)# (2.031)###
lnghgpc# 0.009***# # # # # #######
# (3.550)# # # # # #######
lnch4pc# # 0.008# # # # #######
# # (1.169)# # # # #######
lnhfcspc# # # N0.010*# # # #######
# # # (N2.064)# # # #######
lnpfcspc# # # # N0.005***# # #######
# # # # (N5.322)# # #######
lnsf6pc# # # # # N0.006***# #######
# # # # # (N3.589)# #######
lnn2opc# # # # # # 0.010###
# # # # # # (1.143)###
##RNsquared#(overall)# 0.120# 0.104# 0.085# 0.277# 0.174# 0.095###
##RNsquared#(between)# 0.376# 0.444# 0.536# 0.330# 0.111# 0.464###
##RNsquared#(within)# 0.252# 0.258# 0.269# 0.332# 0.280# 0.259###
##N# 107# 107# 107# 106# 107# 107#
Notes:#lngdppc,(govern,(leftgov,(environexpen(and(lnpop(are#included#but#not#presented.#The#results#are#robust#across#







To# some# extent# this# may# reflect# donor# countries’# domestic# and# international#
strategies# for#mitigating# global# emissions.#Countries# that#make# serious# attempts# to#
mitigate#their#most#dangerous#emissions#into#the#global#atmosphere#at#home#tend#to#
provide# more# official# international# finance# to# reduce# emissions# abroad,# although,#
interestingly,#they#have#a#high#concentration#of#carbon#dioxide#per#capita.#
Donors#may#start#by#mitigating#the#most#dangerous#GHG#emissions#at#home,#which#
is# relatively# easy# to#deal#with#politically.#While#mitigating#CO2# at#home# country# is#
complex#and# involves#all# industries,#as# it# is# the#mostly#widelyNproduced#GHG#and#
the# result# of# various# types# of# human# and# industrial# activities,# emissions# of#
hydrofluorocarbons# (lnhfcspc),# perfluorocarbons# (lnpfcspc)(and(sulphur#hexafluoride#
(lnsf6pc)# are# relatively# small# compared# to# those# of# CO2# and# are# specific# to# certain#
industries.# The# specific# nature# of# these# gases# allows# donor# governments# to# make#
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The# current# climate# change# negotiations# under# the# UNFCCC# can# able# to# draw#
lessons# from# the# past# success# at# abolishing# PFCs# and# HFCs.# The# two# gases# were#
finally#phased#out#a#few#years#after#the#1985#Vienna#Convention#and#its#consequent#
followNups:#the#1990#London#and#the#1992#Copenhagen#Amendments#to#the#Montreal#




2.2# is# replicated# to# test# six# subNindicators# of# Kaufmann’s# World# Governance#
indicators#(govern).#All# the#indices#have#positive#correlations#with#the#proportion#of#
mitigation# finance# in#overall#aid#provision.#Among#all# the#governance# indices,# four#
determine#mitigation# finance# provision:# regulatory# quality,# rule# of# law,# voice# and#
accountability,# and# control# for# corruption.# Table# 2.4# shows# that# the# variables#
representing#these#aspects#–#regulquality# (c11),#ruleoflaw# (c12),#voiceaccount# (c13),#and#
contcorrupt# (c14)# –# are# all# positive# and# significant# at# 1%.# The# other# two# indices,#
political# stability# and# government# effectiveness,# are# insignificant# determinants# of#































(11)# (12)# (13)# (14)# (15)# (16)###
lnco2pc# 0.013**# 0.023***# 0.020**# 0.020**# 0.021***# 0.021***#
# (2.472)# (3.367)# (3.149)# (3.050)# (3.427)# (3.391)###
lngdppc# 0.014# N0.014# N0.007# N0.008# 0.014# 0.011###
# (1.424)# (N1.115)# (N0.548)# (N0.649)# (0.965)# (0.836)###
leftgov# N0.004**# N0.003**# N0.003*# N0.004**# N0.003*# N0.003###
# (N2.534)# (N2.618)# (N2.076)# (N3.013)# (N1.868)# (N1.698)###
environexpen# N0.026**# N0.024**# N0.022*# N0.026**# N0.015# N0.017###
# (N2.477)# (N2.662)# (N2.120)# (N2.621)# (N1.634)# (N1.654)###
lnpop# 0.007**# 0.009***# 0.011***# 0.009**# 0.011**# 0.008**##
# (2.781)# (3.411)# (3.807)# (3.143)# (3.078)# (2.880)###
regulquality# 0.024***# # # # # #######
# (4.190)# # # # # #######
ruleoflaw# # 0.031***# # # # #######
# # (6.226)# # # # #######
voiceaccount# # # 0.062***# # # #######
# # # (5.055)# # # #######
contcorrupt# # # # 0.020***# # #######
# # # # (7.306)# # #######
polstability# # # # # 0.020# #######
# # # # # (1.439)# #######
goveffective# # # # # # 0.010###
# # # # # # (1.479)###
##RNsquared#(overall)# 0.145# 0.150# 0.131# 0.126# 0.099# 0.105###
##RNsquared#(between)# 0.207# 0.286# 0.153# 0.364# 0.738# 0.470###
##RNsquared#(within)# 0.225# 0.286# 0.280# 0.277# 0.213# 0.193###
##N# 113# 113# 113# 113# 113# 113##
Note:#The#results#above#are#robust#across#estimation#models.#The#estimation#with#REM#(available#upon#request)#




It# is# possible# that# donor# countries# with# better# regulatory# quality# have# a# good#
environmental# regulatory#system#and#a# functioning# legal# system#which#promote#
the# implementation# of# green# policies# at# home# as# well# as# in# other# countries.#
Countries#with#a#good#accountability#system#that#also#perform#well#in#facilitating#
public#debate#may#have#greater#public#awareness#of#global#environmental#issues.#








In# Table# 2.5# the# focus# switches# from# mitigation# finance# commitment# to# its#
disbursement.# Data# on#mitigation# finance# disbursement# are# available# only# from#
2002# onwards,# hence# there# are# has# a# fewer# observations# than# those# on#
commitment,#which#may# affect# the# ability# of# its# outcomes# to# result# in# unbiased#
estimations.#
Although# the# results# for# disbursement# may# not# be# as# robust# as# those# of#
commitment,# the#significant#difference#between# the# two#signals# the#gap#between#
donors’# rhetoric#and#actions.#This#gap# is#apparently#consistent#across# robustness#
checks#and#across#estimators.#When#the#FEM#is#applied,#regression#of#mitigation#
finance# disbursement# in# Table# 2.5,# c20# shows# that# only# the# income# per# capita#
variable#is#significant.#Donors’#financial#capacity#becomes#the#only#determinant#of#
mitigation# finance# provision# in# total# ODA,# and# the# correlation# is# positive.# The#
other#variables#become#insignificant.#When#it#comes#to#actual#payment,#domestic#
income# per# capita# becomes# more# relevant# than# other# variables# which# were#
significant# in# the# earlier# commitment# stages.# These# variables,# namely# emissions#



























lnco2pc# N0.004# N0.003# N0.004# N0.003###
# (N0.490)# (N0.208)# (N0.470)# (N0.199)###
lngdppc# 0.024*# 0.018# 0.024**# 0.018###
# (2.133)# (1.663)# (2.046)# (1.592)###
govern# N0.005# 0.001# N0.005# 0.001###
# (N0.588)# (0.130)# (N0.563)# (0.124)###
leftgov# 0.002# 0.001# 0.002# 0.001###
# (0.933)# (0.451)# (0.895)# (0.432)###
environexpen# N0.004# N0.003# N0.004# N0.003###
# (N0.454)# (N0.278)# (N0.436)# (N0.266)###
lnpop# 0.001# 0.001# 0.001# 0.001###
# (0.194)# (0.195)# (0.186)# (0.187)###
democracy# # 0.003# # 0.003###
# # (0.605)# # (0.579)###
co2inten# # 0.014# # 0.014*##
# # (1.832)# # (1.754)###
altenergy# # 0.001*# # 0.001*##
# # (1.936)# # (1.854)###
kyotoprot# # # 0.043***# 0.045***#
# # # (13.918)# (15.620)###
##RNsquared#(overall)# 0.112# 0.070# 0.362# 0.381###
##RNsquared#(between)# 0.795# 0.448# 1.000# 1.000###
##RNsquared#(within)# 0.043# 0.072# 0.043# 0.072###





as# in# c2# (Table# 2.2).# The# income# per# capita# variable# is# insignificant# and# the#
alternative# energy# variable# appears# to# be# significant.# This# indicates# that# the#
proportion# of# alternative# energy# in# the# energy# mix# at# home# (altenergy)# still#
influences#the#donor’s#actual#allocation#of#mitigation#finance#in#its#ODA#provision.#
The# coefficient# of# the# alternative# energy# variable# becomes# a# significant#
determinant#of#mitigation#finance#disbursement#at#10%#(c21).#The#confidence#level#




With# REM# the# results# are# consistent.# Only# income# per# capita# is# significant# and#
positive,# but# it# is# insignificant# in# another# robustness# check# of#mitigation# finance#
that# adds# the# Kyoto# protocol# (kyotoprot)# as# a# dummy# control# variable.# The#
coefficients# of# CO2# intensity# (co2inten)# and# alternative# energy# (altenergy)# are#
significant# determinants# of# mitigation# finance# disbursement# as# well# as# of# the#
Kyoto# Protocol# variable# (c23)# ceteris( paribus.#Donor# countries#which# have# higher#
alternative# energy# provisions# in# their# energy#mix,# but# are# less# efficient# at# their#
energy# use# tend# to# allocate# higher# mitigation# finance# in# their# total# aid#
disbursement.#
#




namely:# the# determinants# of# the# volume,# the# disbursementNcommitment# ratio,# and#
the# proportion# of#mitigation# finance# that# includes# funding# addressing# biodiversity#
and#desertification.#When# the#volume#of#mitigation# finance#replaces# the#proportion#
of# mitigation# finance# in# total# ODA# as# the# dependent# variable# and# total# ODA# is#
controlled# for,# all# the# variables# become# insignificant# except# for# total# ODA# itself,#
which# is# statistically# significant# at# 5%# (Table# 2.6,# c24).# The# increasing# amount# of#
mitigation# finance# is# mainly# determined# by# increasing# total# ODA# and# there# is# no#
evidence#that#it#is#driven#by#domestic#environmental#and#social#factors.#The#growing#
allocation# of# financial# resources# to# ODA# also# makes# more# funding# available# for#
mitigation# finance.#This# appears# to#be# consistent# in# the#disbursement#of#mitigation#
finance:# the# increase# in# total# aid# determines# the# increasing# actual# disbursement# of#
mitigation#finance#(c25).#However,# in#disbursement,#GDP#per#capita# is#positive#and#
statistically# significant# at# 1%.#Richer#donors’# actual# provision# of#mitigation# finance#
Chapter(2!!
! 61#




     




















lnco2pc# 0.248# N0.719# 17.388# 2.342***#
# (0.316)# (N0.938)# (0.720)# (7.728)#
lngdppc# 1.658# 2.898*# N59.468*# N0.832#
# (0.880)# (2.155)# (N1.902)# (N0.894)#
govern# 1.474# 0.657# 16.917# 0.601#
# (1.598)# (0.851)# (1.149)# (1.007)#
leftgov# N0.197# N0.046# 2.701# N0.236#
# (N1.581)# (N0.287)# (1.810)# (N1.744)#
environexpen# N0.411# N0.121# 0.785# N0.381#
# (N1.049)# (N0.184)# (0.113)# (N1.463)#
lnodadisburse*# 1.103**# 0.763**# 0.316# 1.331***#
# (2.317)# (2.646)# (0.064)# (9.474)#
lnpop# 0.210# 0.121# N3.231# N0.307#
# (0.396)# (0.316)# (N0.634)# (N1.549)#
#RNsquared#(overall)# 0.445# 0.438# 0.122# 0.441#
#RNsquared#(between)# 0.195# 0.832# 0.145# 0.012#
#RNsquared#(within)# 0.487# 0.459# 0.131# 0.524#





The# disbursement# of# mitigation# finance# has# historically# lagged# behind# its#
commitment#(with#a#disbursementNcommitment#ratio#!!!!#,#for#all#donors#in#the#range#
of#0.22–0.66).#The#lowest#ratio#indicates#the#poorest#donors’#performance#in#meeting#
their# commitments.# Specification# c26# explores#whether# the#magnitude# of# this# ratio#
depends#on#donor#characteristics.#The#statistical#results#are#again#weak,#with#lngdppc#











mitigation# finance# with# biodiversity# and# desertification# coNbenefits.# Here,# the#
identification#of# the# relationship#between# income#per# capita#and#mitigation# finance#
supply# from# this# chapter# is# useful# for# reflecting#whether# the# richer# countries#with#
higher#economic#capabilities#provide#a#high#volume#of#mitigation#finance#following#
the#normative#guidance#in#the#1992#UNFCCC#that#mitigating#emissions#is#based#on#
‘differentiated( responsibilities( and( respective( capabilities’.( One# may# associate# the#
respective#capabilities#with#economic#capacities#and#if#this#is#so#it#is#conceivable#that#




While# donors’# commitment# to# fund# climate# change# activities# has# increased#
considerably# over# the# last# decade,# some# donor# countries# have# responded# more#
generously#than#others#in#supplying#mitigation#finance.#To#the#author’s#knowledge,#
this# is# the# first# empirical# paper# attempting# to# explicitly# probe# the# relationship#
between#the#provision#of#official#mitigation#finance#and#donors’#characteristics.#The#
data# also# show# that# in# the# early# years# of# the# CRS# records# some# donor# countries#
underNreported#their#supply#of#mitigation#finance,#but# those#who#fully#report# it#are#
not#necessarily#the#major#donors#of#climate#mitigation#finance#in#term#of#its#volume.#
There# is#a# tendency# that#donors#with#better#governance# tend# to#report# to#CRS,#and#
most# of# these# have# achieved# and# surpassed# the# 0.7%# ODA/GNI# target.# Good#
governance# and# donors’# performance# in# alternative# energy# influence# how# much#




early# evidence# that# increasing# CO2# emissions# per# capita# motivates# the# donor# to#
allocate#more#mitigation#finance.#Domestic#emissions#may#not#be#a#main#determinant#





Various# extensions# of# this# analysis# could# be# developed,# and# some# of# these# are#
discussed#in#the#following#chapters.#A#possible#extension#of#the#analysis#as#a#new#line#
of#study#is#a#comparative#study#between#mitigation#finance#and#adaptation#finance.#
The#analysis#of#adaptation# finance#may#shed# light#on#any#determinants#affecting# it#





probes#mitigation# finance# from# the# recipients’# side.# Panel# data# analysis# highlights#
which# country# characteristics# ensure# that# some# recipients# are#more# successful# than#






























































































































































































# # # # # #
sharemfodacommit# 199# 0.022# 0.035# 0.000# 0.267#
sharemfodadisburse# 142# 0.016# 0.025# 0.000# 0.143#
sharetotcfodacommit# 215# 0.037# 0.047# 0.000# 0.292#
lnmfcommit# 199# 2.585# 2.594# N5.409# 8.290#
lnmfdisburse# 142# 2.429# 2.234# N3.285# 7.655#
lnodacommit# 264# 7.472# 1.315# 4.667# 10.371#
lnodadisburse# 176# 7.535# 1.301# 5.013# 10.272#
mfdcratio# 137# 4.667# 19.993# 0.023# 190.649#
lntotalmf# 215# 3.328# 2.218# N4.280# 8.376#
lnghgpc# 241# N4.526# 0.4825# N5.961# N3.260#
lnco2pc# 264# 2.229# 0.336# 1.548# 3.008#
lnch4pc# 241# N6.766# 0.834# N8.717# N4.926#
lnhfcspc# 241# N9.040# 0.545# N11.041# N7.428#
lnpfcspc# 240# N11.271# 2.169# N19.684# N8.001#
lnsf6pc# 241# N11.095# 1.187# N14.398# N8.234#
lnn2opc# 241# N7.013# 0.572# N8.639# N5.912#
co2inten# 264# 2.238# 0.548# 0.960# 3.427#
# # # # # #
altenergy# 264# 16.815# 14.247# 0.554# 50.734#
lngdppc# 264# 10.393# 0.205# 9.743# 10.933#
enviroexpen# 172# 0.512# 0.330# N0.458# 1.617#
kyotoprot# 264# 0.417# 0.494# 0.000# 1.000#
leftgov# 251# 1.956# 0.935# 1.000# 3.000#
# # # # # #
democracy# 264# 9.841# 0.498# 8.000# 10.000#
lnpop# 264# 16.776# 1.212# 15.127# 19.542#
govern# 210# 1.398# 0.360# 0.502# 1.913#
regulquality# 210# 1.402# 0.317# 0.537# 2.012#
# # # # # #
ruleoflaw# 220# 1.503# 0.379# 0.313# 1.964#
voiceaccount# 220# 1.345# 0.254# 0.609# 1.827#
contcorrupt# 220# 1.634# 0.587# 0.156# 2.466#
polstability# 220# 0.927# 0.371# N0.180# 1.577#















# sharemfoda# sharemfdisburse# totmfodashare# lnmfcommit# lnmfdisburse# mfdcratio# lntotalmf#
mfdisburse# 0.7477*# 1.0000#
# # # # #
#
0.0000#
# # # # # #totmfodashare# 0.8975*# 0.6717* 1.0000
# # # #
#
0.0000# 0.0000#




# # # #lnmfdisburse# 0.6914*# 0.7002*# 0.6485*# 0.8700* 1.0000
# #
#
0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000#
# # #mfdcratio# N0.1308# 0.0487# N0.1507# N0.3745*# N0.0480 1.0000
#
#
0.1276# 0.5720# 0.0789# 0.0000# 0.5774#
# #lntotalmf# 0.6964*# 0.5043*# 0.7502*# 0.9159*# 0.8266*# N0.2809* 1.0000
#
0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0009#
#lnodacommit# 0.3881*# 0.2436*# 0.3039*# 0.6692*# 0.6652*# N0.1747# 0.6571*
#
0.0000# 0.0035# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0412# 0.0000#
lnodadisburse# 0.3864*# 0.2362*# 0.3087*# 0.6753*# 0.6604*# N0.1794# 0.6490*#
#
0.0000# 0.0047# 0.0001# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0359# 0.0000#
lnghgpc# N0.0608# N0.2089# N0.0240# N0.0083# N0.0991# N0.0354# 0.0196#
#
0.4061# 0.0162# 0.7332# 0.9094# 0.2582# 0.6932# 0.7810#
lnco2pc# N0.0186# N0.1387# 0.0498# 0.0835# 0.0299# N0.0127# 0.1384#
#
0.7939# 0.0997# 0.4672# 0.2412# 0.7239# 0.8833# 0.0427#
lnch4pc# N0.4124*# N0.3941*# N0.3566*# N0.3553*# N0.4274*# 0.0155# N0.3654*#
#
0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.8625# 0.0000#
lnhfcspc# N0.0084# N0.0840# N0.0053# 0.1226# 0.0783# N0.0888# 0.1697#
#
0.9083# 0.3382# 0.9397# 0.0928# 0.3722# 0.3206# 0.0152#
lnpfcspc# 0.0344# N0.0501# N0.0018# 0.2924*# 0.2236# N0.3431*# 0.2684*#
#
0.6397# 0.5696# 0.9802# 0.0000# 0.0103# 0.0001# 0.0001#
lnsf6pc# 0.1190# 0.0010# 0.1002# 0.3985*# 0.3785*# N0.2383*# 0.3323*#
#
0.1030# 0.9906# 0.1538# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0070# 0.0000#
lnn2opc# N0.4245*# N0.4321*# N0.3138*# N0.3126*# N0.4012*# 0.0028# N0.3286*#
#
0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.9752# 0.0000#
carboninten# 0.0661# N0.0308# 0.0394# N0.0705# N0.1604# 0.0073# N0.0864#
#
0.3535# 0.7162# 0.5656# 0.3221# 0.0566# 0.9328# 0.2068#
altenergy# N0.0174# 0.0792# N0.0730# 0.1080# 0.1823# N0.0989# 0.0683#
#
0.8077# 0.3488# 0.2865# 0.1291# 0.0299# 0.2502# 0.3185#
lngdppc# 0.0341# 0.0437# 0.0695# 0.3340*# 0.3814*# N0.1886# 0.3028*#
#
0.6328# 0.6057# 0.3103# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0273# 0.0000#
enviroexpen# N0.1377# N0.0136# N0.0633# 0.0135# 0.1090# 0.0748# N0.1249#
#
0.1153# 0.8956# 0.4479# 0.8782# 0.2929# 0.4808# 0.1330#
kyotoprot# 0.1521# 0.2444*# 0.1811*# 0.1629# 0.2870*# N0.0310# 0.2325*#
#
0.0320# 0.0034# 0.0078# 0.0215# 0.0005# 0.7193# 0.0006#
leftgov# N0.1502# N0.0335# N0.1406# N0.1471# N0.1325# 0.1019# N0.1591#
#
0.0401# 0.6993# 0.0455# 0.0445# 0.1254# 0.2485# 0.0234#
democracy# N0.0159# N0.0390# N0.0384# N0.0981# N0.0715# 0.0647# N0.1077#
#
0.8238# 0.6453# 0.5753# 0.1680# 0.3981# 0.4524# 0.1155#
lnpop# 0.2861*# 0.1710# 0.1695# 0.4226*# 0.4228*# N0.1136# 0.4192*#
#
0.0000# 0.0419# 0.0128# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.1864# 0.0000#
govern# N0.0820# N0.1578# 0.0136# 0.0341# 0.0007# 0.0464# 0.0256#
#
0.2837# 0.0607# 0.8563# 0.6558# 0.9934# 0.5902# 0.7342#
regulquality# N0.1416# N0.2270*# N0.0465# N0.0153# N0.0497# 0.0655# 0.0008#
#
0.0631# 0.0066# 0.5367# 0.8415# 0.5572# 0.4473# 0.9919#
ruleoflaw# N0.0093# N0.0755# 0.0562# 0.1361# 0.1181# N0.0185# 0.1002#
#
0.9036# 0.3718# 0.4458# 0.0742# 0.1616# 0.8300# 0.1735#
voiceaccount# N0.1640# N0.1998# N0.0773# N0.0638# N0.0924# 0.0728# N0.0528#
#
0.0311# 0.0171# 0.2943# 0.4041# 0.2739# 0.3980# 0.4745#
contcorrupt# N0.0521# N0.1188# 0.0521# 0.0745# 0.0634# 0.0385# 0.0733#
#
0.4961# 0.1592# 0.4804# 0.3300# 0.4537# 0.6552# 0.3201#
polstability# N0.0159# N0.1049# 0.0391# N0.0702# N0.1130# 0.1034# N0.0919#
#
0.8354# 0.2142# 0.5964# 0.3584# 0.1807# 0.2291# 0.2122#
goveffective# N0.1120# N0.1762# N0.0194# 0.0519# N0.0042# 0.0155# 0.0319#
#
0.1424# 0.0359# 0.7923# 0.4976# 0.9601# 0.8574# 0.6657#
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# lnodacommit# lnodadisburse# lnghgpc# lnco2pc# lnch4pc# lnhfcspc# lnpfcspc#
lnodadisburse# 0.9896*# 1.0000#
# # # # #
#
0.0000#
# # # # # #lnghgpc# 0.1072# 0.1024 1.0000
# # # #
#
0.0967# 0.1974#




# # # #lnch4pc# N0.3776*# N0.3803*# 0.5920*# 0.4878* 1.0000
# #
#
0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000#
# # #lnhfcspc# 0.4663*# 0.3686*# 0.3837*# 0.4135*# 0.1610 1.0000
#
#
0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0123#
# #lnpfcspc# 0.3410*# 0.3445*# 0.2588*# 0.3844*# 0.1169# 0.2325* 1.0000
#
0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0707# 0.0003#
#lnsf6pc# 0.4754*# 0.5393*# 0.2230*# 0.3675*# N0.1574# 0.2156*# 0.6795*
#
0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0005# 0.0000# 0.0144# 0.0008# 0.0000#
lnn2opc# N0.3826*# N0.3834*# 0.4547*# 0.3910*# 0.8533*# 0.1363# 0.2059*#
#
0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0344# 0.0013#
carboninten# N0.1651*# N0.1317# 0.6713*# 0.4261*# 0.3272*# 0.1221# N0.0929#
#
0.0072# 0.0815# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0584# 0.1513#
altenergy# 0.1699*# 0.1527# N0.5932*# N0.4255*# N0.2431*# N0.0949# 0.2299*#
#
0.0057# 0.0430# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0001# 0.1417# 0.0003#
lngdppc# 0.5054*# 0.4753*# 0.0767# 0.2395*# N0.0156# 0.3141*# 0.4672*#
#
0.0000# 0.0000# 0.2356# 0.0001# 0.8101# 0.0000# 0.0000#
enviroexpen# N0.1438# N0.0775# 0.3094*# 0.2271*# 0.3804*# 0.0283# N0.0283#
#
0.0598# 0.4104# 0.0001# 0.0027# 0.0000# 0.7218# 0.7220#
kyotoprot# 0.1705*# 0.1027# N0.0868# N0.0469# N0.0744# 0.3434*# N0.0945#
#
0.0055# 0.1750# 0.1795# 0.4482# 0.2499# 0.0000# 0.1444#
leftgov# N0.1674*# N0.1903# N0.1069# N0.1091# 0.1571# N0.0573# N0.1628#
#
0.0079# 0.0137# 0.1065# 0.0844# 0.0174# 0.3878# 0.0139#
democracy# 0.0759# 0.1220# 0.0603# 0.0917# 0.0915# N0.1287# N0.0717#
#
0.2188# 0.1067# 0.3511# 0.1373# 0.1567# 0.0460# 0.2682#
lnpop# 0.7114*# 0.7075*# 0.2403*# 0.2812*# N0.2398*# 0.3961*# 0.1538#
#
0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0002# 0.0000# 0.0002# 0.0000# 0.0171#
govern# 0.0628# 0.0692# 0.0600# 0.1213# 0.3070*# 0.0498# 0.0846#
#
0.3653# 0.3726# 0.4106# 0.0794# 0.0000# 0.4946# 0.2469#
regulquality# 0.0918# 0.1086# 0.2631*# 0.2280*# 0.4467*# 0.3188*# 0.0110#
#
0.1852# 0.1611# 0.0002# 0.0009# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.8805#
ruleoflaw# 0.1346# 0.1410# 0.0659# 0.1576# 0.2597*# 0.1484# 0.1441#
#
0.0462# 0.0619# 0.3541# 0.0193# 0.0002# 0.0360# 0.0422#
voiceaccount# N0.0242# 0.0140# N0.0106# 0.0315# 0.3421*# N0.0371# N0.0321#
#
0.7208# 0.8537# 0.8816# 0.6417# 0.0000# 0.6017# 0.6525#
contcorrupt# 0.1026# 0.1307# 0.0405# 0.1108# 0.2751*# 0.0928# 0.0524#
#
0.1294# 0.0838# 0.5692# 0.1013# 0.0001# 0.1911# 0.4623#
polstability# N0.2128*# N0.2554*# N0.1223# N0.0379# 0.0810# N0.4070*# 0.0197#
#
0.0015# 0.0006# 0.0844# 0.5761# 0.2539# 0.0000# 0.7829#
goveffective# 0.1353# 0.1334# 0.0937# 0.1689# 0.2204*# 0.1343# 0.1891*#
#











# lnsf6pc# lnn2opc# co2inten# altenergy# lngdppc# enviroexpen# kyotoprot#
lnn2opc# N0.0699# 1.0000#
# # # # #
#
0.2796#
# # # # # #co2inten# N0.1070# 0.0803 1.0000
# # # #
#
0.0976# 0.2140#




# # # #lngdppc# 0.5024*# 0.0398# N0.2598*# 0.2427* 1.0000
# #
#
0.0000# 0.5390# 0.0000# 0.0001#
# # #enviroexpen# N0.0174# 0.3340*# 0.2854*# N0.3874*# 0.1609 1.0000
#
#
0.8267# 0.0000# 0.0001# 0.0000# 0.0350#
# #kyotoprot# N0.1524# N0.1236# N0.0500# 0.0048# 0.2872*# 0.0825 1.0000
#
0.0179# 0.0554# 0.4187# 0.9385# 0.0000# 0.2822#
#leftgov# N0.0884# 0.1741*# N0.0563# 0.0341# N0.1980*# 0.0441# N0.1512
#
0.1823# 0.0083# 0.3745# 0.5903# 0.0016# 0.5664# 0.0165#
democracy# N0.0373# 0.0021# 0.1489# N0.1924*# 0.3512*# 0.2175*# N0.0541#
#
0.5645# 0.9747# 0.0154# 0.0017# 0.0000# 0.0042# 0.3816#
lnpop# 0.3221*# N0.3849*# 0.1840*# N0.1055# N0.0584# N0.2904*# 0.0168#
#
0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0027# 0.0872# 0.3448# 0.0001# 0.7861#
govern# 0.1558# 0.4754*# N0.4226*# 0.2682*# 0.4990*# 0.2688*# N0.1022#
#
0.0318# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0001# 0.0000# 0.0017# 0.1400#
regulquality# 0.0437# 0.5204*# N0.2205*# 0.0326# 0.4284*# 0.4252*# 0.0114#
#
0.5490# 0.0000# 0.0013# 0.6380# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.8690#
ruleoflaw# 0.2840*# 0.3789*# N0.3935*# 0.2956*# 0.5465*# 0.2349*# N0.0111#
#
0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0047# 0.8701#
voiceaccount# N0.0625# 0.4967*# N0.3542*# 0.2050*# 0.4718*# 0.1548# N0.0595#
#
0.3790# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0022# 0.0000# 0.0649# 0.3800#
contcorrupt# 0.1579# 0.4144*# N0.3968*# 0.2562*# 0.4773*# 0.1971# N0.0708#
#
0.0256# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0001# 0.0000# 0.0183# 0.2958#
polstability# 0.0389# 0.1953*# N0.3079*# 0.1977*# 0.2587*# 0.2028# N0.2191*#
#
0.5840# 0.0056# 0.0000# 0.0032# 0.0001# 0.0151# 0.0011#
goveffective# 0.2358*# 0.4182*# N0.4180*# 0.3115*# 0.4932*# 0.1651# N0.1647#
#
0.0008# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0488# 0.0144#
 
# leftgov# democracy# lnpop# govern# regulquality# ruleoflaw#
democracy# 0.0883# 1.0000#
# # # #
#
0.1631#








# # #regulquality# 0.1475# 0.3858*# N0.3225*# 0.8839* 1.0000
#
#
0.0377# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000#
# #ruleoflaw# 0.0822# 0.3462*# N0.4031*# 0.9540*# 0.8404* 1.0000
#
0.2367# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000#
#voiceaccount# 0.1270# 0.5014*# N0.5439*# 0.8908*# 0.7771*# 0.7863*
#
0.0670# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000#
contcorrupt# 0.1551# 0.4332*# N0.4151*# 0.9780*# 0.8747*# 0.9355*#
#
0.0249# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000#
polstability# 0.1092# 0.4248*# N0.6127*# 0.7626*# 0.4943*# 0.6564*#
#
0.1155# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000#
goveffective# 0.0245# 0.3001*# N0.3764*# 0.9404*# 0.8207*# 0.8960*#
#
0.7249# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000# 0.0000#
 

























CO2# intensity# per# unit# of# GDP,# larger# carbon# sinks,# lower# per# capita# GDP# and#
good# governance# tend# to# be# selected# as# recipients# of# climate#mitigation# finance,#
and# to# receive# more# of# it.# CO2# emissions# are# not# used# as# a# determinant# of#
mitigation#finance#until#the#actual#financial#disbursement.#Poverty#aid#tends#to#be#
allocated# to# countries# with# low# CO2# emissions,# possibly# to# avoid# diverting# aid#
from# poorer# developing# countries.# However,# such# a# diversion# is# unavoidable# if#
the#share#of#mitigation#finance#in#climate#finance#and#in#overall#ODA#continues#to#
escalate.# This# study# calls# for# an# equitable# allocation# of# official# mitigation# and#
adaption#finance,#and#for#transparent#criteria#and#the#verification#of#reporting#on#
the# allocation# of# mitigation# finance.# Additionally,# the# chapter# examines# (1)# the#
influence# of# developing# countries’# commitment# to# international# climateQrelated#
conventions#on#their#eligibility#as#mitigation#finance#recipients,# (2)#the#variability#
of#significant#determinants#of#mitigation#finance#inflows#across#different#phases#of#

















OECD,# 2011a).# Official# finance# devoted# to# tackle# climate# problems#
comprises#mainly#mitigation#rather#than#adaptation#finance#(Halimanjaya#&#
Papyrakis,# 2012).# In# the# past# decade# the# relatively# small# amount# of#
mitigation#finance#increased1#rapidly#while#that#of#poverty#aid#increased#at#
a#slower#rate# (Figure#1.5).#Little# is#known#about#official#mitigation#finance#
specificities,# although# there# are# some# studies# examining# the# allocation# of#





i.e.# how# much# of# ODA# can# be# used# as# climate# finance# and# mitigation#
finance# in#particular,# are#not#yet# agreed.#Thus#whether#mitigation# finance#
can#be#considered#as#‘aid’#is#not#clearly#determined.#The#extent#to#which#it#
should# focus#on# reducing#emissions#and#prioritising#global# as#opposed# to#
local#development#is#also#unclear.#On#the#top#of#these#issues,#developed#and#
developing# countries# have# not# yet# agreed# on# the# indicative# list# and#
definition# of# the# ‘full# incremental# costs’# of# climate# action# stated# in# the#
UNFCCC# (1992),# Article# 4.3;# that# is,# the# additional# costs# of# developing#
countries’# emission# reduction# activities# that# are# financed# by# developed#
countries#(Olbrisch#et(al.,#2011).##
#
With# this# lack# of# definitive# parameters# with# which# to# allocate#mitigation#
finance,# the# OECD’s# (2011)# promotion# of# the# use# of# ODA# as# fastQstart#
climate# finance# and# for#prescriptive# climate# research# (Eliasch,# 2008;# Stern,#
                                            
1#The# increasing# number# of# donor# countries# implementing# the# Rio# Marker# aid# reporting# system,# as#
shown#in#Chapter#2,#partly#explains#this#increasing#trend#in#mitigation#finance.#Figure#2.2#shows#that#the#
number#of#DAC#donors#reporting#their#provision#of#mitigation#finance#from#2006#onwards#is#higher#than#






2008)# is# improving# the# fungibility# of# ODA.# This# allows# donors# greater#
flexibility# in# how# they# spend# it# to# fund# mitigation# activities# while# also#
aiming#to#alleviate#poverty#in#line#with#the#original#aim#of#ODA.#
#
This# will# accelerate# the# mainstreaming# of# climate# change# into# the#
development#agenda#(Klein#et#al.,#2005)#at# the#risk#of#diverting#ODA#from#
its# fundamental# objective# of# halving# world# poverty# (Michaelowa# &#
Michaelowa,# 2007).# ODA# may# support# projects# that# aim# to# create# an#
enabling# environment# for# developing# countries# to# later# host# Clean#
Development#Mechanism#(CDM)#projects#(Dutschke#&#Michaelowa,#2006).#
The# strong# emphasis# on# ‘additionality’# as# a# conceptual# safeguard# aims# to#
ensure# an# equitable# financial# distribution# between# richer# and# poorer#
developing#countries#and#to#ensure#that#climate#finance#remains#additional#
to#ODA#rather#than#diverting#funds#from#its#poverty#agenda.#Nevertheless#





the# identification# of# its# determinants# by# the# academic# community.# Little#
research# has# been# devoted# to# identifying# the# determinants# used# in# the#
allocation#and#disbursement#of#official#mitigation#finance.#There#is#a#lack#of#
information,# for# example,# on# how# allocation# is# influenced# by# countries’#
positions# in# the# UNFCCC# negotiations,# and# such# as# the# extent# to# which#
certain# developing# countries’# characteristics# (e.g.# country# size)# determine#
the#financial#inflows#they#receive.#The#study#conducted#by#Yohe#(2001,#pp.#
103–104)# initiates# an# early# discussion# about# the# allocation# criteria# of#
mitigation# finance.#He#proposes# several# variables# for# consideration#under#




instruments,# institutional# structure,# resource# distribution# channels,# and#




The# next# section# reviews# relevant# literature# on# mitigation# finance,# climate#
finance,#environmental#aid#allocation#and#aid#more#broadly.#Section#3#shows#
an# overview# of# global# mitigation# finance.# Sections# 4# and# 5# explain# the#
hypotheses#and#the#research#methods.#Section#6#analyses#the#determinants#of#
mitigation# finance;# section# 7# compares# determinants# of# mitigation# finance,#
poverty#aid#and#overall#ODA;#section#8#examines#the#influence#of#developing#
countries’#commitment#to#international#climate#conventions#on#their#eligibility#
for# mitigation# finance;# section# 9# assesses# the# variability# of# significant#
determinants# affecting# mitigation# finance# allocation# in# different# Kyoto#





To# the# author’s# knowledge# only# a# few# studies# clarify# the# relationships#
between#these#variables#representing#developing#countries’#characteristics#and#
the#distribution#of#climate#finance.#These#studies#focus#on#streams#other#than#
official# mitigation# finance,# such# as# adaptation# finance# (Michaelowa# &#
Michaelowa,# 2011b;# Stadelmann# et( al.,# 2013)# and# private# mitigation# finance#
(Dolšak#&#Crandall,#2013;#Winkelman#&#Moore,#2011).##
#
Evidence# from# the# study# of# private# mitigation# finance# shows# that# much#
private# investment# is# influenced# by# political# factors# such# as# colonial# ties,#




2013).# This# evidence# is# in# line# with# Hicks# et( al.ks# (2008)# finding# from# their#
broader# study# of# environmental# aid.# Their# finding# also# supports# earlier# and#
and# more# recent# studies# that# show# economic# performance# determines#
decisions#about#environmental#aid#and#green#investment#(Eyraud#et(al.,#2011;#












So# far# academic# studies# are# limited# to# informing# the# parameters# of# official#
mitigation#finance#allocation.#The#chapter#responds#to#this#academic#limitation#
and#supports#climate#and#development#community#in#its#policy#formulation#of#







other# countries.# Secondly,# the# major# sources# of# GHG# emissions# are# mainly#









mitigation# activities# in# developing# countries# are# influenced# by# the# latter’s#
environmental,# economic# and# institutional# capacity# and# capability# and#other#
characteristics.#It#assesses#primarily#bilateral#DAC#donors’#total#contributions#
to# supporting# developing# countries# to# finance#mitigation# projects.# Being# the#
first# empirical# study# to# identify# the#determinants# of# the# allocation#of# official#
mitigation# finance#and#covering#a#vast# coverage#of#180#developing#countries#
and# countries#with# economies# in# transition,# this# chapter# tests# new#variables:#
total# and# individual# GHG# and# change# in# CO2# intensity# per# unit# of# GDP.# It#
adds#value# to#general#aid#studies#by#comparing# the#determinants#of#poverty#
aid# and# mitigation# finance.# This# chapter# neither# evaluates# which# sets# of#
criteria#are#most#costQeffective#nor#proposes#a#set#of#allocation#criteria,#both#of#
which# are# beyond# its# scope;# its# aim# is# solely# to# identify# the#determinants# of#
mitigation#finance#and#to#compare#them#with#the#determinants#of#poverty#aid.#
To# additionally# contribute# to# the# study# of# development# aid# more# broadly,#




















































































































































































































































































the# sectors# prioritised# in#mitigation# finance# are# primarily# energy# (36%)# and#
transport#and#storage#(26%).#Table#3.1#also#shows#what#consistutes#as#poverty#
aid.# In# this# chapter# poverty# aid# is# defined# as# the# remainder# of#ODA,#which#






Official#mitigation#finance*# # # 41.7# # #
Energy# 15.0# 36%# # # #
Transport#and#storage# 10.7# 26%# # # #
General#environment#protection# 9.0# 21%# # # #
Forestry# 3.1# 7%# # # #
Water#supply#and#sanitation# 1.6# 4%# # # #
Other#sectors# 2.3# 4%# # # #
Other#official#climate#finance,#
including#adaptation#
# 29.9# # #
Official#climate#finance**# # # # 71.6# #
Official#poverty#aid***# # # # 1238.7# #
Total#ODA# # # # # 1310.3#








Over# half# of# all#mitigation# finance# goes# to# India,# Indonesia,#China,#Vietnam#
and# Thailand,# and# its# provision# is# mainly# reliant# on# Japan,# Germany,# and#
France#(Figure#3.2).#Bosetti#et(al.#(2009)#argue#that#early#emission#mitigation#in#
richer#developing#countries#is#economically#attractive#and#possibly#cheaper#on#
a# large# scale.# Figure# 3.3# shows# that# Europe# irregularly# receives# a# large#
proportion# of# ODA#mitigation# finance,# while# South# Asia#with# low# CO2# per#
capita# receives# almost# a# third# of# poverty# aid.# Some# small# states# such# as#
Mauritius# and# Guyana# receive# over# 30%# of# ODA# as# mitigation# finance,#
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LeastQdeveloped# and# lowQincome# countries# with# relatively# low# CO2#












































# (1)# # (2)# # (3)# # (3)#Q#(2)# #
Least#developed#
countries# 2.7# 6.4# 9.2# 12.9# 461.1# 35.2# 451.8# 36.1#
Other#low#
income#
countries# 3.7# 8.8# 6.7# 9.3# 203.6# 15.5# 197.0# 15.8#
Lower#middle#
income#
countries# 26.6# 64.0# 38.5# 53.8# 527.6# 40.3# 489.1# 39.1#
Upper#middle#
income#
countries# 3.8# 9.0# 5.8# 8.2# 113.8# 8.7# 107.9# 8.6#
More#advanced#
developing#
countries# 0.0# 0.0# 0.0# 0.0# 4.3# 0.3# 4.2# 0.3#
Unallocated#by#
income# 4.9# 11.9# 11.3# 15.7#
# #
(11.3)*# #
Total## 41.7# 100# 71.6# 100# 1310.3# 100# 1238.7# 100#
*#The#amount#of#mitigation# finance# reported# to# the#OECD#CRS# that# is#not# allocated#by# country#hence# it# cannot#be#
categorised#into#income#level.#These#projects#are#excluded#in#the#econometric#analysis#of#this#paper#since#there#is#no#














According# to# Stern# (2008,# p.# 8),# two# thirds# of# emissions# originate# in#
energy#consumption.#The#remainder#is#from#waste#(3%),#agriculture#(14%)#and#
landQuse# change# (18%),# primarily# deforestation.# Assuming# that# developed#
















magnitude# of# emissions.# Another# five# GHGs# (UNFCCC,# 2012)# are# tested#
separately,#and#this#study#also# tests#a#mixed#GHG#(CO2,#CH4,#N2O#in#CO2#
equivalent# (CO2e))# The# three# gases# are# selected# as# they# have# greater#

























(CO2/GDP),# in# two# subsequent# periods# or# in# this# study# labelled# as# ‘rci’( is#
measured#by#CO2#intensity#per#unit#of#GDP#of#a#developing#country#in#the#
period#of# (t)#divided#by# its#CO2# intensity#per#unit#of#GDP# in# the#previous#




study( is# different# from# the# Responsibility# and# Capacity# Index# (RCI)#
introduced#by#Baer# et(al.# (2010,#p.#224),#as# the#specification# in# this# chapter#
does# not# allocate# any# weight# to# variable# that# are# tested.# Instead,# it#
separately# tests# developing# countries’# emissions# and# natural# capacity#
(carbon# sinks).# Ideally,# rci( is# added# to# Eq.# (1)# and#GHG# in#CO2e# replaces#








The# third#variable,# carbon# sink,# represents#natural# capacity# to# accumulate#
carbon# (EWI,# 2013).# Predominantly# forests,# oceans# and# soils# have# the#
capacity#to#store,#accumulate#or#release#carbon#dioxide#(IPCC,#2007,#p.#820).#
Preserving#forest#in#developing#countries#is#a#lowQcost#and#effective#method#











In# this# thesis,# deforestation# (deforest)# is# a# rate# of# gain# (positive)# or# loss#
(negative)# in# per# cent# of# the# remaining# forest# area# each# year# within# the#
given#period.#For#example,#if#a#developing#country#has#100#ha#in#2000#and#
95#ha#in#2005,#deforest#is#calculated#as:#
= (95− 100)100 ×1002005− 2000 = −1%#
#
The# following# hypotheses# represent# developing# countries’# mitigation#
capacity:#
Hypothesis(2B:(The(higher(the(deforestation(rate(of(a(developing(country(the(more(
likely( it( is( to( be( selected( as( a( recipient( of(mitigation( finance( and( to( receive(more(
mitigation(finance.#
(
One# might# argue# that# emission# and# deforestation# variables# may# be#
endogenous.#It# is# true#that#the#normative#objective#of#mitigation#finance#is#
to# mitigate# emissions# through# various# means# such# as# improving# energy#
efficiency# # and# combating# deforestation.# So# far# there# is# lack# of# academic#
literature#showing#that#the#deployment#of#mitigation#finance#has#immediate#
results# in# developing# countries# such# as# decreasing# emission# and#
deforestation# levels;# at# the#global# level,# the#most# recent# studies# show# that#
emission# levels# continue# to# increase#with# irreversible# effects# (IPCC,# 2014).#
Hence# it#may#be# too# early# to# assume# that#mitigation# finance# is# effectively#




improve# the# model# without# sufficient# scientific# proof# may# lead# to# false#
inferences.##
(
Marine# Protected# Areas2#(MPAs)# are# considered# an# alternative# to# carbon#
sinks.# Recent# studies# show# that# the# marine# sector# also# offers# mitigation#
potential# through# ‘blue# carbon’# reservoirs# such# as# mangrove# plantations,#
seaQgrass#beds#and#salt#marshes.#Mcleod#et(al.#(2011)#and#Wickramasinghe#et(
al.( (2009)# show# that# these# reservoirs#make# a# bigger# contribution# per# unit#
area# to# longQterm# carbon# sequestration# than# terrestrial# forest.# Mixed#
mitigation# finance# investment# in#MPAs#often#aims# to#protect#biodiversity,#
with# possible# longQterm# reduction# of# carbon# emissions.# This# study#





included.# This# study# acknowledges# Emerson# et( al.ks# (2012)# Environmental#
Performance# Index# (EPI),# but# this# is# not# tested# since# most# of# mitigation#




a#good#policy# environment# (Dollar#&#Levin,# 2006;#Epstein#&#Gang,# 2009).#
Without# good# governance,# developing# countries# may# find# it# difficult# to#
comply#with#expensive#and#administrative#MRV#system#(Bierbaum#&#Fay,#
                                            









2010).#The#absence#of#proper# land# tenure# rights# such#as# in#parts#of#Africa#
(Unruh,# 2008)# is# a#major# obstacle# to# carbon# sequestration#projects.#All# six#






Including#GDP#per#capita# (WDI,#2013)# tests#whether#mitigation# finance#as#
part# of# development# aid# also# carries# a# development# mission,# i.e.# is#
distributed#to#enhance#economic#growth#and#reduce#poverty.#The#scope#of#
GDP# per# capita# to# measure# other# development# aspects# is# limited,# hence#
infant#mortality#is#also#included#in#the#main#specification.#Infant#mortality#
is#expected# to#correlate#positively#with#mitigation# finance.#This#variable# is#
tested#to#further#understand#whether#mitigation#finance#is#allocated#across#
developing# countries# as# ODA# coQbenefits# their# social# development.# This#
might# contradict# the# fact# that# developing# countries# with# high# emission#
levels#have#low#infant#mortality#rates.#The#contradictory#correlation#can#be#





live#below#poverty# line# is# also# taken# into#a# consideration# to# capture#other#
aspects# of# development,# but# its# limited# coverage# significantly# reduces# the#
sample# size,# so# income# per# capita# and# infant#mortality# are# chosen# as# the#








likely( it( is( to( be( selected( as( a( recipient( of(mitigation( finance( and( to( receive(more(
mitigation(finance.(
Hypothesis(#4B:(The(higher(the(infant(mortality(rate(of(a(developing(country,(the(




Control# variables# are# foreign# direct# investment# inflow# (FDI),# level# of#
democracy,# population# size,# exQcolonial# and# political# ties# and# time#
dummies# (see# Table# 3.3# in# the# end# of# this# section).# These# variables# are#
expected#to#have#positive#relationships#with#mitigation#finance.##
#
Donors# may# favour# providing# climate# finance# to# protect# their# existing#
foreign# investments# (Buchner# et( al.,# 2011,# p.# 12).# Developing# countries#
whose# economy# is#more# open# to# foreign# investment#may# attract# a# higher#
volume# of# mitigation# finance# due# to# accelerate# private# investors# that#
promote,#for#instance,#renewable#technological#advancement#tools.#An#open#
economy#is#often#associated#with#donors’# trade#interests,# in#which#aid#can#
have# a# strategic# role# (MartínezQZarzoso# et( al.,# 2010).# Donors# are# able# to#
benefit#from#the#aid#they#provide#by#imposing#conditions,#such#as#insisting#
that#recipient#governments#spend#their#aid#on#products#produced#by#donorQ
country# companies# (Hicks# et( al.,# 2008b,# p.# 104).# The# percentage# of# FDI#
inflow#of#GDP#(WDI,#2013)#is#a#better#measurement#than#the#total#volume#of#
export#and#import#since#FDI#inflow#indicates#wide#access#and#flexibility#for#






likelihood( that( it( is( selected( as( a( mitigation( finance( recipient( and( receives( more(
mitigation(finance.(
Democratic#countries#that#exhibit#a#strong#commitment#to#the#international#
environment# and# demonstrate# cooperative# behaviour# (Neumayer,# 2002)#
may#also#show#greater#interest# in#being#involved#in#reciprocal#multilateral#
environmental# action# and# hosting# climate# change# mitigation# projects.#
Alternatively,# democratic# states# are# arguably# allowed# more# freedom# of#
speech#and#a#fair#and#transparent#media#which#make#it#easy#to#disseminate#
climateQchangeQrelated# information# (Hicks# et( al.,# 2008b).# An# updated#
version#of#the#revised#combined#Polity#Score,#on#a#scale#of#1#to#10#(10#being#
the#most#democratic)#is#used#as#a#proxy#for#democracy#(Keefer,#2010).##
Hypothesis( #6:( The( more( democratic( a( developing( country( is,( the( greater( the(
likelihood( that( it( is( selected( as( a( mitigation( finance( recipient( and( receives( more(
mitigation(finance.(
#
This# chapter# also# tests#whether#mitigation# finance# is# targeted# at# countries#
with# large# populations.# In# general# aid# studies,# e.g.# Anderson# and# Clist#
(2011),#population#is#tested#as#a#standard#control#of#smallQcountry#bias#–#a#
coefficient# of# less# than# 1# indicates# that# recipient# countries# with# smaller#
populations#receive#larger#per#capita#aid#than#those#with#larger#populations.#
The# potential# multicollinearity# between# population# and# CO2# emissions# is#
kept# in#mind# (See# the# correlation#between# the# two#variables# in#Appendix#
3.3).#
Hypothesis(#7:(The( larger( the(population(of(a(developing(country,( the(greater( the(







mitigation# finance,# as# Dolšak# and# Crandall# (2013)# have# found# it# to# be# a#
determinant# of# CDM# location.# Studies# of# environmental# aid# allocation#
found#a#similar#pattern;#exQcolonies#tend#to#receive#more#environmental#aid#
(Hicks#et(al.,#2008).#Aid#studies#such#as# that#of#Burnside#and#Dollar# (1997)#
show# that# donors# tend# to# give# development# aid# to# their# exQcolonies.# This#
research#investigates#whether#this#is#also#the#case#in#the#allocation#of#official#
mitigation#finance.##
Hypothesis#8:( Developing( countries( with( historical( and( political( ties( tend( to( be(
selected(as(mitigation(finance(recipients(and(to(receive(more(mitigation(finance.#
#
Total#aid# is#not#controlled#for# in# the#main#regressions#because#adding#this#
variable#into#the#main#specification#would#be#problematic,#especially#in#the#




total# aid# is# included# in# this#model# the# coefficients#of#other#main#variables#












Variable( Label( Obs.( Mean( SD( Min( Max(
Dependent(variable((1998Q2010)(
Commitment## binarycfcommit# 2340# 0.442# 0.497# 0.000# 1.000#
binarypovaidcommit# 2340# 0.665# 0.472# 0.000# 1.000#
# binaryodacommit# 2340# 0.859# 0.349# 0.000# 1.000#
# lncfcommit# 1034# 13.744# 2.915# 3.059# 21.711#
# lnpovaidcommit# 1555# 5.758# 1.454# Q1.300# 9.497#
# lntotalodacommit# 2009# 19.202# 1.682# 10.597# 23.863#
Disbursement# binarycfdisburse# 2340# 0.428# 0.495# 0.000# 1.000#
# binarypovaiddisburse# 2340# 0.656# 0.475# 0.000# 1.000#
# binaryodadisburse# 2340# 0.859# 0.349# 0.000# 1.000#
# lncfdisburse# 1002# 13.356# 2.494# 6.016# 20.715#
# lnpovaiddisburse# 1536# 5.546# 1.408# 1.310# 9.424#
lntotalodadisburse# 1978# 19.019# 1.614# 10.597# 23.936#
Independent(variable(
Emissions# lnco2## 1910# 8.601# 2.405# 2.686# 15.855#
# lnch4## 271# 8.847# 1.927# 3.415# 12.945#
# lnn2o## 267# 7.999# 2.058# 1.834# 12.215#
# lnhfcs## 164# 5.005# 2.440# Q1.966# 10.166#
# lnpfcs## 87# 4.728# 2.205# Q3.507# 8.773#
# lnsf6# 127# 2.302# 2.582# Q3.912# 9.439#
# lnghg# 246# 10.607# 1.863# 3.851# 14.798#
CO2#intensity# rci# 792# 1.222# 1.119# 0.273# 10.854#
Carbon#sinks# lnforest# 1820# 6.956# 3.025# Q1.204# 13.221#
# marine# 1650# 4.431# 10.001# 0.000# 75.360#
Deforestation# deforest# 2179# Q0.241# 1.303# Q9.710# 6.680#
Governance# govern# 1764# Q0.306# 0.755# Q2.480# 1.500#
Income#per#
capita#
lngdppc# 1991# 7.345# 1.416# 4.415# 11.121#
Infant#mortality# lninfant# 2015# 3.379# 0.890# 0.742# 4.988#
Population# lnpop# 2158# 15.165# 2.238# 9.141# 21.000#
FDI#inflow# fdiinflow# 1976# 4.980# 8.298# Q37.616# 167.300#
Levels#of#
democracy#
democracy# 1658# 1.928# 6.407# Q10.000# 10.000#
Political#interests# xcolony# 2340# 0.589# 0.492# 0.000# 1.000#
Regional#
dummies#
eastsouthafrica# 2340# 0.150# 0.357# 0.000# 1.000#
westafrica# 2340# 0.128# 0.334# 0.000# 1.000#
eastasiapacific# 2340# 0.200# 0.400# 0.000# 1.000#
southasia# 2340# 0.044# 0.206# 0.000# 1.000#
easteurope# 2340# 0.111# 0.314# 0.000# 1.000#
# westeurope# 2340# 0.222# 0.147# 0.000# 1.000#
# middleeast# 2340# 0.083# 0.276# 0.000# 1.000#
# northafrica# 2340# 0.028# 0.164# 0.000# 1.000#
# latinamerica# 2340# 0.111# 0.314# 0.000# 1.000#
REDD+## reddplus# 2340# 0.255# 0.436# 0.000# 1.000#
Coalition#
dummies#
smallisland# 2340# 0.228# 0.419# 0.000# 1.000#






To# identify# the# determinants# of# foreign# aid# A,( for# a# particular# aid#
category#j(–#either#mitigation#finance#or#poverty#aid#or#overall#ODA#–#at#time#t(
to# a# developing# country# i,# this# study# tests# the# main# variables# in# Eq.# (1):#
emissions# !!!" ,# CO2# intensity# per# unit# of# GDP# !!!" ,# carbon# sinks# !!!" ,#
deforestation#!!",#governance#!!!",#and#income#per#capita#!!":#
#!!"! =!∝!+∝! !!" + ∝! !!" +∝! !!" +∝! !!" +∝! !!" +∝! !!" +∝! !!" + !!"!## (1)##
 





included# in# each# regression# but# not# presented# in# the# results# below.# The#
hypothesis#for#each#parameter#is#explained#in#a#later#section.##
#
To#estimate# the#parameters#of#equation# (1),# this# research#employs#a# twoQpart#
model# following# the# approach# used# by# Clist# et( al.( (2011).# The# first# part,# the#
selection#stage,#uses#a#logit#model#to#identify#the#determinants#of#developing#
country#selection;#the#second#part,# the#allocation#stage,#employs#the#ordinary#
least# squares# (OLS)#model# strictly# to# positive#mitigation# finance# received# at#
time( t,# dropping# all# zero# and# nonQselected# countries.# The# allocation# stage#
identifies# the# determinants# used# to# decide# which# recipients# receive# more#
mitigation#finance.##
#









Porter,# 2009,# p.# 822)#with# a# discrete# probability# distribution# comprising# two#
binary# events# (in# this# study,# receiving# and# not# receiving# aid).# So# when# a#
developing#country#i(at#time#t#treceives#an#aid#inflow,#!!"! > 0,#this#means#that#
there# is# a# successful# observed# event,# Y=1.# The# probability# of# this# event# is#
denoted# as#!,# while# the# probability# of# an# unsuccessful# event,# Y=0# Q# i.e.# not#
receiving#mitigation#finance#or#aid#Q#is#denoted#as#1− !.#
 
This#multinomial#logit#model#can#be#expressed#mathematically#as:#ln !!!! = !! + !!!! +⋯+ !!!!# # # # ### # (2)#
Generally#the#logit#model#is#a#nonQlinear#probability#distribution#function#(pdf)#
of# a# set# of# parameters#!!,!!,… ,!!.# The# odds# ratio# is# determined# by# a# set# of#
variables# !! #that# represent# characteristics# of# developing# countries.# These#





X=1# divided# by# the# odds# of# receiving# mitigation# finance# Y=1# given# a#
characteristic#X=0.#Mathematically#the#odds#ratio#can#be#expressed#as:#
!""#!!"#$% = !!!!!!!!!!!! # # # # # # # # (3)#
#
This#study#uses#a#simple# logit#model#rather# than#the#conditional# logit#model#







The# twoQpart# model# is# used# for# two# reasons.# First,# this# model# is# used# in#
general# aid# allocation# studies# such# as# that# of#Clist# (2011).#Another# reason# is#
that#not#all#of#the#observations#can#be#included#in#a#single#model#because#the#
regressand#is#transformed#into#logarithmic#form#and#the#logarithm#of#zero#is#






The# first# part# of# the# twoQpart# model# accommodates# the# evaluation# of# this#
donor# selection# process.# The# twoQstep# selection# model# is# used# for# the#
allocation#of#climate#finance#by#some#donor#agencies.#Bilateral#climate#finance#
donors# such# as# Germany’s# International# Climate# Initiative# (ICI),# implement#
the#twoQstep#selection#approach#(BMU,#2013).#The#ICI’s#first#step#is#an#annual#
call# for#proposals#using#the#project#outline# template#provided#on# its#website.#
The# selected# applicants# are# then# requested# to# submit# a# formal# funding#
application,# again# using# the# templates# provided# (ibid).# Some# funding#
organisations,# such# as# the# Clean# Energy# Financing# Partnership# Facility#
(CEFPF)# publish# clear# eligibility# criteria# for# the# funding# application# (see#
Annex# in#DECC# (2012)).# The# twoQpart#model# selected# in# this# chapter# aligns#










As#explained# in# this# earlier# section,#mitigation# finance#data#before#2004#may#
not# accurately# represent# the# volume# of# mitigation# finance# inflow# to#






when# some# observations# on# both# dependent# and# independent# variables# are#
lost;#censoring#occurs#when#only#the#dependent#variable#is#cut#below#or#above#
a# certain# level# (Cameron# &# Trivedi,# 2005,# p.# 529).# The# censored# data,# for#
example#is#a#dataset#of#the#dependent#variable,#e.g.#mitigation#finance#inflow#
to# ‘developing# countries’,# only# covers#middleQincome# countries,# leaving# out#
poor#and#rich#developing#countries#whose#income#per#capita#is#below#or#above#
certain#levels.#When#the#data#are#truncated,#the#application#of#OLS#may#lead#to#
biased# estimates# (Cameron# and# Trivedi# 2005,# p.# 530).# When# the# dependent#
variable#data#are#missing,#the#possible#effect#of#using#OLS#is#to#cause#a#shift#of#
the# intercept.# Nevertheless# in# some# cases,# the# effect# can# also# lead# to# an#
inconsistent# slope,# as# the#mean# of# the# truncated# data# (labelled# as# ‘truncated#



















As# in# the# case# of#mitigation# finance# data,# this# cutQoff# point# is# not# zero# as#
there# is# no# negative# allocation,# and# besides# this,# each# donor#may# have# a#
different#cutQoff#point.##
#
Some# donors# do# not# report# the# relatively# little# amounts# of# mitigation#
finance# often# used# to# finance# smallQscale# pilot# projects.# In# this# case,# the#
annual#mitigation#finance#data#!!"#is#cut#from#below#or#denoted#at#point#L.#
For#the#observed#observations#that#are#incomplete#is#denoted#as#!!"∗ #and#the#
unobserved#ones# are#known#as#missing.#Hence# the# available# observations#
lie# on# the# outside# of# relevant# bound.# The# available# observations# that# are#
observed#!!"∗ #are#only#those#larger#than#L.#
#








finance#may# change# the# overall# outlook# of# their#ODA#distribution,#which#
ideally# focuses# on# recipients’# local# and# national# development# rather# than#
global#development.#When#such#a#large#amount#of#mitigation#finance#is#not#
reported,# the# annual# mitigation# finance# data#!!" #is# cut# from# above,# or#
denoted# at# point#U.# # Hence# the# existing# observations# are# those# that# are#
smaller#than#U.#!!" = !!"∗ #if#!!"∗ < !# # # # # # # # (5)#
#
When#cuts#occur#from#both#below#and#above,#the#existing#observed#data#are#
larger# than# L# and# smaller# than# U# and# therefore# the# relevant# bound# is#
contracted.##!!" = !!"∗ #if#! < !!"∗ < !# # # # # # # # (6)#
#
The# cuts# from#below#and#above#occur#at#unknown# levels# and# it# is# almost#
impossible# to#predict# the# cutQoff#points.#There# is# a# lack#of# explanation# for#
why#some#projects#are#not#coded.#Development#projects# in#the#early#years#
of#CRS#code#implementation#may#not#be#coded#due#to#project#implementers’#
lack# of# awareness# about# the# need# to# report# them.# For# similar# reasons,#
donors# may# also# overQcode# development# projects,# counting# nonQclimate#
projects# as# climate# and# mitigation# projects.# Michaelowa# and#Michaelowa#
(2011)#interpret#this#as#a#violation#of#the#coding#rules,#motivated#by#donor#
governments’#political#interests#and#environmental#preferences,#first#by#the#







Where# such# overQreporting# due# to# political# motives# occurs# it# leads# to#
overestimation# of# the# sample#mean,# shifting# the# dotted# line# in# Figure# 3.6#
further#upward,#while#underreporting#due#to#the#removal#of#many#uncoded#
projects#in#the#period#1998Q2003#(as#shown#in#Chapter#1,#Table#1.2)#shifts#the#
sample# mean# down,# potentially# underestimating# it.# These# inherent#
distortions# of# the# mitigation# finance# data# affect# the# accuracy# of# the#
representation# of# the# real# volume# of# mitigation# finance# inflows# to#







WGI# governance# data# only# cover# 168# of# 180# developing# countries# in# this#
study;# the# data# for# the# trend# of# CO2# intensity# per# unit# of# GDP# (rci)# only#




mitigation# finance# data.# # There# is# lack# of# information# that# explains# or#
verifies#the#minimum#threshold#or#ceiling#amount#at#which#donors#decide#
not# to# report# their# development# projects.# The# Heckman# selection# model#
(HSM)#(Tobit#model#type#II)#is#often#used#as#an#alternative#to#the#twoQpart#










words,# the# residuals#at#both# stages# should#not#be# correlated.#The# tests# for#
assumptions# find# that# the# residuals#of# the# two#stages# indicate#a#degree#of#
correlation,# violating# the# assumption# of# the# twoQpart# model.# Table# 3.4#
shows#that#the#rho#(!),#which#tests#whether#!!#is#equal#to#zero,# is#strongly#
rejected,# indicating# the# correlation# between# error# terms# of# selection# and#
allocation# stages# in# the# case# of# both# mitigation# finance# commitment# and#
disbursement.# The# pQvalues# in# both# cases# are# (0.008)# and# (0.006)# with#!!#
=7.000#and#7.470#respectively.#On#the#other#hand,# the# tests# for#poverty#aid#
commitment# and# disbursement# as# well# as# overall# ODA# disbursement# do#
not#show#strong#evidence#to#reject#the#null.#The#associated#pQvalues#to#(!)(is#

























Log#of#poverty#aid# 6.42# 16.36# 2.160#
















Log#of#poverty#aid# 30.55# 50.77# 0.220#












due# to# a#violation#of# the# assumption#of# independent# error# terms#between#
the# two# stages,#Appendix# 3.4# presents# the# estimations# using#HSM,#which#
allows#the#correlation#of#error#terms#between#the#two#stages.##
#
Neither# normality# nor# homoscedasticity# are# necessary# conditions# for#
consistent#parameters#in#the#twoQpart#model#(Cameron#&#Trivedi,##2005,#pp.#
534Q538).# To# explore# the# characteristics# of#mitigation# finance,# poverty# aid#
and# overall#ODA#data,# Table# 3.4# also# shows# the# results# of# normality# and#
heteroscedasticity#tests#applied#to#the#residuals#of#estimations#for#the#three#
aid# categories.# There# is# strong# evidence# that# the# residual# errors# are# not#
normally#distributed#and#homoscedastic.#The#pQvalues#of#the#skewness#and#
BreuschQPagan# tests# are# below#0.01,# indicating# strong# rejection#of# the#null#
hypotheses#that#the#residuals#from#all#estimations#are#normally#distributed#
and#homoscedastic.#Robustness#checks#are#used#to#verify#the#consistency#of#




Using# the# twoQpart#model# involves# a# conceptual# choice# of#which# type# of#
logit# model# is# appropriate# considering# the# characteristics# of# mitigation#
finance#data.#The#fixed#effect#or#conditional#logit#model#(CLM)#introduced#
by# McFadden# (1973)# is# a# possible# alternative# to# the# simple# logit# for#
estimating#panel#data.#CLM#controls# for# qualitative# choice# behaviour,# not#
only#across#developing#countries#but#also#within#developing#countries.#The#
Hausman#test# indicates#whether#a# fixed#or#a#random#effect#model# is#more#
appropriate.#The#results#show#strong#evidence#at#the#1%#level,#rejecting#the#









Using# CLM,# the# majority# of# coefficients# become# statistically# insignificant#
(the#results#are#not#reported,#but#are#available#upon#request).#Baltagi#(2005,#
pp.# 212Q3)# notes# that# in# the# case# of# large# samples# N,# residual# errors# are#
difficult# to#estimate#consistently#using#CLM.#Insignificant#and#inconsistent#
coefficients#may#occur#due# to#problems#with# controlling# fixed# effects# that#
are#inherent#in#the#logit#model.#The#application#of#CLM#when#datasets#are#
characterised#as#short#panel#data#often#leads#to#inconsistent#estimates:#this#
is# known# as# an# incidental( parameter( problem# (ibid).#When# the# time# goes# to#
infinity# the# fixedQeffect# estimator# is# consistent,# but# if# the# period# of#
observation#is#short#and#the#number#of#countries#continues#to#increase,#the#
fixed# effects# of# individual# effects# that# are# unique# to# each# observation# are#
inconsistent,# as# the# number# of# these# parameters# increases# along#with# the#
increase#in#the#number#of#cases#(ibid,(p.13).#
#






estimation# for# only# African# countries# (eastsouthafrica==1( and( westafrica==1)#
finds#the#beta#coefficient#of#lnpop#to#be##negative#and#significant#at#5%#c79,#






Compared# to#CLM,# the# simple# logit#model#does#not# include# fixed# effects,#
and#this#is#the#model’s#major#pitfall.#However,#it#can#also#be#advantageous.#
If# the# focus# of# the# study# is# to# test# some# fixed# or# invariant# variables#
(dichotomous#or#categorical#variables),#simple#logit#requires#and#allows#for#
the# inclusion# of# some# fixed# variables# in# the# specification.# The# remaining#
factors,#which#cannot#be#observed,#are#captured#by#the#residuals.#To#control#
the# omitted# variable# bias,# the# robustness# check# specification# includes# all#
regional#dummies#(except#Caribbean),#dummy#variables#such#as#Reducing#
Emissions# from# Deforestation,# and# Forest# Degradation# (REDD+),# and#
regional#and#coalition#dummies.#Including#them#as#control#variables#allows#




(2011)# and#Michaelowa#and#Michaelowa# (2011)# analyse#global# foreign#aid#
allocation# and# the# global# factors# that# influence# donors’# reporting#
behaviours#respectively.#They#use#simple#logit#models#as#the#CLM#does#not#
allow#the#inclusion#of#the#important#timeQinvariant#variables#that#they#aim#
to# analyse.# By# contrast,# Blaise# (2005)# does# use# the# CLM# to# estimate# the#
regional# allocation# of# Japanese# private# investment# in# China,# possibly#




This#section#presents# the#results#of# the# inquiry# into# the# two#stages#of#
mitigation# finance# allocation.# At# the# selection# stage# some# variables#
consistently# determine# the# allocation# of# mitigation# finance,# but# at# the#








Five# parameters# variables# are# significant# determinants# of# mitigation#
finance# commitments# at# the# selection# stage# (see#Table# 3.5,# column#1# (c1)).#
Carbon# sinks# (lnforest),( governance# (govern),# income# per# capita( (lngdppc),#
population#(lnpop),#and#democracy#(democracy)#are#statistically#significant#at#
1%.# The# robustness# checks# c2# show# that# the# first# three# are# stable# and#

























Stage:# Selection# # Allocation# # Selection# # Allocation# #
# Model#1# Model#2# Model#1# Model#2# Model#1# Model#2# Model#1# Model#2#
# (1)# (2)# (3)# (4)# (5)# (6)# (7)# (8)#
lnco2# 0.128# 0.188# 0.092# 0.190# Q0.034# 0.093# 0.277**# 0.445***#
# (1.357)# (1.522)# (0.717)# (1.282)# (Q0.352)# (0.732)# (2.278)# (3.265)####
lnforest# 0.208***# 0.171***# 0.070# 0.159*# 0.275***# 0.286***# 0.054# 0.087####
# (5.358)# (3.263)# (1.113)# (1.924)# (6.600)# (5.044)# (1.112)# (1.327)####
deforest# Q0.014# Q0.049# 0.289***# 0.136# 0.072# 0.038# 0.235***# 0.125*###
# (Q0.242)# (Q0.782)# (3.346)# (1.488)# (1.088)# (0.547)# (3.399)# (1.704)####
govern# 0.786***# 1.201***# 1.177***# 0.869***# 0.891***# 1.233***# 1.123***# 0.978***#
# (3.822)# (4.748)# (4.376)# (2.787)# (4.172)# (4.756)# (5.144)# (4.198)####
lngdppc# Q0.489***# Q0.691***# Q0.551***# Q0.405*# Q0.290*# Q0.496**# Q0.806***# Q0.844***#
# (Q3.250)# (Q3.386)# (Q2.875)# (Q1.771)# (Q1.953)# (Q2.384)# (Q4.640)# (Q4.301)####
lninfant# 0.008# 0.407*# Q0.155# Q0.056# 0.193# 0.576***# Q0.353*# Q0.099####
# (0.045)# (1.906)# (Q0.678)# (Q0.201)# (1.052)# (2.618)# (Q1.816)# (Q0.463)####
lnpop# 0.319***# 0.253# 0.669***# 0.492***# 0.433***# 0.292*# 0.444***# 0.143####
# (2.647)# (1.599)# (4.203)# (2.733)# (3.573)# (1.839)# (2.860)# (0.856)####
fdiinflow# 0.018# 0.025# 0.052***# 0.059***# 0.014# 0.021# 0.013# 0.033####
# (0.929)# (1.260)# (3.156)# (3.565)# (0.861)# (1.320)# (0.656)# (1.584)####
democracy# 0.041***# 0.006# 0.004# 0.014# 0.031**# 0.001# 0.020# 0.020####
# (2.898)# (0.368)# (0.208)# (0.614)# (2.171)# (0.053)# (1.178)# (1.213)####
xcolony# Q0.116# 0.132# Q0.058# Q0.308# Q0.074# Q0.082# Q0.004# 0.078####
# (Q0.685)# (0.567)# (Q0.247)# (Q1.109)# (Q0.425)# (Q0.340)# (Q0.022)# (0.319)####
eastsouthafrica# # Q2.046***# # 0.708# # Q1.074*# # Q0.395####
# # (Q3.320)# # (0.910)# # (Q1.726)# # (Q0.640)####
westafrica# # Q2.736***# # 0.316# # Q1.758***# # Q1.325**##
# # (Q4.318)# # (0.396)# # (Q2.816)# # (Q2.009)####
eastasiapacific# # Q1.294**# # 0.798# # Q0.741# # 0.065####
# # (Q2.307)# # (1.181)# # (Q1.271)# # (0.135)####
southasia# # Q0.684# # 1.290# # 0.851# # 0.936####
# # (Q0.936)# # (1.596)# # (1.195)# # (1.573)####
easteurope# # Q1.184*# # 0.686# # Q0.475# # Q0.552####
# # (Q1.782)# # (0.835)# # (Q0.696)# # (Q0.890)####
westeurope# # Q2.058***# # 2.852***# # Q0.355# # 2.149***#
# # (Q2.662)# # (2.660)# # (Q0.440)# # (2.722)####
middleeast# # Q1.453**# # Q0.060# # Q0.425# # Q1.572**##
# # (Q2.216)# # (Q0.073)# # (Q0.616)# # (Q2.267)####
northafrica# # Q0.524# # 2.909***# # 1.273*# # 1.103####
# # (Q0.796)# # (3.357)# # (1.850)# # (1.585)####
latinamerica# # Q0.299# # 0.002# # 0.004# # Q0.388####
# # (Q0.464)# # (0.003)# # (0.006)# # (Q0.667)####
reddplus# # 0.471**# # 0.373# # 0.858***# # 0.261####
# # (2.108)# # (1.441)# # (3.593)# # (1.202)####
smallisland# # 0.089# # 0.676# # 0.912**# # 0.231####
# # (0.228)# # (1.375)# # (2.121)# # (0.511)####
opecmember# # Q0.766**# # Q1.576***# # Q1.032***# # Q1.078***#
# # (Q2.293)# # (Q3.770)# # (Q2.907)# # (Q2.889)####
 χ2# 276.9# 308.5# # # 317.9# 356.9# # ################
R2# # # 0.268# 0.325# # # 0.345# 0.435####
Adjusted#R2# # # 0.247# 0.292# # # 0.325# 0.406####
PQvalues# 0.000# 0.000# 0.000# 0.000# 0.000# 0.000# 0.000# 0.000####






This# section# further# analyses# the# results# given# in# Table# 3.5# and# explains# the#




Table# 3.5# c1# shows# evidence# that# developing# countries# with# large# forest#
areas# tend# to# receive# mitigation# finance.# At# the# selection# stage# the#




be# treated#as#proximities.#These#positive# relationships# show# that# the#odds#
increase#with#the#expansion#of#carbon#sink.#However,#reforestation#projects#





the# selection# stage,# governance# is# positive# and# significant# at# the# 1%# level,#
consistent#with#the#finding#of#Hicks#et(al.#(2008,#pp.#112Q114),#who#however#
only# test# ‘government# effectiveness’# and# find# it# to# be# positive# and#
significant# at# the# 5%# level# for# bilateral# and#multilateral# green# and# brown#
environmental# aid# at# the# selection# stage.# This# determinant# is# used# as# a#















Bank.# A# negative# relationship# between#mitigation# and# income# per# capita#





turn.#The#results#show#that# lnforest,(deforestation,(governance,( lngdppc,( lnpop,(
fdiinflow#and(democracy#are#consistently#significant#and#stable#(See#Appendix#
3.5,# Table# 3.15)# The# main# model# in# this# chapter# includes# both# infant#
mortality# and# income# per# capita# to# capture# both# economic# and# social#
aspects#of#development.#The#χ2(is#higher#with#lninfant((308.5)#than#without#
lninfant# (276.8)# although# the# adjusted#R2# of# the# allocation# stage# is# slightly#
lower# with# lninfant( (0.247)# than# without# it# (0.248).# This# indicates# that#
including#lninfant(improves#the#explanatory#power#of#the#main#specification#
(c1)# and# does# not# distort# the# consistency# of# other# parameters# than#when#
excluding#it.#
#
Two# control# variables# at# the# selection# stage,# lnpop( and# democracy,# both#
significant# at# 1%,# influence# the#probability# of# a# developing# country# being#
selected#to#receive#mitigation#finance.#There#is#a#smallQcountry#bias#at#both#
stages.#Most#of#the#beta#parameters#of#lnpop(are#less#than#1.#Small#countries’#
position# may# not# be# overlooked# in# the# international# climate# change#









At# the# allocation# stage,# deforestation# rate# (deforest),( governance#
(govern),#income#per#capita#(lngdppc),#population#(lnpop)#and#FDI#(fdiinflow)#






The# results# in# Table# 3.5,# c3# shows# a# positive# relationship# between#
deforestation#rate#and#mitigation#finance,#the#higher#the#deforestation#rate,#
the#higher#mitigation# finance# inflow# to#a# recipient#country#–# significant#at#
1%#level.# If#a# #country’s#deforestation#rate#within#a#given#period# increases#
by#10%,#the#country#tends#to#receive#2.8%#higher#mitigation#finance.#
#
At# the# allocation# stage,# the# governance# variable# (govern)(has# a# significant#
coefficient# of# 1.177# (Table# 3.5,# c3);# this# means,# ceteris( paribus,# that# a# 0.1#
increase# in# the# governance# index# tends# to# increase# the# allocation# of#




A# negative# relationship# between# mitigation# finance# inflow# and# GDP# per#
capita#is#also#found#at#the#allocation#stage.#Significant#at#1%,#the#coefficient#






mitigation# finance# for# Kazakhstan# and# Cameroon.# GDP# per# capita# of#
Kazakhstan# and# Cameroon# is# respectively# US$# 9,070# and# US$# 1,147.#










developing# countries.# Hicks# et( al.( (2008)# find# a# similar# pattern# for# brown#
and#green#aid.#
#
Recipients#with# higher# FDI# inflow# incentivise# donors# to# pledge# a# greater#
amounts# of# mitigation# finance# investment,# perhaps# because# mitigation#
finance# can# indirectly# support# and# protect# the# investments# of# donorQ
country# companies.# Developing# countries# with# large# FDI# may# allow# the#




the# coefficient# is# positive# as# expected,# it# is# not# statistically# significant.#
Donors# may# use# mitigation# finance# as# an# incentive# to# invite# developing#
countries# with# greater# capacity# (larger# lnforest)# to# join# in# global# emission#




emissions# (higher# lnco2).# The# variable# of# historical# ties# xcolony( is# also#
insignificant#at#both#stages,#which#contrasts#with#the#results#of#Hicks#et(al.#
(2008)#find#it#significant#for#bilateral#and#multilateral#green#aid.#It#is#possible#
that# using# mitigation# finance# for# political# reasons# is# restricted# by# the#
narrower#objectives#of#mitigation#finance.##
#
The# Wald# test# examines# whether# the# parameters# of# interest# are#
simultaneously#equal# to#zero# indicating#they#do#not# improve#the#fit#of# the#
model# and# there# is# a# strong# suggestion# to# remove# them.#When# the# three#
insignificant#regressors#(lnco2,(lninfant,(xcolony)#are#dropped,#the#!!#value#of#
joint#significance#is#higher#(commitment:#181.19,#disbursement:#181.87)#than#
when# including# only# significant# regressors# (commitment:# 134.08,#
disbursement:#141.02).#PQvalues#associated#with#!!#show#strong#evidence#to#




An# important# difference# between# commitment# and# disbursement# is#
that# lnco2( becomes# statistically# significant# in# the# selection# stage# for#
disbursement.# In# the# allocation# stage# of# mitigation# finance# disbursement#
(c7),# lnco2(is#positive#and#significant#at#5%#and#consistently#significant#(c8)#











This# variable# is# an# insignificant# determinant# in# decisionQmaking# about#
allocation#until# the# actual# aid# transfer# stage.#Perhaps# there# is# a# fear#using#
this# parameter# will# divert# ODA# to# industrial# developing# countries# and#




Marginal# effects# (ME)# are# an# alternative# way# of# interpreting# the#
coefficient#in#the#logit#model#and#are#more#straightforward#than#using#odd#
ratios.# ME# show# the# change# in# the# expected# probability# of# receiving#
mitigation# finance# or# overall#ODA#E(Y=1)# if# an# independent# variable,# for#






To# explain# ME,# Bartus# (2005)# considers# the# singleQequation# regression#
model#!(!) = !(!")# # # # # # # # # (7)#!(!) = !(!!!! + !!!!+. .+!!!!)# # # # # # (8)#
#
Eq.# (7)# and# its# longer# form# in# Eq.# (8)# denote# a# linear# combinations# of# the#
standard# basis# vectors# with( jth( explanatory# variable# ! #and#!(. ) #is# the#











the# change# in# the#expected#probability#of# receiving#mitigation# finance# if# a#
variable,#!!,#i.e.#lnco2,#increases#by#1%.#
#
The#average#marginal#effect# (AME)# is# the#average#of# the#difference#of# two#
CDFs# from#two#possible#outcomes# (successful#and#unsuccessful),#with# the#
values# of# all# other# independent# variables# remaining# as# they# are.# For#
example,# for# a# particular# explanatory# dummy# variable,#!! ,# i.e.# xcolony(
dummy,#a#developing#country’s#characteristic#whether#it#is#an#exQcolony#of#
a#DAC#donor#or#not.#As#expressed#in#Eq.#(10),#first#AME#computes#the#CDF#
for# observationQk# when( a# developing# country# is# an# exQcolony# of# DAC#
donors,# !!! = 1 ,# holding# everything# else# constant.# This# value# is# then#
substracted# by# the# CDF# for( the# observationQk# when# it# is# tagged# as# nonQ
DACQexQcolony,#!!! = 0.#AME#calculates#the#sum#of#differences#between#the#
first# and# second# case# and# divides# this# total# value# by# n# number# of#
observation.#
#!"#! = !! ! !!!|!!! = 1 − ! !!!|!!! = 0!!!! # # # #########(10)#
#
Marginal# effect# calculates# an# effect# on# the# dependent# variable# for# a#
particular# difference# of# an# explanatory# variable,# such# as# the# difference# of#






Another# way# to# express# the# partial# effect# of# a# change# in# an# explanatory#
variable# is# by#having#all# variables# at# their#mean#values.#This# is# known#as#
Marginal# Effect# at#Mean# (MEM).# As# shown# in# Eq.# (11),# theoretically# it# is#
possible#to#calculate#the#effect#of#change#of#colonial#status.#Firstly,#calculate#
the# PDF# when# the# average# of# colonial# status# equal# to# one# having# other#
independent# variables# at# their# mean# values,# then# substract# this# function#
with#PDF#when#the#average#of#colonial#status#is#zero.##
#!"!! = ! !!|!! = 1 − ! !!|!! = 0 ## # # # #########(11)#
#
Many# applied# econometrians# argue# that# AME# offers# a# more# meaningful#
explanation# that# MEM,# when# the# majority# of# independent# variables# are#
discrete#rather#than#continuous.#This#computation#of#!!#at#its#representative#






Nevertheless,# in# this# chapter,# the# main# explanatory# variables# under#
investigation# are# continuous# rather# than# discrete.# When#!!#is# continuous#










!"#! = Δ!!!! !! !(!!!)!!!! ( ( ( ( ( ((((( (((((((12)#
 
The# MEM# for# a# continuous# explanatory# variableQj# is# composed# by# the#
derivative# of#!!#representing# the# vector# of# a# linear# combination# with# the#
explanatory#variables# (in# the#case#of#multivariate#analysis)#are#all#at#mean#
values.#When#Δ!! = 1,#or#!!#is#varying#by#one#unit,#then#MEM#for#variableQj(
can#be#expressed#as#shown#in#Eq.#(13).#!"!! = !!!(!!)# # # # # # # # ######(13)#
#
There#are# two#ways# to# translate# these# formulas# to#obtain#AME#and#MEM.#
Manually,#as#in#Eq.#(13),#MEM#can#be#computed#by#inserting#the#coefficient#






















# (9)# (10)# (11)# (12)#
lnco2# 0.030# 0.020# 0.021# 0.021#
# (1.360)# (1.360)# (1.360)# (1.360)#
lnforest# 0.049***# 0.033***# 0.034***# 0.038***#
# (5.360)# (5.540)# (5.550)# (5.550)#
deforest# Q0.003# Q0.002# Q0.002***# Q0.002***#
# (Q0.240)# (Q0.240)# (Q0.240)# (Q0.240)#
#govern# 0.185***# 0.128***# 0.129***# 0.127***#
# (3.820)# (3.920)# (3.910)# (3.920)#
lngdppc# Q0.115**# Q0.079***# Q0.080***# Q0.079***#
# (Q3.240)# (Q3.290)# (Q3.310)# (Q3.920)#
lninfant# 0.002# 0.013# 0.001# 0.089#
# (0.004)# (0.040)# (0.040)# (0.040)#
lnpop# 0.075***# 0.052***# 0.052***# 0.052***#
# (2.660)# (2.680)# (2.670)# (2.700)#
fdiinflow# 0.004# 0.003# 0.003# 0.003#
# (0.930)# (0.930)# (0.930)# (0.930)#
democracy# 0.010***# 0.007***# 0.007***# 0.007***#
# (2.900)# (2.940)# (2.940)# (2.943)#
xcolony# Q0.027# Q0.018# # #





consequently# increases# the# probability# of# receiving# mitigation# finance# by(
4.9%.# Despite# the# difficulty# of# implementing# reforestation# projects# that#
involve# economic# tradeQoffs# such# as# giving# up# land# that# can# be# used# for#
commercial# purposes# such#palmQoil# plantation,# the# incentives# that# donors#
offer# to#developing#countries# for#mitigating# their#national#GHG#emissions#
are#relatively#small.##
# #
Additionally,# a# rapid# expansion# or# protection# of# forests# without# careful#
social# and# economic# planning# can,# potentially# restrict# local# communities’#
access# to# the# forest# resources# on# which# they# depend.# Uncoordinated#







For# comparison#purposes,# Table# 3.6# presents# the#marginal# effects# at# three#
different# scenarios:#Marginal#Effects# at#Means# (MEMs),#Average#Marginal#
Effects# (AMEs),# and#Marginal# Effects# at# Representative#Values# (MERs)(of#
exQcolony# equals# to# 1# and# 0,# having# the# other# independent# variables# at#
mean#values.#
#
When#all# the#other# independent#variables# are#held# constant# at# their#mean#
values#(MEMs)#c9,#the#probability#of#a#developing#country#being#eligible#for#
mitigation# finance# commitment# is# 18.5%# higher# for# every# 0.1# increase# of#
average# governance# index,# ceteris( paribus.# While# holding# everything# else#
constant,# for# every# additional# 1%# increase# of# income# per# capita,# the#
probability# of# a# developing# country# being# eligible# for# mitigation# finance#
commitment#is#decreasing#by#11.5%.#Having#1%#larger#population#increases#
the#eligibility#for#mitigation#finance#by#7.5%,#ceteris(paribus.#If#a#democracy#
index# of# a# developing# country# is# increasing# by# one# unit,# its# eligibility# to#
receive# mitigation# finance# increases# by# 1%.# In# general,# governance# and#
income#per#capita#are#more#influential#determinants#than#other#donors#since#
its# marginal# effects# change# significantly# the# probability# of# a# developing#
country#to#be#mitigation#finance#recipient.#
#
Most#of# the# independent#variables# in#Table#3.6#are#continuous#rather# than#
discrete.# Therefore,# as# explained# earlier,# AME# only# estimates# an# infinite#
small# change.#This# is#proven#by#when#AME# for# lnco2,(govern,(and# lngdppc(











Tables# 3.7# and# 3.8# show# the# estimation# results# from# the# relationship# tests#


































# Selection# # # # # # Allocation# # # # # #
# GHGs+# CH4# N2O# HFCs# PFCs# SF6# GHGs+# CH4# N2O# HFCs# PFCs# SF6#
# (13)# (14)# (15)# (16)# (17)# (18)# (19)# (20)# (21)# (22)# (23)# (24)#
lnco2# # A0.566# A0.835***# A2.663**# A1.025# A0.207#### # 0.081# A0.619# A0.664# 1.269# A4.698*###
# # (A1.635)# (A2.615)# (A2.537)# (A0.648)# (A0.172)#### # (0.140)# (A1.125)# (A0.746)# (0.168)# (A1.790)####
lnforest# 0.678***# 0.570***# 0.566***# 0.095# 1.053**# 2.140***# 0.120# 0.395# 0.081# A0.036# 1.862# A0.949####
# (4.302)# (2.729)# (3.594)# (0.333)# (2.365)# (2.830)#### (0.403)# (1.352)# (0.319)# (A0.121)# (0.611)# (A0.839)####
deforest# A0.091# A0.052# A0.096# A0.555# 1.842**# 0.833#### 0.291# 0.153# 0.107# 0.411# A5.753# A1.776####
# (A0.471)# (A0.278)# (A0.515)# (A1.220)# (2.005)# (0.994)#### (1.054)# (0.584)# (0.405)# (0.517)# (A0.346)# (A0.749)####
govern# 1.835***# 1.842***# 1.608**# 0.702# 2.689# 4.422***# 0.458# 0.195# 0.505# 1.705# 21.723# A0.138####
# (2.697)# (2.917)# (2.563)# (0.585)# (1.118)# (2.791)#### (0.370)# (0.177)# (0.444)# (1.000)# (0.786)# (A0.032)####
lngdppc# A0.314# A0.142# 0.058# A0.343# 0.109# A1.396#### 0.452# 0.691# 0.679# 0.148# A10.500# 3.556####
# (A0.799)# (A0.395)# (0.161)# (A0.574)# (0.101)# (A1.541)#### (0.856)# (1.417)# (1.307)# (0.199)# (A0.828)# (1.323)####
lnghgcom# A0.538# # # # # ################ A0.263# # # # # ###################
# (A1.511)# # # # # ################ (A0.564)# # # # # ###################
lnch4# # A0.324# # # # ################ # A1.430*# # # # ###################
# # (A0.898)# # # # ################ # (A1.770)# # # # ###################
lnn2o# # # A0.379*# # # ################ # # A0.082# # # ###################
# # # (A1.815)# # # ################ # # (A0.341)# # # ###################
lnhfcs# # # # 0.778***# # ################ # # # 0.488**# # ###################
# # # # (2.681)# # ################ # # # (2.204)# # ###################
lnpfcs# # # # # A0.845# ################ # # # # A0.733# ###################
# # # # # (A1.598)# ################ # # # # (A0.479)# ###################
lnsf6# # # # # # 0.875**## # # # # # A0.919####
# # # # # # (2.330)#### # # # # # (A0.956)####
 χ2# 51.4# 55.1# 63.0# 36.3# 33.6# 28.4#### # # # # # ###################
R2# # # # # # ################ 0.286# 0.326# 0.298# 0.587# 0.870# 0.673####
Adjusted#R2# # # # # # ################ 0.060# 0.109# 0.072# 0.312# A0.434# 0.170####
PAvalues# 0.000# 0.000# 0.000# 0.014# 0.029# 0.100#### 0.001# 0.000# 0.001# 0.000# A0.434# 0.170####









# Selection# # # # # # Allocation# # # # # #
# GHGs+# CH4# N2O# HFCs# PFCs# SF6# GHGs+# CH4# N2O# HFCs# PFCs# SF6#
# (25)# (26)# (27)# (28)# (29)# (30)# (31)# (32)# (33)# (34)# (35)# (36)#
lnco2# # A0.286# A0.594*# A1.445# A3.426**# A0.824#### # A0.147# 0.265# A0.259# A1.108# A3.480####
# # (A0.828)# (A1.775)# (A1.175)# (A2.061)# (A0.683)#### # (A0.219)# (0.448)# (A0.199)# (A0.136)# (A1.487)####
lnforest# 0.429**# 0.514**# 0.412**# A0.094# 0.718*# 2.581**## 0.049# 0.087# 0.300# 0.243# 0.141# 0.929####
# (2.479)# (2.150)# (2.230)# (A0.452)# (1.781)# (1.978)#### (0.191)# (0.302)# (1.189)# (0.687)# (0.042)# (0.680)####
deforest# 0.202# 0.221# 0.128# 0.259# 3.762**# 1.580#### 0.818**# 0.722**# 0.595# 0.027# 3.636# A2.808####
# (0.851)# (0.880)# (0.570)# (0.504)# (2.302)# (1.313)#### (2.269)# (2.126)# (1.592)# (0.028)# (0.324)# (A1.074)####
govern# 1.649***# 1.355**# 1.364**# 0.659# 0.991# 3.651#### 1.343# 1.164# 0.568# 1.388# 4.824# 0.413####
# (2.692)# (2.426)# (2.463)# (0.530)# (0.543)# (1.352)#### (1.052)# (0.885)# (0.429)# (0.777)# (0.220)# (0.119)####
lngdppc# A0.130# 0.143# 0.182# 0.060# 0.943# A1.944#### 0.210# 0.303# 0.430# 0.405# A1.067# 1.103####
# (A0.336)# (0.408)# (0.504)# (0.103)# (1.397)# (A1.171)#### (0.410)# (0.631)# (0.811)# (0.609)# (A0.092)# (0.478)####
lnghgcom# A0.253# # # # # ################ 0.738*# # # # # ###################
# (A0.664)# # # # # ################ (2.003)# # # # # ###################
lnch4# # A0.590# # # # ################ # 0.886# # # # ###################
# # (A1.443)# # # # ################ # (1.106)# # # # ###################
lnn2o# # # A0.159# # # ################ # # A0.206# # # ###################
# # # (A0.665)# # # ################ # # (A0.617)# # # ###################
lnhfcs# # # # 0.402**# # ################ # # # 0.246# # ###################
# # # # (1.994)# # ################ # # # (1.049)# # ###################
lnpfcs# # # # # A1.148# ################ # # # # 0.290# ###################
# # # # # (A1.252)# ################ # # # # (0.157)# ###################
lnsf6# # # # # # 1.680**## # # # # # A0.183####
# # # # # # (2.303)#### # # # # # (A0.268)####
#χ2# 62.5# 54.7# 54.8# 32.1# 70.4# 25.7#### # # # # # ###################
R2# # # # # # ################ 0.617# 0.604# 0.599# 0.704# 0.950# 0.826####
Adjusted#R2# # # # # # ################ 0.421# 0.383# 0.376# 0.393# A0.058# 0.393####
PAvalues# 0.000# 0.000# 0.000# 0.043# 0.000# 0.176#### 0.000# 0.000# 0.000# 0.000# A0.058# 0.393####










5%# at# selection# stage# mitigation# finance# disbursement# (Table# 3.8,# c28),#
whereas# the# coefficients# of# sulphur# hexafluoride,# lnsf6,# are# positive# and#
significant# only# at# the# selection# stage# at# both# mitigation# finance#
commitment#and#disbursement# (Table#3.7,# c18#and#Table#3.8,# c30).#HFCs#










In# Table# 3.9,# rci,# indicating# the# trend# of# CO2# intensity# per# unit# of# GDP,#
appears#to#be#positive#and#significant#in#both#selection#(c37)#and#allocation#
(c38)# stages# at# 1%# and# 5%# respectively.# The# beta# coefficient# of# rci# is#
consistently#positive#and#significant#in#mitigation#finance#disbursement#at#
selection# stage# (c41).# It# shows# that# the#more# emissions# per# unit# of# GDP#
compared#to#the##previous#year,#the#higher#the#probability#of#a#developing#
country# being# eligible# for# mitigation# finance# and# the# more# mitigation#
finance# it# tends# to# receive.# This# unexpected# finding# shows# that# the#
increasing# intensity# of# emissions# of# developing# countries# positively#
determines#the#distribution#of#mitigation#finance#in#both#the#selection#and#





energy# used# per# unit# of# economic# activity# in# large# developing# countries#






# rci# # marine# # rci# # marine# #
# Selection# Allocation# Selection# Allocation# Selection# Allocation# Selection# Allocation#
# (37)# (38)# (39)# (40)# (41)# (42)# (43)# (44)#
lnco2# 0.003# 0.066# N0.174# N0.025#### N0.391**# 0.326*# N0.470***# N0.101####
# (0.021)# (0.314)# (N1.286)# (N0.134)#### (N2.337)# (1.667)# (N3.430)# (N0.570)####
lnforest# 0.144**# N0.060# 0.127***# N0.039#### 0.205***# N0.058# 0.161***# N0.042####
# (2.492)# (N0.653)# (2.861)# (N0.533)#### (3.116)# (N0.845)# (3.509)# (N0.720)####
deforest# N0.087# 0.349**# 0.063# 0.433***# 0.103# 0.132# 0.193***# 0.356***#
# (N1.074)# (2.538)# (1.002)# (4.097)#### (0.982)# (1.413)# (2.582)# (4.376)####
govern# 0.737**# 0.720# 0.547**# 0.949***# 0.899**# 1.279***# 0.570**# 0.593**##
# (2.106)# (1.634)# (2.294)# (3.213)#### (2.453)# (3.406)# (2.359)# (2.401)####
lngdppc# N0.333# N0.375# N0.380*# N0.492**## 0.058# N0.741***# N0.130# N0.553**##
# (N1.493)# (N1.514)# (N1.914)# (N1.982)#### (0.238)# (N2.778)# (N0.679)# (N2.444)####
lninfant# N0.066# N0.011# N0.197# N0.230#### 0.386# N0.278# N0.068# N0.599***#
# (N0.238)# (N0.040)# (N0.917)# (N0.896)#### (1.466)# (N1.062)# (N0.320)# (N2.667)####
lnpop# 0.514**# 0.940***# 0.730***# 0.923***# 0.977***# 0.519**# 1.025***# 1.052***#
# (2.455)# (3.580)# (4.164)# (3.857)#### (4.433)# (2.011)# (5.788)# (4.512)####
fdiinflow# N0.002# 0.093**# 0.010# 0.060***# N0.003# N0.000# 0.002# 0.066***#
# (N0.063)# (2.349)# (0.446)# (2.909)#### (N0.078)# (N0.002)# (0.094)# (2.632)####
democracy# 0.052**# 0.066**# 0.047***# 0.029#### 0.033# 0.044*# 0.047***# 0.052***#
# (2.242)# (2.021)# (2.745)# (1.218)#### (1.445)# (1.710)# (2.702)# (2.687)####
xcolony# 0.032# 0.232# N0.040# 0.166#### 0.200# 0.453*# 0.187# 0.330####
# (0.123)# (0.847)# (N0.194)# (0.616)#### (0.754)# (1.775)# (0.883)# (1.452)####
rci# 0.399***# 0.239***# # ################ 0.383***# 0.015# # ################
# (3.367)# (2.624)# # ################ (3.467)# (0.170)# # ################
marine# # # 0.024***# 0.017**## # # 0.023***# 0.015**##
# # # (2.986)# (2.164)#### # # (2.830)# (2.110)####
#χ2# 151.4# # 215.8# ################ 167.9# # 231.1# ################
R2# # 0.365# # 0.318#### # 0.438# # 0.420####
Adjusted#
R2#
# 0.328# # 0.290#### # 0.403# # 0.395####
PNvalues# 0.000# 0.000# 0.000# 0.000#### 0.000# 0.000# 0.000# 0.000####










higher# quantity# of# emissions.# This# chapter# shows# that# the# developing#
countries#with#the#highest#emissions#in#terms#of#GWP#are#countries#with#
industrial# economies# such#as#Brazil# and#Turkey.#Using# these#parameters#
tends# to#deter# such# countries# from#controlling# their# emissions,# as#higher#
emissions#increase#their#eligibility#for#mitigation#finance.#It#also#potentially#






eligible# for#mitigation# finance# and# also# receive#more#mitigation# finance.#
Donors# seem# to# rely# on# the# assumption# that# emissions# can# be# reduced#
alongside#or#as#a#longNterm#byNproduct#of#protecting#marine#biodiversity,#





developing# countries,# and# mitigation# finance# inflows# depend# on# these#
countries’#potential#for#reducing#their#emissions.#This#section#shows#how#
certain# characteristics# representing# such# potential,# namely# greenhouse#
gases#with#high#GWP,# increasing#rates#of#CO2# intensity#per#unit#of#GDP,#








This# section# contrasts# the# distribution# of# mitigation# finance,# poverty##
aid#and#overall#ODA#commitment#in#two#stages.#Several#determinants#affect#




First,# the# relationship# between# overall# ODA# and# lnco2# is# negative# and#
significant# at# 1%# (Table# 3.10,# c47).# Poverty# aid# also# has# a# negative#
relationship#with#lnco2(although#only#statisitically#significant#at#1%#(c45).#CO2#
emission#levels#tend#to#have#a#negative#effect#on#of#overall#ODA#and#poverty#


























# Selection# Allocation# Selection# Allocation#
# (45)# (46)# (47)# (48)##
lnco2# N0.249*# N0.011# N7.566***# N0.026####
# (N1.667)# (N0.335)# (N5.130)# (N0.889)####
lnforest# 0.229***# N0.025# 0.847***# 0.001####
# (5.183)# (N1.492)# (3.120)# (0.071)####
deforest# 0.230***# 0.033# 2.012***# 0.087***#
# (3.552)# (1.354)# (4.018)# (4.363)####
govern# 0.785***# 0.272***# 5.515***# 0.409***#
# (3.381)# (3.513)# (3.330)# (5.921)####
lngdppc# N0.303# N0.479***# 1.534***# N0.508***#
# (N1.533)# (N8.946)# (2.849)# (N10.716)####
lninfant# 0.886***# 0.069# 10.579***# 0.052####
# (4.416)# (1.168)# (4.918)# (0.978)####
lnpop# 0.527***# 0.514***# 6.672***# 0.538***#
# (2.960)# (12.641)# (5.584)# (14.617)####
fdiinflow# N0.014# 0.023***# 0.066# 0.016***#
# (N0.577)# (3.789)# (1.041)# (3.027)####
democracy# 0.040**# 0.024***# N0.191**# 0.022***#
# (2.234)# (4.246)# (N2.270)# (4.093)####
xcolony# N0.345# 0.160***# N3.050***# 0.165***#
# (N1.606)# (2.654)# (N4.516)# (2.740)####
 χ2# 242.1# # 96.3# ################
R2# # 0.609# # 0.623####
Adjusted#
R2#
# 0.600# # 0.616####
PNvalues# 0.000# 0.000# 0.000# 0.000####




Secondly,# the# social# variable# (lninfant)# is# a# positive# determinant# of# poverty#
aid,# significant# at# 1%# indicating# that# social# development# is# still# a# strong#
concern#at#the#selection#stage.#It#is#insignificant#at#the#allocation#stage.#A#high#
level# of# corruption# in#poor# countries# often#becomes# a# barrier# for#donors# to#
provide#more#poverty#aid#(Gibson#et(al.,#2005,#p.#87).#There#is#lack#of#evidence#
on#whether#mitigation#finance#has#a#social#development#impact#and#seems#to#











an# important# condition# for#mitigation# finance# –# positive# and# significant# at#
1%,# but# overall#ODA# is# also# allocated# to# nonNdemocratic# environment# and#
there#are# increasing#development#activities# in# the# fragile# states#and#conflict#
zones#(de#Mesquita#&#Smith,#2013;#Zürcher,#2012).#
#
A# few# determinants# affect# mitigation# finance# and# overall# ODA# provisions#
differently,#but#carbon#sinks#(lnforest),#governance#and#population#determine#
both# in# a# similar# manner.# First,# lnforest# is# significant# and# a# strong#
determinant#of#all#aid#categories#(Table#3.5,#c1#and#Table#3.10,#c45#and#c47).#
There# is#a#strong#association#between#forests#or#a# large#area#of#natural#sink#
and# ODA.# Potentially# many# development# activities# take# place# in# richN
forested#developing# countries# due# to# a# close# relationship# between#poverty,#
livelihood# and# access# to# environmental# resources# (Kamanga# et( al.,# 2009;#
NaughtonNTreves# et( al.,# 2011).# Third,# the# relationship# between# infant#
mortality# (lninfant)# and# overall# ODA# is# positive# and# significant# at# 1%,#
indicating#that#poverty#and#social#development#are#still#major#determinants#
of#overall#ODA#allocation.#The#magnitude#of#its#beta#coefficient#10.579#is#very#




finance# and#overall#ODA# # (compare#Table# 3.10,# c45,# c47# and#Table# 3.5,# c1).#




gatekeeper# of# overall# ODA’s# eligibility# criteria# and# mitigation# finance’s#
allocation#criteria.#The#beta# coefficient#of#overall#ODA# is# larger# in# selection#
stage# and# otherwise# for# mitigation# finance.# Surprisingly,# in# general,#
qualifying#for#general#ODA#demands#better#governance#than#qualifying#for#
mitigation# finance.# While# in# mitigation# finance,# governance# is#
complementary#to#objective#parameters#of#mitigation#finance.##
#
There# is# a# consistent# significantly# negative# relationship# with# income# per#
capita# and# a# significantly# positive# relationship# with# population# in# all#























economy#of#nonNindustrial# countries# is# still# a#major#general# concern#of# aid.#
This# emission# variable#may# have# less# relevance# in# the# case# of# poverty# aid,#




the# case# of# overall# aid# (c47)# than# in# that# of# poverty# aid# (c45),# and# the#
coefficient#of#deforest(behaves#in#a#similar#way.#While#deforest(is#insignificant#
at# the#selection#stage#for#poverty#aid,# it# is#strongly#significant# in#the#case#of#
overall# aid# (c48).#There# is# a# tendency# for# the# allocation#of# overall# aid# to#be#
influenced#by#environmental#problems#such#as#deforestation.#It#is#also#worth#
noting# that# the# coefficient# of# governance# (govern)( in# poverty# aid# is#weaker#
than# that# in# overall# aid.# The# coefficient# of# govern( at# the# selection# stage# for#
poverty#aid#(c45)#is#7.8#times#smaller#than#that#at#the#same#stage#of#overall#aid#
(c47).# It# is# likely# that# poverty# aid# is# allocated# to# countries# with# weak#




also# slightly# different.# The# coefficient# of# income# per# capita# (lngdppc)# is#
positive#at#the#selection#stage#for#overall#aid#(c47)#while#it#is#insignificant#in#
the# case#of#poverty# aid# (c45).#The#positive# relationship#between#overall# aid#
and# income#per# capita# contradicts#ODA’s# intended#objective# of#developing#
the#economies#of#poorer#countries#and#regions.#It#is#understandable#that#the#
coefficient# of# lngdppc( for# poverty# aid# is# insignificant# when# this# particular#












This# section# discusses# which# global# atmospheric# pollution# treaties# to#




key# requirements# for# the# success# of# international# negotiations# on# climate#
change# and# of# mitigating# emissions# globally.# There# is# an# urgent# need# for#
serious#commitment,#ideally#to#legallyNbinding#emission#targets,#by#not#only#
developed# but# also# developing# countries,# particularly# China,# India,# Brazil,#
Mexico# and#other# economies# in# transition# (Chandler# et( al.,# 2002).#Currently#
developing# countries# are# tending# to#postpone# their# commitment# to# legallyN
binding# emission# targets# because# they# fear# that# it#will# limit# their# economic#
growth# (Bodansky,#2010a,#p.# 112).#Another# reason# is#an# increasing#demand#
calling#for#global#environmental#justice,#as#climate#change#is#known#to#have#
been#caused#by#rich#nations’#historical#industrial#economic#development#and#
to# affect# severely# poor# and#vulnerable# in# developing# countries# (Okereke#&#
Schroeder,#2009).##
#
At# COP15# some# developing# countries# committed# to# nonNlegallyNbinding#
targets#measured# against# different# factors.# Brazil,# Indonesia,#Mexico,# South#
Africa# and# South#Korea# committed# to# reducing# their# emissions# against# the#
level#of#businessNasNusual#(BAU)#set#by#IPCC#First#Assessment#Report#(1990)#
by#36.1%N38.9%,#26%,#30%,#34%#and#30%#respectively,#and#China#and#India#





are# neither# financial# nor# legal# consequences# if# they# fail# to# fulfil# these#




Sandler# (2004)# explains# that# international# negotiations# as# a# form# of# global#
collective# action# that# aims# to# mitigate# two# different# types# of# atmospheric#
pollution,#may#have#different#outcomes.#The#world#has#been#successful#with#
treaties# curbing# stratospheric# ozoneNdepleting# substances# such# as#
chlorofluorocarbons# (CFCs)# and# bromideNbased# substances.#However,# little#





Secondly,# ultraNviolet# radiation# resulting# from# the# increase# in# these# ozoneN
depleting#substances#has#an#equal# impact#on#all#humans#on#earth,#whereas#
the# negative# impacts# of# climate# change# are# global# but# are# not# equally#
distributed.# Some# countries# can# benefit# from# increasing# temperatures,# for#












tetrachloride# and# methyl# chloroform;# and# nonNbinding# cuts# to#
hydrochlorofluorocarbons#(HCFCs)#
(3) the# 1992# Copenhagen# Amendment# to# the# Montreal# Protocol# to#







The# first# three# agreements# crucially# support# the# successful# elimination# of#
ozoneNdepleting# substances# (Sandler,# 2004,# p.# 216)# and# the# latter# two#
ambitiously#aim#to#mitigate#all#GHG#emissions.#According#to#Sandler# there#
are# diverging# outcomes# of# mitigating# ozone# depleting# substances# and#
mitigating# GHG# emissions# and# thus# two# different# responses# which#
differentiate# the# first# three# agreements# from# the# Rio# Conventions# and# the#
Kyoto# Protocol.# The# hypothesis# is# that# mitigation# finance# responds# to# the#
latter# two# more# than# to# the# first# three# agreements,# which# may# influence#
mitigation# finance# inflows# as# commitment# to# these# agreements# shows# the##
persistence# of# a# country’s# environmental# commitment# in# mitigating# CFCs#
hydrochlorofluorocarbons# (HCFCs)# and# hydrobromochlorofluN# orocarbons#





and# ‘2’# for#a#party,# the#highest# level#of# commitment.# In# this# study# the# total#
score# for# the# five# agreements# is# called# the# ‘climate# treaty# index’.# To# avoid#




includes# five# variables# representing# five# individual# treaties.# The# status# of#
each# country# on# each# agreement# is# obtained# from#NASA’s# Environmental#
Treaties# and# Resource# Indicators# (ENTRI)# compiled# by# its# Socioeconomic#
Data# and# Application# Centre# (SEDAC),# which# is# hosted# by# the# Center# for#
International# Earth# Science# Information# Network# at# Colombia# University#
(CIESINNSEDAC,#2011).#
#
In#Table#3.11,#all# five#treaty#variables#are# tested#simultaneously#with#all# the#
main# variables# listed# in# Eq.# (1).# As# expected,# developing# countries# being#
parties# or# signatories# to# agreements# prior# to# the#Rio#Conventions#does# not#
significantly#influence#their#being#selected#to#receive,#mitigation#finance.#The#
coefficients# of# these# treaties# are# not# significant# in# either# its# commitment# or#
the# disbursement# of# mitigation# finance# (Table# 3.11,# c49,# c51,# c53,# c55).#
Interestingly,# the# other# two# treaties# –# the# Rio# Conventions# and# the# Kyoto#
Protocol# –# significantly# influence# the# allocation# of# mitigation# finance# in#
opposing#ways.#The#coefficients#of# the#Rio#Conventions#are#negative# in# the#
allocation# stage# for# both#mitigation# finance# commitment# and#disbursement#
(c51,#c55).##
         










# Selection# Allocation# Selection# Allocation#
# Model#1# Model#2# Model#1# Model#
2#
Model#1# Model#2# Model#1# Model#2#
# #(49)# #(50)# #(51)# #(52)# #(53)# #(54)# #(55)# #(56)#
lnco2# 0.109# 0.057# 0.136# 0.092# N0.057# N0.091# 0.292**# 0.285**##
# (1.060)# (0.589)# (1.006)# (0.688)# (N0.549)# (N0.922)# (2.277)# (2.211)####
lnforest# 0.154***# 0.169***# 0.043# 0.049# 0.230***# 0.239***# 0.040# 0.048####
# (3.835)# (4.274)# (0.641)# (0.749)# (5.338)# (5.694)# (0.753)# (0.948)####
deforest# N0.026# N0.019# 0.291***# 0.298***# 0.073# 0.063# 0.211***# 0.254***#
# (N0.440)# (N0.338)# (3.229)# (3.296)# (1.112)# (0.969)# (2.939)# (3.469)####
govern# 0.819***# 0.775***# 1.187***# 1.136***# 0.948***# 0.898***# 1.130***# 1.109***#
# (3.664)# (3.523)# (4.111)# (3.985)# (4.100)# (3.963)# (5.020)# (4.879)####
lngdppc# N0.415**# N0.383**# N0.644***# N0.499**# N0.257# N0.217# N0.921***# N0.785***#
# (N2.547)# (N2.449)# (N2.972)# (N2.440)# (N1.568)# (N1.391)# (N4.917)# (N4.175)####
lninfant# 0.155# 0.080# N0.162# N0.041# 0.296# 0.251# N0.430**# N0.297####
# (0.827)# (0.432)# (N0.635)# (N0.166)# (1.582)# (1.357)# (N2.024)# (N1.436)####
lnpop# 0.368***# 0.386***# 0.579***# 0.675***# 0.455***# 0.483***# 0.418***# 0.447***#
# (2.788)# (3.029)# (3.516)# (4.058)# (3.526)# (3.840)# (2.604)# (2.730)####
fdiinflow# 0.022# 0.020# 0.039**# 0.050***# 0.015# 0.015# N0.000# 0.003####
# (1.109)# (0.935)# (2.044)# (2.732)# (0.896)# (0.867)# (N0.022)# (0.130)####
democracy# 0.027*# 0.034**# 0.003# 0.004# 0.019# 0.021# 0.019# 0.019####
# (1.780)# (2.345)# (0.149)# (0.193)# (1.221)# (1.441)# (1.097)# (1.087)####
xcolony# N0.046# N0.137# 0.073# N0.045# N0.021# N0.072# 0.087# 0.024####
# (N0.258)# (N0.793)# (0.296)# (N0.192)# (N0.111)# (N0.404)# (0.414)# (0.115)####
ozonelayer1985# 0.003# # 0.307# # 0.209# # N0.169# ################
# (0.021)# # (1.256)# # (1.363)# # (N0.744)# ################
amendmontrealpro
tlondon90#
0.016# # 0.254# # 0.121# # 0.132# ################
(0.144)# # (1.610)# # (1.035)# # (1.018)# ################
amendmontrealpro
tcopenhag92#
0.025# # N0.172# # N0.048# # 0.018# ################
(0.240)# # (N1.318)# # (N0.445)# # (0.168)# ################
rioconventions92# 0.303# # N0.887***# # 0.116# # N1.044***# ################
(0.921)# # (N2.640)# # (0.380)# # (N3.793)# ################
kyotoprotocol97# 0.558***# # 0.052# # 0.273*# # 0.057# ################
# (3.699)# # (0.251)# # (1.754)# # (0.357)# ################
climatetreatyindex# # 0.082**# # 0.046# # 0.088**# # 0.003####
# # (2.015)# # (0.771)# # (2.054)# # (0.063)####
#χ2# 269.9# 260.6# # # 320.2# 302.3# # ################
R2# # # 0.281# 0.271# # # 0.360# 0.346####
Adjusted#R2# # # 0.253# 0.247# # # 0.334# 0.324####
PNvalues# 0.000# 0.000# 0.000# 0.000# 0.000# 0.000# 0.000# 0.000####
N# 1094# 1094# 638# 638# 1094# 1094# 608# 608####
# # # # # # # # #







climate# treaty,# appears# to# be# an# important# factor# for# receiving# mitigation#
finance.# Developing# countries# with# this# commitment# status# tend# to# be#
selected# as# recipients,# although# those# selected# do# not# necessarily# receive#
more#mitigation# finance# (c51,#c55).#The#coefficient#kyotoprotocol97( is#positive#
and# significant# at# 1%# (c49).# The# positive# relationship# is# also# stable# in# the#
disbursement# of# mitigation# finance# (c53).# It# is# possible# that# developing#
countries’#participation#as#either#signatories#or#parties#to#the#Kyoto#Protocol#
demonstrates# their# commitment# to# involve# in# solving#global# environmental#
problems.# Hence,# donors# appreciate# their# commitment# by# providing#
mitigation# finance# to# fund# climate# projects# in# these# environmentally#
committed#countries.##
#
The# coefficient# kyotoprotocol97( (0.558)( is# almost# sevenfold# that# of#
climatetreatyindex((0.082)#–#statistically#significant#at#1%#and#5%#respectively#N#




















The# focus# of# analysis# of# this# section# is# to# compare# the# magnitude# of# the#
coefficients# and# the# statistical# significance# of# the# determinants# of# the# three#
aid#categories# in# the# two#periods# (see# the# timeline#of# the#Kyoto#Protocol# in#
Figure# 3.8).# The# comparative# analysis# of# the# three# aid# categories# are#
performed#using# an# identical# period# of# observation.# In# the# case# of# poverty#
aid#and#overall#ODA,# the#period#may#not#be# related# to#any# relevant# event,#
but# these# two# categories# are# set# identically# to# the# period# of# observation# of#
mitigation# finance# to# identify# whether# climateNrelated# determinants#
influenced# the# allocation# of# overall# ODA# in# the# similar# manner# as# the#
allocation# of# mitigation# finance# in# the# same# time# frame.# The# analysis# of#
overall#ODA#is#extended#to#before#the#adoption#of#the#Kyoto#Protocol#(1990N











































have# influenced# the# donors’# perceptions# of# how#much#money# they# should#




In# this# section# important# global# events# relevant# to# climate# change#
negotiations#are#discussed#together#with#the#estimation#results.#These#events#
may# influence#global#policy#concerned#with# the#provision#and#allocation#of#




Before# the# adoption# of# the#Kyoto#Protocol# in# 1997,# several# relevant#
and# important# events# (see# Figure# 3.8)# had# an# impact# on# international#




In# the# early# 1990s,# some# Asian# countries,# notably# South# Korea,# China,#
India# and# Indonesia,# experienced# economic# booms.# Alesina# and# Dollar#
(2000)# argue# that# these# countries’# good# policy# environments# accelerate#
development# aid# contributing# to# this# success.# The# estimation# shown# in#




governance# (govern),# population# (lnpop),# income#per# capita# (lngdppc)# and#
democracy# (democracy)# were# major# determinants# of# the# allocation# of#
overall#ODA# –# statistically# significant# at# 1%# and# 5%.# This# indicates# that#
recipients# with# better# governance,# lower# income# per# capita,# larger#
populations# and#more#democratic# tended# to# receive#more#ODA# inflows,#
ceteris( paribus.# There# is# lack# of# attention# to# the# social# development#
parameter# lninfant,# which# is# positive# but# insignificant.# Democracy# was#



























lnco2# 0.101#### N0.019#### N0.028#### N0.028#### 0.160#### N0.060#### N0.065####
# (1.190)#### (N0.095)#### (N0.576)#### (N0.643)#### (0.973)#### (N1.301)#### (N1.519)####
lnforest# N0.038#### 0.155#### N0.041#### 0.022#### 0.026#### N0.053**## N0.002####
# (N0.929)#### (1.237)#### (N1.402)#### (1.151)#### (0.372)#### (N2.215)#### (N0.117)####
deforest# 0.146*### 0.377**## 0.010#### 0.112***# 0.275***# 0.029#### 0.057**##
# (1.727)#### (2.087)#### (0.214)#### (3.828)#### (2.797)#### (0.776)#### (2.085)####
govern# 0.496***# 1.147**## 0.239**## 0.462***# 1.170***# 0.094#### 0.336***#
# (2.882)#### (2.439)#### (2.017)#### (5.607)#### (3.613)#### (0.767)#### (3.268)####
lngdppc# N0.447**## N0.458#### N0.432***# N0.514***# N0.596**## N0.473***# N0.443***#
# (N2.595)#### (N1.320)#### (N4.858)#### (N7.594)#### (N2.509)#### (N6.040)#### (N6.373)####
lninfant# 0.262#### 0.078#### 0.226**## 0.038#### N0.194#### 0.036#### 0.090####
# (1.149)#### (0.187)#### (2.094)#### (0.462)#### (N0.669)#### (0.406)#### (1.328)####
lnpop# 0.388***# 0.553**## 0.488***# 0.509***# 0.719***# 0.613***# 0.608***#
# (3.873)#### (2.096)#### (8.130)#### (9.636)#### (3.618)#### (10.630)#### (11.467)####
fdiinflow# N0.006#### 0.026#### 0.001#### 0.003#### 0.060**## 0.037***# 0.035***#
# (N1.494)#### (1.261)#### (0.141)#### (0.817)#### (2.143)#### (3.722)#### (5.071)####
democracy# 0.032**## N0.034#### 0.010#### 0.009#### 0.028#### 0.031***# 0.028***#
# (2.011)#### (N0.977)#### (1.034)#### (1.338)#### (1.110)#### (3.427)#### (3.655)####
xcolony# 0.232#### N0.062#### 0.010#### 0.067#### N0.116#### 0.216**## 0.159**##
# (1.111)#### (N0.150)#### (0.098)#### (0.781)#### (N0.399)#### (2.541)#### (1.969)####
R2# 0.536#### 0.217#### 0.657#### 0.611#### 0.302#### 0.631#### 0.640####
Adjusted#R2# 0.487#### 0.169#### 0.636#### 0.600#### 0.279#### 0.618#### 0.630####
PNvalues# 0.000#### 0.000#### 0.000#### 0.000#### 0.000#### 0.000#### 0.000####
N# 105#### 244#### 244#### 531#### 425#### 425#### 550####





Interestingly# deforestation# variable# influenced# overall# ODA# before# the#
negotiation#of#Kyoto#Protocol#was#ratified#in#1997#–#deforest(is#positive#and#
statistically#significant#at#10%,#ceteris(paribus.# It# is#possible#that#in#this#era#




on# improving# the# economic# growth# of# lowNincome# recipient# countries#
with#good#governance#via#measures#such#as#structural#adjustment,#market#
liberalisation# and# trade# (Kremer# et( al.,# 2009).# It# is# often# claimed# that# the#
rapid# economic# growth# of# these# countries# is# the# result# of# positive#




activity#was#still# in# its# infancy#and# few#studies#explored# the# relationship#
between# climate# change# and# development# activities.# The# main# studies#
during# this# period# are# the# First# Assessment# and#Working# Group# IPCC#
reports# in#1990#and# its# three# supplementary# reports# in#1992# (IPCC,#1990,#
1992a,# 1992b,# 1992c).# The# report# of#Working# Group# III# highlighting# the#




Following# the# adoption# of# the# Kyoto# Protocol# in# 1997# there# was# a#
transitional# period#when# the# response# to# climate# change#was# erratically#
mainstreamed# into# global# development# policies# and# ODA.# However,#




challenged# this# process.# The# adoption# of# the# Kyoto# Protocol# coincided#
with#the#onset#of#Asian#economic#crisis#and#the#2000#US#election#–#won#by#




extent# from#continuing# their# support# for# the# resolution#of# global# climate#
change#problems,# and#partly# account# for# the# 2000# shortfall# in#mitigation#
finance#commitment#from#overall#ODA#(see#the#decreasing#trend#in#2000#
in# Figure# 2.2).#Nevertheless,# as# the# date# for# the#Kyoto# Protocol# to# come#
into#force#approached,#Japan’s#international#diplomacy#actively#worked#to#
persuade#more#countries# to# ratify# it# including#negotiating#with#Russia,#a#
country# with# a# large# economic# and# political# capacity,# whose# position#
became#crucial#to#the#fulfilment#of#the#second#condition#(MOFA,#2004).#On#
November# 18# 2004,# 90# days# before# the# Kyoto# Protocol# came# into# effect,#
Russia#finally#ratified#it,#although#the#US#and#Australia#did#not.##
#
In# 1998N2004# there# is# no# obvious# evidence# that# allocation# of# mitigation#
finance#was# strong#determined#by# the#objectives#of#mitigation# finance# to#
reduce#global#emissions.#It#was#still#largely#influenced#by#the#determinants#
of# overall# ODA,# namely# governance# and# population# with# a# growing#
interest# in#recipient#countries#with#higher#deforestation#rates# (Table#3.12,#
c58).# The# coefficient# of# lnforest( of# mitigation# finance# is# greater# than# the#
1991N98#overall#ODA’s# (c57).# In#1998N2004,# the# coefficients#of#governance(
(govern)#in#the#case#of#mitigation#finance,#poverty#aid,#overall#ODA(are#all#
positive#and#significant#at#5%#and#1%.#As# the#coefficient#of#govern( in# the#
case# of#mitigation# finance# (c58)# is# larger# than# in# the# case# of# poverty# aid#
(c59)#and#overall#ODA#(c60),#for#every#increase#of#one#average#point#on#the#









influenced# the# allocation# of# mitigation# finance# –# lnco2( and# lnforest# are#
insignificant#(c58).#Possibly#much#attention#turned#to#persuading#as#many#








In# the# years# after# the# Kyoto# Protocol# became# legally# binding# for#
which# mitigation# finance# data# are# available,# i.e.# 2005N2010,# there# were#
academic# and# policyNrelated# movements# to# promote# more# active# global#
responses#to#climate#change.#In#2007#the#influential#and#contentious#Stern#
report#on#the#economics#of#climate#change#was#released#at#the#same#time#
as# the# IPCC’s# fourth#assessment# report# (IPCC,# 2007;# Stern,# 2008a).#These#
events#promoted#a#more#active#global#response#to#climate#change#and#are#
likely#to#have#contributed#to#increased#disbursement#of#and#commitment#
to#mitigation# finance# from# 2006# onwards# (see# the# increasing# trend# after#
2006# in# Figure# 2.2).# Donors# started# implementing# national# carbon#
mitigation#policies#and#there#were#real#intentions#to#also#begin#working#to#
mitigate# emissions# in# developing# countries.# From# 2005,# donors#













countries#with# larger# areas# of# forest.# The# greater# their# forested# area,# the#
more# funding# these# countries# received,( ceteris(paribus.#The#estimations#of#
poverty#aid#and#overall#ODA#in#c62#and#c63#show#that#recipients#with#a#
higher#level#of#democracy#and#with#exNcolonial#status#are#rewarded#with#
more# poverty# aid# and# overall# ODA# N# significant# at# 1%.# However,# these#
characteristics# are# not# significant# determinants# of# mitigation# finance.#
Mitigation#finance,#with#its#specific#targets,#is#effective#when#the#recipients#
have# natural# capacity# to#mitigate# emissions,# therefore# the# two# variables#
representing# political# interests# are# less# applicable# in# the# allocation# of#
mitigation#finance.#
#
In# this# period,# FDI# inflow,# income#per# capita# and#population# turn# to# be#
strong#determinants#of#all#three#aid#categories#–#statistically#significant#at#
5%# and# 1%# (c61Nc63).# There# is# an# indication# that# a# developing# country#
whose# GDP# largely# depends# on# foreign# investment# tends# to# receive#
mitigation# finance.# Foreign# investment# related# to# climate# change# sectors#
such# as# renewable# and# alternative# energy# and# their# accompanying#
technologies#may# account# for# donors’# access# to# international# investment#
opportunities#offered#by#the#recipient#countries.#An#increasing#intensity#of#




development# explains# the# importance# of# FDI# inflow#as# a#determinant# of#
aid# allocation# in# both# categories# after# 2005# (DECC,# 2013;# Pattberg# &#
Stripple,# 2008;# Selaya#&# Sunesen,# 2012).# In# this# period,# large#developing#
recipient# countries# with# large# populations# and# lower# income# per# capita#
tended# to#receive#aid# in#all# categories.# If# this# is# the#case,#a#small#country#
bias#–#with#the#coefficient#of# lnpop(smaller#than#1#–#characterises#all#three#





Mitigation# finance# disbursement# reflects# mitigation# finance#





The# results# from# disbursement# data# in# the# two# periods# of# the# Kyoto#
Protocol# show# evidence# that,# only# in# the# period# of# 1998N2004# CO2#
emissions# (lnco2)# is# a# significant# determinant# of# mitigation# finance# –#
positive#and#significant#at#5%#(Table#3.13,#c65).#During#the#negotiations#on#
the# Kyoto# Protocol# (1998N2004)# donors# disbursed# a# larger# amount# of#
mitigation#finance#to#recipients#with#higher#emissions.#In#the#same#period,#
governance#(govern)#turns#to#be#an#insignificant#determinant#of#mitigation#
finance# (c65).# Donors# become# less# stringent# to# use# governance# and#































Regressors# # # # # # # #
lnco2# N0.043#### 0.516**## 0.052#### 0.069#### 0.223#### N0.039#### N0.041####
# (N0.439)#### (2.549)#### (0.881)#### (1.611)#### (1.529)#### (N0.811)#### (N0.904)####
lnforest# N0.016#### 0.068#### N0.036#### N0.022#### 0.044#### N0.041*### 0.005####
# (N0.355)#### (0.839)#### (N1.068)#### (N1.216)#### (0.709)#### (N1.958)#### (0.286)####
deforest# 0.099#### 0.354***# N0.008#### 0.094***# 0.183**## 0.000#### 0.021####
# (1.284)#### (3.373)#### (N0.158)#### (3.319)#### (2.078)#### (0.007)#### (0.654)####
govern# 0.341**## 0.453#### 0.113#### 0.462***# 1.492***# 0.105#### 0.349***#
# (2.022)#### (1.525)#### (0.703)#### (5.497)#### (5.320)#### (0.900)#### (3.521)####
lngdppc# N0.400**## N0.749***# N0.621***# N0.624***# N0.909***# N0.527***# N0.536***#
# (N2.381)#### (N2.965)#### (N6.787)#### (N8.941)#### (N4.075)#### (N6.901)#### (N7.930)####
lninfant# 0.036#### 0.219#### 0.175#### 0.116#### N0.583**## N0.006#### N0.006####
# (0.153)#### (0.910)#### (1.554)#### (1.468)#### (N2.197)#### (N0.068)#### (N0.082)####
lnpop# 0.473***# N0.064#### 0.327***# 0.354***# 0.622***# 0.493***# 0.509***#
# (4.017)#### (N0.251)#### (4.927)#### (6.975)#### (3.323)#### (8.756)#### (9.132)####
fdiinflow# N0.001#### N0.038#### N0.000#### N0.000#### 0.023#### 0.038***# 0.037***#
# (N0.349)#### (N1.424)#### (N0.034)#### (N0.100)#### (0.983)#### (3.572)#### (4.989)####
democracy# 0.018#### 0.008#### N0.000#### N0.000#### 0.023#### 0.012#### 0.010####
# (1.113)#### (0.333)#### (N0.015)#### (N0.076)#### (1.012)#### (1.430)#### (1.325)####
xcolony# 0.210#### N0.077#### 0.009#### 0.040#### N0.025#### 0.148*### 0.116####
# (0.968)#### (N0.229)#### (0.079)#### (0.463)#### (N0.100)#### (1.741)#### (1.386)####
# # ################ # ################ ################ # ###################
R2# 0.527#### 0.356#### 0.597#### 0.564#### 0.373#### 0.597#### 0.607####
Adjusted#R2# 0.475#### 0.310#### 0.572#### 0.552#### 0.351#### 0.583#### 0.596####
PNvalues# 0.000#### 0.000#### 0.000#### 0.000#### 0.000#### 0.000#### 0.000####
N# 102#### 208#### 242#### 522#### 430#### 417#### 542####




Of# all# the# variables# tested# in# this# chapter,# income# per# capita# (lngdppc)#
appears#to#be#the#only#one#that#consistently#influences#mitigation#finance#
across# different# periods# and# categories# (Table# 3.13,# c64Nc70).# A# negative#
relationship# between# the# actual# allocation# of# mitigation# finance# and#
income#per#capita#aligns#with#the#hypothesis#set#in#this#chapter,#indicating#
that# mitigation# finance,# like# poverty# aid# and# ODA# overall,# carries# a#
mission# to# support# and# promote# poor# developing# countries’# economic#




benefits# that# are# shared# with# all# countries# on# Earth,# still# has# a# strong#
developmental# economic# feature,# showing# that# its# allocation# adheres# to#









tend# to# receive# more# mitigation# finance.# There# is# a# delay# in# using# CO2#
emissions#and#in#decisionNmaking#about#allocation#until#the#actual#funding#is#







However,# the# risk# of# diverting# overall# ODA# from# addressing# social#
development# is# unavoidable# if# the# share# of# mitigation# finance# in# climate#









per# unit# of# GDP# even# though# the# resulting# reduction# may# be# small# and#
apparently#insignificant.##
#
There# is# strong# evidence# that# developing# countries’# commitment# to# the#
Kyoto#Protocol#is#an#important#criterion#for#receiving#mitigation#finance#and#
that# the#effects#of# the#natural# characteristics#of#developing#countries#on# the#
probability# of# receiving#mitigation# finance# vary# according# to# the# results# of#
dynamic# interactions# between# policymaking# and# research# dissemination#
during#international#climate#change#negotiations.###
#
The# Kyoto# Protocol# is# a# hallmark# of# not# only# donors’# but# also# developing#
countries’# commitment# to# mitigating# global# pollution.# The# commitment# of#
developing# countries# to# the# Kyoto# Protocol# qualifies# them# to# receive#
mitigation# finance,#while# their# status# and# commitment# to# previous# treaties#
related#to#the#protection#of#the#ozone#layer#are#insignificant#in#the#allocation#
of# mitigation# finance.# Before# the# implementation# of# the# Kyoto# Protocol#
mitigation#finance#allocation#strongly#reflected#overall#ODA#allocation,#while#
during# its# implementation# climateNrelated# determinants# influenced# the#
allocation#of#mitigation#finance,#although#there#was#inconsistent#application#
of# mitigation# finance# determinants# between# its# commitment# and#
disbursement.# This# inconsistency# negatively# affects# the# motivation# of#
recipients# that# are# serious# about# reducing# their# national# emissions# but#































India$ IND$ 1$ 8624.00$ 23.49%$ $0.055$$ $2$$ 54712.54$ 4.20%$ $0.002$$
Indonesia$ IDN$ 2$ 5683.83$ 15.48%$ $0.024$$ $3$$ 47472.7$ 3.65%$ $0.001$$
China$ CHN$ 3$ 4615.33$ 12.57%$ $0.016$$ $7$$ 39372.88$ 3.03%$ $0.001$$
Vietnam$ VNM$ 4$ 1667.74$ 4.54%$ $0.002$$ $4$$ 44183.58$ 3.40%$ $0.001$$
Thailand$ THA$ 5$ 1621.64$ 4.42%$ $0.002$$ $37$$ 11139.46$ 0.86%$ $0.000$$
Turkey$ TUR$ 6$ 1442.13$ 3.93%$ $0.002$$ $24$$ 16016.61$ 1.23%$ $0.000$$
Egypt$ EGY$ 7$ 1296.24$ 3.53%$ $0.001$$ $14$$ 25447.55$ 1.96%$ $0.000$$
Kenya$ KEN$ 8$ 1031.32$ 2.81%$ $0.001$$ $18$$ 20586.3$ 1.58%$ $0.000$$
Brazil$ BRA$ 9$ 861.63$ 2.35%$ $0.001$$ $54$$ 6748.49$ 0.52%$ $0.000$$
Bangladesh$ BGD$ 10$ 708.57$ 1.93%$ $0.000$$ $9$$ 34098.4$ 2.62%$ $0.001$$
Morocco$ MAR$ 11$ 636.14$ 1.73%$ $0.000$$ $19$$ 19001.21$ 1.46%$ $0.000$$
Tunisia$ TUN$ 12$ 632.90$ 1.72%$ $0.000$$ $46$$ 9382.02$ 0.72%$ $0.000$$
Sri$Lanka$ LKA$ 13$ 581.96$ 1.59%$ $0.000$$ $26$$ 14189.25$ 1.09%$ $0.000$$
Pakistan$ PAK$ 14$ 456.48$ 1.24%$ $0.000$$ $6$$ 43711.43$ 3.36%$ $0.001$$
Mexico$ MEX$ 15$ 344.68$ 0.94%$ $0.000$$ $65$$ 5141.35$ 0.40%$ $0.000$$
Azerbaijan$ AZE$ 16$ 321.84$ 0.88%$ $0.000$$ $73$$ 4440.9$ 0.34%$ $0.000$$
Nepal$ NPL$ 17$ 321.61$ 0.88%$ $0.000$$ $42$$ 10132.56$ 0.78%$ $0.000$$
Uzbekistan$ UZB$ 18$ 318.06$ 0.87%$ $0.000$$ $78$$ 4060.37$ 0.31%$ $0.000$$
Tanzania$ TZA$ 19$ 288.28$ 0.79%$ $0.000$$ $10$$ 33119.57$ 2.55%$ $0.001$$
Guyana$ GUY$ 20$ 270.49$ 0.74%$ $0.000$$ $94$$ 2505.39$ 0.19%$ $0.000$$























Iraq$ IRQ$ 22$ 240.50$ 0.66%$ $0.000$$ $1$$ 79080.42$ 6.08%$ $0.004$$
Mauritius$ MUS$ 23$ 232.52$ 0.63%$ $0.000$$ $106$$ 1661.43$ 0.13%$ $0.000$$
South$Africa$ ZAF$ 24$ 227.07$ 0.62%$ $0.000$$ $31$$ 12637.82$ 0.97%$ $0.000$$
Philippines$ PHL$ 25$ 214.29$ 0.58%$ $0.000$$ $23$$ 16207.77$ 1.25%$ $0.000$$
Armenia$ ARM$ 26$ 176.25$ 0.48%$ $0.000$$ $66$$ 5054.07$ 0.39%$ $0.000$$
Peru$ PER$ 27$ 168.32$ 0.46%$ $0.000$$ $43$$ 9682.86$ 0.74%$ $0.000$$
Jordan$ JOR$ 28$ 165.16$ 0.45%$ $0.000$$ $35$$ 12028.86$ 0.92%$ $0.000$$
Mozambique$ MOZ$ 29$ 163.90$ 0.45%$ $0.000$$ $13$$ 25571.26$ 1.96%$ $0.000$$
Uganda$ UGA$ 30$ 160.43$ 0.44%$ $0.000$$ $15$$ 21482.51$ 1.65%$ $0.000$$
Serbia$ SRB$ 31$ 158.06$ 0.43%$ $0.000$$ $17$$ 20738.2$ 1.59%$ $0.000$$
Ukraine$ UKR$ 32$ 142.36$ 0.39%$ $0.000$$ $82$$ 3814.03$ 0.29%$ $0.000$$
Chile$ CHL$ 33$ 139.57$ 0.38%$ $0.000$$ $104$$ 1797$ 0.14%$ $0.000$$
Bosnia_Herzegovina$ BIH$ 34$ 137.07$ 0.37%$ $0.000$$ $40$$ 10730.6$ 0.82%$ $0.000$$
Mongolia$ MNG$ 35$ 135.22$ 0.37%$ $0.000$$ $67$$ 4925.69$ 0.38%$ $0.000$$
Cameroon$ CMR$ 36$ 113.30$ 0.31%$ $0.000$$ $25$$ 15847.46$ 1.22%$ $0.000$$
Ethiopia$ ETH$ 37$ 110.18$ 0.30%$ $0.000$$ $11$$ 32975.17$ 2.53%$ $0.001$$
Nicaragua$ NIC$ 38$ 107.90$ 0.29%$ $0.000$$ $30$$ 13318.72$ 1.02%$ $0.000$$
Burkina$Faso$ BFA$ 39$ 107.50$ 0.29%$ $0.000$$ $34$$ 12115.41$ 0.93%$ $0.000$$
Zambia$ ZMB$ 40$ 90.24$ 0.25%$ $0.000$$ $22$$ 17280.99$ 1.33%$ $0.000$$
Croatia$ HRV$ 41$ 76.82$ 0.21%$ $0.000$$ $88$$ 3015.29$ 0.23%$ $0.000$$
Bolivia$ BOL$ 42$ 71.65$ 0.20%$ $0.000$$ $28$$ 13858.98$ 1.06%$ $0.000$$
Congo,$Dem.$Rep.$ ZAR$ 43$ 70.17$ 0.19%$ $0.000$$ $12$$ 30014.61$ 2.31%$ $0.001$$
Afghanistan$ AFG$ 44$ 68.65$ 0.19%$ $0.000$$ $5$$ 43745.57$ 3.36%$ $0.001$$























Senegal$ SEN$ 45$ 68.62$ 0.19%$ $0.000$$ $27$$ 13962.85$ 1.07%$ $0.000$$
Kazakhstan$ KAZ$ 46$ 67.47$ 0.18%$ $0.000$$ $86$$ 3274.24$ 0.25%$ $0.000$$
Georgia$ GEO$ 47$ 66.15$ 0.18%$ $0.000$$ $48$$ 7659.64$ 0.59%$ $0.000$$
Ghana$ GHA$ 48$ 60.35$ 0.16%$ $0.000$$ $16$$ 21137.27$ 1.62%$ $0.000$$
Namibia$ NAM$ 49$ 57.39$ 0.16%$ $0.000$$ $87$$ 3189.9$ 0.25%$ $0.000$$
Yemen$ YEM$ 50$ 56.87$ 0.15%$ $0.000$$ $47$$ 8420.4$ 0.65%$ $0.000$$
Albania$ ALB$ 51$ 54.03$ 0.15%$ $0.000$$ $55$$ 6378.2$ 0.49%$ $0.000$$
Cambodia$ KHM$ 52$ 52.79$ 0.14%$ $0.000$$ $45$$ 9430.08$ 0.72%$ $0.000$$
Ecuador$ ECU$ 53$ 45.75$ 0.12%$ $0.000$$ $80$$ 3997.19$ 0.31%$ $0.000$$
Tajikistan$ TJK$ 54$ 42.85$ 0.12%$ $0.000$$ $77$$ 4122.7$ 0.32%$ $0.000$$
Malawi$ MWI$ 55$ 41.26$ 0.11%$ $0.000$$ $41$$ 10466.18$ 0.80%$ $0.000$$
Costa$Rica$ CRI$ 56$ 37.42$ 0.10%$ $0.000$$ $108$$ 1598.87$ 0.12%$ $0.000$$
Kyrgyz$Republic$ KGZ$ 57$ 36.35$ 0.10%$ $0.000$$ $70$$ 4540.87$ 0.35%$ $0.000$$
El$Salvador$ SLV$ 58$ 35.73$ 0.10%$ $0.000$$ $71$$ 4502.77$ 0.35%$ $0.000$$
Mali$ MLI$ 59$ 35.25$ 0.10%$ $0.000$$ $32$$ 12477.33$ 0.96%$ $0.000$$
Dominican$Republic$ DOM$ 60$ 30.98$ 0.08%$ $0.000$$ $84$$ 3393.43$ 0.26%$ $0.000$$
Angola$ AGO$ 61$ 29.84$ 0.08%$ $0.000$$ $49$$ 7350.22$ 0.56%$ $0.000$$
Chad$ TCD$ 62$ 27.53$ 0.07%$ $0.000$$ $60$$ 5573.14$ 0.43%$ $0.000$$
Solomon$Islands$ SLB$ 63$ 24.14$ 0.07%$ $0.000$$ $92$$ 2725.71$ 0.21%$ $0.000$$
Cape$Verde$ CPV$ 64$ 23.59$ 0.06%$ $0.000$$ $91$$ 2743.03$ 0.21%$ $0.000$$
Madagascar$ MDG$ 65$ 22.04$ 0.06%$ $0.000$$ $38$$ 11133.82$ 0.86%$ $0.000$$
Maldives$ MDV$ 66$ 21.32$ 0.06%$ $0.000$$ $126$$ 771.59$ 0.06%$ $0.000$$
























Malaysia$ MYS$ 68$ 20.82$ 0.06%$ $0.000$$ $69$$ 4660.61$ 0.36%$ $0.000$$
Samoa$ WSM$ 69$ 20.33$ 0.06%$ $0.000$$ $119$$ 1062.86$ 0.08%$ $0.000$$
Cote$ddIvoire$ CIV$ 70$ 18.78$ 0.05%$ $0.000$$ $33$$ 12453.93$ 0.96%$ $0.000$$
Colombia$ COL$ 71$ 18.08$ 0.05%$ $0.000$$ $29$$ 13518.2$ 1.04%$ $0.000$$
Rwanda$ RWA$ 72$ 18.02$ 0.05%$ $0.000$$ $44$$ 9580.15$ 0.74%$ $0.000$$
West$Bank$&$Gaza$Strip$ WBG$ 73$ 16.40$ 0.04%$ $0.000$$ $20$$ 18839.23$ 1.45%$ $0.000$$
Benin$ BEN$ 74$ 16.33$ 0.04%$ $0.000$$ $50$$ 7325.43$ 0.56%$ $0.000$$
Bhutan$ BTN$ 75$ 14.70$ 0.04%$ $0.000$$ $111$$ 1405.28$ 0.11%$ $0.000$$
Montenegro$ MNE$ 76$ 14.59$ 0.04%$ $0.000$$ $129$$ 631.54$ 0.05%$ $0.000$$
Micronesia,$Fed.$States$ FSM$ 77$ 13.69$ 0.04%$ $0.000$$ $107$$ 1626.38$ 0.12%$ $0.000$$
Djibouti$ DJI$ 78$ 13.50$ 0.04%$ $0.000$$ $105$$ 1677.84$ 0.13%$ $0.000$$
Myanmar$ MMR$ 79$ 13.49$ 0.04%$ $0.000$$ $90$$ 2778.55$ 0.21%$ $0.000$$
Argentina$ ARG$ 80$ 12.66$ 0.03%$ $0.000$$ $98$$ 2209.99$ 0.17%$ $0.000$$
Timor_Leste$ TMP$ 81$ 12.65$ 0.03%$ $0.000$$ $81$$ 3922.02$ 0.30%$ $0.000$$
Honduras$ HND$ 82$ 12.44$ 0.03%$ $0.000$$ $39$$ 10869.72$ 0.84%$ $0.000$$
Congo,$Rep.$ COG$ 83$ 11.88$ 0.03%$ $0.000$$ $58$$ 5851.97$ 0.45%$ $0.000$$
Jamaica$ JAM$ 84$ 11.70$ 0.03%$ $0.000$$ $99$$ 2198.87$ 0.17%$ $0.000$$
Guatemala$ GTM$ 85$ 11.31$ 0.03%$ $0.000$$ $57$$ 5864.62$ 0.45%$ $0.000$$
Nigeria$ NGA$ 86$ 11.31$ 0.03%$ $0.000$$ $8$$ 34227$ 2.63%$ $0.001$$
Panama$ PAN$ 87$ 10.97$ 0.03%$ $0.000$$ $117$$ 1091.96$ 0.08%$ $0.000$$
Marshall$Islands$ MHL$ 88$ 10.80$ 0.03%$ $0.000$$ $125$$ 874.43$ 0.07%$ $0.000$$
Sudan$ SDN$ 89$ 10.60$ 0.03%$ $0.000$$ $21$$ 18377.62$ 1.41%$ $0.000$$
























Liberia$ LBR$ 91$ 9.93$ 0.03%$ $0.000$$ $56$$ 6343.25$ 0.49%$ $0.000$$
Lao$PDR$ LAO$ 92$ 9.66$ 0.03%$ $0.000$$ $64$$ 5188.55$ 0.40%$ $0.000$$
Macedonia,$FYR$ MKD$ 93$ 9.37$ 0.03%$ $0.000$$ $76$$ 4123.23$ 0.32%$ $0.000$$
Mauritania$ MRT$ 94$ 8.88$ 0.02%$ $0.000$$ $68$$ 4842.74$ 0.37%$ $0.000$$
Haiti$ HTI$ 95$ 8.68$ 0.02%$ $0.000$$ $36$$ 11363.86$ 0.87%$ $0.000$$
Uruguay$ URY$ 96$ 8.56$ 0.02%$ $0.000$$ $132$$ 582.49$ 0.04%$ $0.000$$
Lebanon$ LBN$ 97$ 8.38$ 0.02%$ $0.000$$ $53$$ 6926.53$ 0.53%$ $0.000$$
Gabon$ GAB$ 98$ 8.24$ 0.02%$ $0.000$$ $101$$ 1973.33$ 0.15%$ $0.000$$
Niger$ NER$ 99$ 7.67$ 0.02%$ $0.000$$ $51$$ 7310.26$ 0.56%$ $0.000$$
Burundi$ BDI$ 100$ 6.95$ 0.02%$ $0.000$$ $59$$ 5581.15$ 0.43%$ $0.000$$
Botswana$ BWA$ 101$ 6.86$ 0.02%$ $0.000$$ $102$$ 1966.31$ 0.15%$ $0.000$$
Papua$New$Guinea$ PNG$ 102$ 6.33$ 0.02%$ $0.000$$ $52$$ 7215.78$ 0.55%$ $0.000$$
Algeria$ DZA$ 103$ 6.32$ 0.02%$ $0.000$$ $62$$ 5298.3$ 0.41%$ $0.000$$
Nauru$ NRU$ 104$ 6.03$ 0.02%$ $0.000$$ $149$$ 273.73$ 0.02%$ $0.000$$
Belize$ BLZ$ 105$ 5.77$ 0.02%$ $0.000$$ $133$$ 568.65$ 0.04%$ $0.000$$
Zimbabwe$ ZWE$ 106$ 5.27$ 0.01%$ $0.000$$ $63$$ 5235.78$ 0.40%$ $0.000$$
Iran$ IRN$ 107$ 4.90$ 0.01%$ $0.000$$ $103$$ 1804.99$ 0.14%$ $0.000$$
Syria$ SYR$ 108$ 4.43$ 0.01%$ $0.000$$ $74$$ 4218.82$ 0.32%$ $0.000$$
Tonga$ TON$ 109$ 3.86$ 0.01%$ $0.000$$ $134$$ 555.13$ 0.04%$ $0.000$$
Swaziland$ SWZ$ 110$ 3.78$ 0.01%$ $0.000$$ $122$$ 953.69$ 0.07%$ $0.000$$
Vanuatu$ VUT$ 111$ 3.55$ 0.01%$ $0.000$$ $118$$ 1069.78$ 0.08%$ $0.000$$
Fiji$ FJI$ 112$ 3.46$ 0.01%$ $0.000$$ $124$$ 881.39$ 0.07%$ $0.000$$
























Niue$ NIU$ 114$ 2.60$ 0.01%$ $0.000$$ $156$$ 179.63$ 0.01%$ $0.000$$
Cook$Islands$ COK$ 115$ 2.38$ 0.01%$ $0.000$$ $153$$ 208.83$ 0.02%$ $0.000$$
Oman$ OMN$ 116$ 2.23$ 0.01%$ $0.000$$ $123$$ 927.53$ 0.07%$ $0.000$$
Turkmenistan$ TKM$ 117$ 1.93$ 0.01%$ $0.000$$ $139$$ 498.04$ 0.04%$ $0.000$$
Moldova$ MDA$ 118$ 1.93$ 0.01%$ $0.000$$ $83$$ 3576.82$ 0.27%$ $0.000$$
Slovenia$ SVN$ 119$ 1.85$ 0.01%$ $0.000$$ $128$$ 632.69$ 0.05%$ $0.000$$
Tuvalu$ TUV$ 120$ 1.55$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $154$$ 206.14$ 0.02%$ $0.000$$
Sierra$Leone$ SLE$ 121$ 1.26$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $61$$ 5431.19$ 0.42%$ $0.000$$
Guinea_Bissau$ GNB$ 122$ 1.15$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $109$$ 1553.32$ 0.12%$ $0.000$$
Comoros$ COM$ 123$ 1.05$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $131$$ 611.08$ 0.05%$ $0.000$$
Venezuela$ VEN$ 124$ 0.95$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $121$$ 1032.11$ 0.08%$ $0.000$$
Sao$Tome$&$Principe$ STP$ 125$ 0.60$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $127$$ 634.67$ 0.05%$ $0.000$$
St.Vincent$&$Grenadines$ VCT$ 126$ 0.54$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $147$$ 370.39$ 0.03%$ $0.000$$
Trinidad$and$Tobago$ TTO$ 127$ 0.47$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $148$$ 306.35$ 0.02%$ $0.000$$
St.$Kitts_Nevis$ KNA$ 128$ 0.45$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $150$$ 269.88$ 0.02%$ $0.000$$
Central$African$Rep.$ CAF$ 129$ 0.39$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $93$$ 2555$ 0.20%$ $0.000$$
Equatorial$Guinea$ GNQ$ 130$ 0.37$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $137$$ 541.75$ 0.04%$ $0.000$$
Kiribati$ KIR$ 131$ 0.37$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $146$$ 383.51$ 0.03%$ $0.000$$
St.$Helena$ SHN$ 132$ 0.35$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $140$$ 477.05$ 0.04%$ $0.000$$
Belarus$ BLR$ 133$ 0.25$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $136$$ 542.08$ 0.04%$ $0.000$$
Seychelles$ SYC$ 134$ 0.24$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $143$$ 432.56$ 0.03%$ $0.000$$
Guinea$ GIN$ 135$ 0.21$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $72$$ 4493.02$ 0.35%$ $0.000$$
























Suriname$ SUR$ 137$ 0.18$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $113$$ 1332.33$ 0.10%$ $0.000$$
St.$Lucia$ LCA$ 138$ 0.16$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $135$$ 545.39$ 0.04%$ $0.000$$
Barbados$ BRB$ 139$ 0.14$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $155$$ 183.68$ 0.01%$ $0.000$$
Togo$ TGO$ 140$ 0.12$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $89$$ 2786.41$ 0.21%$ $0.000$$
Saudi$Arabia$ SAU$ 141$ 0.11$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $152$$ 231.71$ 0.02%$ $0.000$$
Libya$ LBY$ 142$ 0.09$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $151$$ 237.04$ 0.02%$ $0.000$$
Dominica$ DMA$ 143$ 0.04$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $141$$ 443.22$ 0.03%$ $0.000$$
Eritrea$ ERI$ 144$ 0.04$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $85$$ 3380.9$ 0.26%$ $0.000$$
Antigua$and$Barbuda$ ATG$$$ 145$ 0.04$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $158$$ 125.37$ 0.01%$ $0.000$$
Grenada$ GRD$ 146$ 0.04$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $144$$ 425.36$ 0.03%$ $0.000$$
Lesotho$ LSO$ 147$ 0.03$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $97$$ 2246.89$ 0.17%$ $0.000$$
Montserrat$ MSR$ 148$ 0.03$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$ $130$$ 619.24$ 0.05%$ $0.000$$
Wallis$&$Futuna$ WLF$ 149$ 0.00$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $116$$ 1261.57$ 0.10%$ $0.000$$
New$Caledonia$ NCL$ 150$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $120$$ 1045.98$ 0.08%$ $0.000$$
French$Polynesia$ PYF$ 151$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $114$$ 1280.09$ 0.10%$ $0.000$$
Korea$ KOR$ 152$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $145$$ 395.32$ 0.03%$ $0.000$$
Virgin$Islands$(UK)$ VGB$ 153$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $163$$ 6.78$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$
Anguilla$ AIA$ 154$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $161$$ 56.01$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$
Korea,$Dem.$Rep.$ PRK$ 155$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $100$$ 2163.17$ 0.17%$ $0.000$$
Gibraltar$ GIB$ 156$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $167$$ 0.3$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$
Kosovo$ KSV$ 157$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $115$$ 1262.9$ 0.10%$ $0.000$$
Hong$Kong$ HKG$ 158$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $178$$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$
























Singapore$ SGP$ 160$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $180$$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$
Israel$ ISR$ 161$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $173$$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$
Kuwait$ KWT$ 162$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $176$$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$
Somalia$ SOM$ 163$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $75$$ 4212.61$ 0.32%$ $0.000$$
Brunei$Darussalam$ BRN$ 164$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $169$$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$
Turks$and$Caicos$Islands$ TCA$ 165$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $160$$ 70.9$ 0.01%$ $0.000$$
Falkland$Islands$(Malvinas)$ FLK$ 166$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $172$$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$
Northern$Marianas$ MNP$ 167$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $166$$ 0.45$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$
Netherlands$Antilles$ ANT$ 168$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $162$$ 33.23$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$
Malta$ MLT$ 169$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $159$$ 106.24$ 0.01%$ $0.000$$
Bahrain$ BHR$ 170$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $138$$ 534.21$ 0.04%$ $0.000$$
Cayman$Islands$ CYM$ 171$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $171$$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$
Bahamas,$The$ BHS$ 172$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $177$$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$
Chinese$Taipei$ TWN$ 173$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $174$$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$
Mayotte$ MYT$ 174$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $79$$ 4040.18$ 0.31%$ $0.000$$
Aruba$ ABW$ 175$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $165$$ 0.47$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$
Cyprus$ CYP$ 176$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $168$$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$
United$Arab$Emirates$ ARE$ 177$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $170$$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$
Macao$ MAC$ 178$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $164$$ 1.95$ 0.00%$ $0.000$$
Bermuda$ BMU$ 179$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $179$$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$
Qatar$ QAT$ 180$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$ $175$$ 0$ 0.00%$ $_$$$$





































































































































































$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $
binarycfcommit$ 1.0000$ $ $ $ $ $ $
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $
binarycfdisburse$ 0.7447*$ 1.0000$ $ $ $ $ $
$ 0.0000$ $ $ $ $ $ $
binarypovaidcommit$ 0.6322*$ 0.6149*$ 1.0000$ $ $ $ $
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ $ $ $ $ $
binarypovaiddisburse$ 0.6184*$ 0.5988*$ 0.9821*$ 1.0000$ $ $ $
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ $ $ $ $
binaryodacommit$ 0.3612*$ 0.3513*$ 0.5713*$ 0.5610*$ 1.0000$ $ $
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ $ $ $
binaryodadisburse$ 0.3612*$ 0.3513*$ 0.5713*$ 0.5610*$ 0.9965*$ 1.0000$ $
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ $ $
lncfcommit$ .$ 0.0936*$ .$ a0.0607$ .$ .$ 1.0000$
$ .$ 0.0026$ .$ 0.0511$ .$ .$ $
lncfdisburse$ 0.1832*$ .$ .$ a0.0147$ .$ .$ 0.6736*$
$ 0.0000$ .$ .$ 0.6417$ .$ .$ 0.0000$
lnpovaidcommit$ 0.2416*$ 0.1726*$ .$ 0.0491$ .$ .$ 0.4122*$
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ .$ 0.0528$ .$ .$ 0.0000$
lnpovaiddisburse$ 0.2221*$ 0.1660*$ .$ .$ .$ .$ 0.3690*$
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ .$ .$ .$ .$ 0.0000$
lntotalodacommit$ 0.4126*$ 0.3622*$ 0.4529*$ 0.4470*$ .$ 0.0260$ 0.4505*$
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ .$ 0.2432$ 0.0000$
lntotalodadisburse$ 0.3804*$ 0.3398*$ 0.4242*$ 0.4289*$ 0.0327$ .$ 0.3914*$
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.1460$ .$ 0.0000$
lnforest$ 0.3681*$ 0.3402*$ 0.4286*$ 0.4184*$ 0.3031*$ 0.2991*$ 0.2716*$
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$
deforest$ a0.0788*$ a0.0480*$ a0.1008*$ a0.1009*$ a0.1826*$ a0.1826*$ 0.1180*$
$ 0.0002$ 0.0250$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0002$
rci$ 0.1280*$ 0.1209*$ 0.0876*$ 0.0254$ 0.0723*$ 0.0723*$ 0.0681$
$ 0.0003$ 0.0006$ 0.0136$ 0.4750$ 0.0418$ 0.0418$ 0.1464$
marine$ 0.1531*$ 0.1357*$ 0.1591*$ 0.1581*$ 0.1162*$ 0.1161*$ a0.0211$
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.5623$
govern$ a0.1702*$ a0.1671*$ a0.3514*$ a0.3559*$ a0.5035*$ a0.5035*$ a0.0107$
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.7472$
lngdppc$ a0.2242*$ a0.2013*$ a0.4244*$ a0.4326*$ a0.5464*$ a0.5435*$ a0.0428$
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.1805$
lninfant$ 0.0720*$ 0.0653*$ 0.2691*$ 0.2821*$ 0.4842*$ 0.4850*$ a0.0147$
$ 0.0012$ 0.0033$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.6403$
lnpop$ 0.3952*$ 0.3353*$ 0.3916*$ 0.3778*$ 0.2542*$ 0.2530*$ 0.3976*$
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$
fdiinflow$ a0.0337$ a0.0094$ a0.0825*$ a0.0805*$ a0.0388$ a0.0389$ a0.0718*$
$ 0.1344$ 0.6748$ 0.0002$ 0.0003$ 0.0847$ 0.0841$ 0.0235$
democracy$ 0.1990*$ 0.1775*$ 0.1891*$ 0.1800*$ 0.0798*$ 0.0798*$ 0.0110$
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0012$ 0.0012$ 0.7402$
xcolony$ 0.0806*$ 0.1034*$ 0.1569*$ 0.1618*$ 0.1842*$ 0.1842*$ 0.0028$
$ 0.0001$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.9271$
reddplus$ 0.2935*$ 0.2850*$ 0.3208*$ 0.3022*$ 0.2378*$ 0.2378*$ 0.0919*$
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0031$
smallisland$ a0.1160*$ a0.0643*$ a0.0608*$ a0.0598*$ 0.1444*$ 0.1444*$ a0.2166*$
$ 0.0000$ 0.0019$ 0.0032$ 0.0038$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$
opecmember$ a0.0412*$ a0.0512*$ a0.0822*$ a0.0808*$ a0.1226*$ a0.1226*$ a0.0729*$
$ 0.0465$ 0.0132$ 0.0001$ 0.0001$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0191$
lnco2$ 0.2384*$ 0.1893*$ 0.1015*$ 0.0869*$ a0.1136*$ a0.1146*$ 0.3301*$
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0001$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$
lnch4$ 0.2745*$ 0.3546*$ 0.2815*$ 0.2755*$ 0.0717$ 0.0717$ 0.3491*$
















lnn2o$ 0.2327*$ 0.3280*$ 0.2428*$ 0.2455*$ 0.0211$ 0.0211$ 0.3093*$
$ 0.0001$ 0.0000$ 0.0001$ 0.0001$ 0.7315$ 0.7315$ 0.0021$
lnhfcs$ 0.2522*$ 0.3485*$ 0.0705$ 0.0589$ a0.0046$ a0.0046$ 0.5276*$
$ 0.0011$ 0.0000$ 0.3696$ 0.4537$ 0.9538$ 0.9538$ 0.0000$
lnpfcs$ 0.1316$ 0.2104$ 0.0548$ 0.0937$ 0.0889$ 0.0889$ 0.3392$
$ 0.2243$ 0.0504$ 0.6143$ 0.3881$ 0.4127$ 0.4127$ 0.0667$
lnsf6$ 0.4005*$ 0.5469*$ 0.3546*$ 0.3560*$ 0.2983*$ 0.2983*$ 0.3466*$
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0007$ 0.0007$ 0.0245$
lnghg$ 0.2044$ 0.6765*$ a0.0960$ a0.0960$ .$ .$ 0.5433$














lncfdisburse$ 1.0000$ $ $ $ $ $ $
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $
lnpovaidcommit$ 0.4491*$ 1.0000$ $ $ $ $ $
$ 0.0000$ $ $ $ $ $ $
lnpovaiddisburse$ 0.4006*$ 0.9309*$ 1.0000$ $ $ $ $
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ $ $ $ $ $
lntotalodacommit$ 0.4728*$ 0.9974*$ 0.9277*$ 1.0000$ $ $ $
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ $ $ $ $
lntotalodadisburse$ 0.4292*$ 0.9317*$ 0.9980*$ 0.9342*$ 1.0000$ $ $
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ $ $ $
lnforest$ 0.3086*$ 0.5263*$ 0.4808*$ 0.6105*$ 0.5612*$ 1.0000$ $
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ $ $
deforest$ 0.1296*$ a0.1104*$ a0.1319*$ a0.0634*$ a0.0789*$ a0.1468*$ 1.0000$
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0053$ 0.0006$ 0.0000$ $
rci$ a0.0384$ a0.0665$ a0.0448$ a0.0525$ a0.0340$ 0.0291$ 0.0515$
$ 0.4310$ 0.0912$ 0.2592$ 0.1511$ 0.3578$ 0.4228$ 0.1526$
marine$ 0.0016$ a0.0132$ a0.0189$ 0.0521$ 0.0391$ 0.1715*$ a0.1379*$
$ 0.9660$ 0.6615$ 0.5340$ 0.0508$ 0.1472$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$
govern$ a0.0085$ a0.3744*$ a0.4086*$ a0.4075*$ a0.4403*$ a0.4553*$ 0.2442*$
$ 0.7975$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$
lngdppc$ a0.0478$ a0.4993*$ a0.5490*$ a0.5191*$ a0.5506*$ a0.4008*$ 0.3378*$
$ 0.1430$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$
lninfant$ a0.0590$ 0.3354*$ 0.3678*$ 0.3286*$ 0.3643*$ 0.3497*$ a0.3502*$
$ 0.0654$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$
lnpop$ 0.4364*$ 0.7283*$ 0.6814*$ 0.7423*$ 0.7119*$ 0.7008*$ a0.0935*$
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$
fdiinflow$ a0.0898*$ a0.1557*$ a0.1347*$ a0.1587*$ a0.1440*$ a0.1796*$ 0.0304$
$ 0.0055$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.1843$
democracy$ 0.0507$ 0.0404$ a0.0261$ 0.1148*$ 0.0426$ 0.1450*$ a0.1393*$
$ 0.1386$ 0.1450$ 0.3510$ 0.0000$ 0.0999$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$
xcolony$ a0.0164$ 0.0569*$ 0.0363$ 0.0859*$ 0.0657*$ 0.0190$ a0.0657*$
$ 0.6032$ 0.0248$ 0.1548$ 0.0001$ 0.0035$ 0.4185$ 0.0021$
reddplus$ 0.1142*$ 0.2664*$ 0.2319*$ 0.3299*$ 0.2944*$ 0.4893*$ a0.1833*$
$ 0.0003$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$
smallisland$ a0.2554*$ a0.5430*$ a0.5491*$ a0.5115*$ a0.5249*$ a0.4110*$ a0.0119$
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.5780$
opecmember$ a0.0724*$ a0.0083$ 0.0031$ 0.0134$ 0.0271$ 0.0586*$ a0.0054$
$ 0.0220$ 0.7436$ 0.9041$ 0.5481$ 0.2275$ 0.0123$ 0.8022$
lnco2$ 0.4129*$ 0.3736*$ 0.3162*$ 0.4133*$ 0.3872*$ 0.3946*$ 0.1407*$
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$
lnch4$ 0.4810*$ 0.4052*$ 0.3426*$ 0.4106*$ 0.3547*$ 0.7463*$ 0.0400$
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.5234$
lnn2o$ 0.3376*$ 0.3283*$ 0.2867*$ 0.3542*$ 0.3063*$ 0.7229*$ 0.0253$
$ 0.0037$ 0.0000$ 0.0003$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.6889$
lnhfcs$ 0.5251*$ 0.5190*$ 0.4365*$ 0.2082*$ 0.1552$ 0.4354*$ a0.2252*$














lnpfcs$ 0.0984$ 0.5915*$ 0.4998*$ 0.2800*$ 0.2318$ 0.5720*$ 0.2962*$
$ 0.5799$ 0.0000$ 0.0006$ 0.0317$ 0.0827$ 0.0000$ 0.0104$
lnsf6$ 0.3891*$ 0.6054*$ 0.2685*$ 0.4779*$ 0.3188*$ 0.3504*$ a0.0503$
$ 0.0131$ 0.0000$ 0.0364$ 0.0000$ 0.0033$ 0.0002$ 0.5949$
lnghg$ 0.2255$ 0.2582$ 0.2223$ 0.2436$ 0.2082$ 0.7343*$ a0.2508$
$ 0.6269$ 0.4714$ 0.5371$ 0.4704$ 0.5389$ 0.0101$ 0.4570$
 
 
$ rci$ marine$ govern$ lngdppc$ lninfant$ lnpop$ fdiinflow$
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $
rci$ 1.0000$ $ $ $ $ $ $
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $
marine$ 0.0003$ 1.0000$ $ $ $ $ $
$ 0.9933$ $ $ $ $ $ $
govern$ 0.1163*$ a0.1065*$ 1.0000$ $ $ $ $
$ 0.0022$ 0.0001$ $ $ $ $ $
lngdppc$ 0.0619$ a0.0931*$ 0.7320*$ 1.0000$ $ $ $
$ 0.0861$ 0.0003$ 0.0000$ $ $ $ $
lninfant$ a0.1119*$ 0.0966*$ a0.6573*$ a0.8196*$ 1.0000$ $ $
$ 0.0017$ 0.0001$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ $ $ $
lnpop$ a0.0992*$ 0.0819*$ a0.4794*$ a0.3635*$ 0.2311*$ 1.0000$ $
$ 0.0052$ 0.0009$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ $ $
fdiinflow$ 0.1254*$ a0.0463$ 0.1646*$ 0.0954*$ a0.0597*$ a0.2237*$ 1.0000$
$ 0.0005$ 0.0737$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0088$ 0.0000$ $
democracy$ a0.0030$ 0.0855*$ 0.3521*$ 0.0234$ a0.1497*$ a0.0236$ 0.0102$
$ 0.9358$ 0.0026$ 0.0000$ 0.3502$ 0.0000$ 0.3383$ 0.6842$
xcolony$ a0.0666$ a0.0849*$ a0.0436$ a0.0861*$ 0.1988*$ a0.0320$ a0.0175$
$ 0.0611$ 0.0006$ 0.0669$ 0.0001$ 0.0000$ 0.1376$ 0.4358$
reddplus$ a0.0649$ 0.1624*$ a0.1982*$ a0.2480*$ 0.2010*$ 0.2991*$ a0.0331$
$ 0.0680$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.1407$
smallisland$ 0.0559$ 0.0052$ 0.2850*$ 0.1885*$ a0.1848*$ a0.5594*$ 0.1153*$
$ 0.1161$ 0.8320$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$
opecmember$ a0.0285$ 0.1210*$ a0.1286*$ 0.1648*$ a0.0760*$ 0.1585*$ a0.0806*$
$ 0.4226$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0006$ 0.0000$ 0.0003$
lnco2$ 0.0160$ 0.0352$ a0.0413$ 0.2290*$ a0.2954*$ 0.7460*$ a0.1508*$
$ 0.6538$ 0.1767$ 0.1051$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$
lnch4$ a0.0791$ 0.2188*$ a0.3980*$ a0.0877$ 0.1776*$ 0.9134*$ a0.3118*$
$ 0.3441$ 0.0034$ 0.0000$ 0.1609$ 0.0042$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$
lnn2o$ a0.3904*$ 0.3134*$ a0.3928*$ a0.0947$ 0.1171$ 0.8746*$ a0.3102*$
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.1329$ 0.0625$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$
lnhfcs$ a0.2621*$ 0.2696*$ 0.0817$ 0.2795*$ 0.0987$ 0.4649*$ a0.0059$
$ 0.0136$ 0.0070$ 0.3535$ 0.0005$ 0.2281$ 0.0000$ 0.9430$
lnpfcs$ a0.0015$ 0.4061*$ a0.3863*$ a0.0769$ 0.3672*$ 0.6063*$ 0.1974$
$ 0.9931$ 0.0005$ 0.0021$ 0.5150$ 0.0013$ 0.0000$ 0.0941$
lnsf6$ 0.1905$ 0.2675*$ 0.1352$ 0.3322*$ 0.1362$ 0.4636*$ a0.2526*$
$ 0.1316$ 0.0113$ 0.1868$ 0.0003$ 0.1483$ 0.0000$ 0.0067$
lnghg$ a0.9084*$ a0.3132$ 0.2578$ 0.3419$ a0.2531$ 0.5660$ a0.0762$
$ 0.0328$ 0.4118$ 0.4440$ 0.3034$ 0.4527$ 0.0695$ 0.8239$
 
 
$ democracy$ xcolony$ reddplus$ smallisland$ opecmember$
$ $ $ $ $ $
democracy$ 1.0000$ $ $ $ $
$ $ $ $ $ $
xcolony$ a0.0888*$ 1.0000$ $ $ $
$ 0.0003$ $ $ $ $
reddplus$ 0.1837*$ 0.1271*$ 1.0000$ $ $
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ $ $ $
smallisland$ 0.1604*$ 0.2384*$ a0.1664*$ 1.0000$ $
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ $ $
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$ democracy$ xcolony$ reddplus$ smallisland$ opecmember$
opecmember$ a0.2615*$ 0.0422*$ a0.0545*$ a0.1452*$ 1.0000$
$ 0.0000$ 0.0410$ 0.0084$ 0.0000$ $
lnco2$ a0.0593*$ a0.2067*$ 0.0412$ a0.4755*$ 0.3248*$
$ 0.0215$ 0.0000$ 0.0716$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$
lnch4$ a0.0590$ a0.2030*$ 0.0529$ a0.4386*$ 0.1196*$
$ 0.3687$ 0.0008$ 0.3858$ 0.0000$ 0.0493$
lnn2o$ a0.0879$ a0.2339*$ 0.0479$ a0.4613*$ 0.1583*$
$ 0.1830$ 0.0001$ 0.4354$ 0.0000$ 0.0096$
lnhfcs$ 0.3021*$ 0.0850$ 0.2951*$ a0.1737*$ a0.0539$
$ 0.0003$ 0.2789$ 0.0001$ 0.0261$ 0.4928$
lnpfcs$ a0.3149*$ 0.0087$ 0.0989$ a0.5299*$ 0.1266$
$ 0.0067$ 0.9361$ 0.3620$ 0.0000$ 0.2425$
lnsf6$ 0.4554*$ 0.1234$ 0.1664$ 0.0738$ 0.0782$
$ 0.0000$ 0.1670$ 0.0614$ 0.4097$ 0.3819$
lnghg$ 0.2960$ 0.4975$ 0.2143$ a0.3135$ .$
$ 0.4063$ 0.1194$ 0.5268$ 0.3479$ .$
 
 
$ lnco2$ lnch4$ lnn2o$ lnhfcs$ lnpfcs$ lnsf6$ lnghg$
lnco2$ 1.0000$ $ $ $ $ $ $
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $
lnch4$ 0.8615*$ 1.0000$ $ $ $ $ $
$ 0.0000$ $ $ $ $ $ $
lnn2o$ 0.7594*$ 0.8770*$ 1.0000$ $ $ $ $
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ $ $ $ $ $
lnhfcs$ 0.4861*$ 0.4256*$ 0.4055*$ 1.0000$ $ $ $
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ $ $ $ $
lnpfcs$ 0.6966*$ 0.5732*$ 0.6147*$ 0.3736*$ 1.0000$ $ $
$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 0.0008$ $ $ $
lnsf6$ 0.3660*$ 0.3392*$ 0.2781*$ 0.5781*$ 0.4462*$ 1.0000$ $
$ 0.0001$ 0.0001$ 0.0016$ 0.0000$ 0.0001$ $ $
lnghg$ 0.3571$ 0.5217$ 0.6538*$ 0.7650$ 1.0000*$ a0.9526$ 1.0000$






























lnco2$ 0.178*$ 0.112$ 0.091$$$$ 0.250$$$$
$ (1.860)$ (0.631)$ (0.868)$$$$ (1.093)$$$$
lnforest$ 0.072*$ 0.134$ 0.104**$$ 0.134$$$$
$ (1.759)$ (1.365)$ (2.383)$$$$ (1.448)$$$$
deforest$ 0.024$ 0.274**$ 0.082$$$$ 0.249**$$
$ (0.564)$ (2.127)$ (1.500)$$$$ (2.086)$$$$
govern$ 0.507***$ 1.391***$ 0.601***$ 1.328***$
$ (2.762)$ (4.246)$ (3.157)$$$$ (3.557)$$$$
lngdppc$ a0.420***$ a0.697***$ a0.337**$$ a0.894***$
$ (a2.914)$ (a2.719)$ (a2.318)$$$$ (a2.792)$$$$
lninfant$ a0.002$ a0.175$ 0.089$$$$ a0.325$$$$
$ (a0.008)$ (a0.611)$ (0.472)$$$$ (a0.929)$$$$
lnpop$ 0.109$ 0.760***$ 0.177$$$$ 0.562*$$$
$ (0.861)$ (3.457)$ (1.266)$$$$ (1.851)$$$$
fdiinflow$ 0.007$ 0.053***$ 0.005$$$$ 0.014$$$$
$ (0.536)$ (2.779)$ (0.384)$$$$ (0.510)$$$$
democracy$ 0.021$ 0.016$ 0.015$$$$ 0.028$$$$
$ (1.625)$ (0.573)$ (1.082)$$$$ (0.944)$$$$
xcolony$ a0.035$ a0.105$ a0.005$$$$ a0.044$$$$
$ (a0.197)$ (a0.314)$ (a0.029)$$$$ (a0.111)$$$$
reddplus$ 0.532***$ $$ 0.593***$ $
$ (2.982)$$$ $ (2.704)$$$$ $
χ2$ 262.9$ $ 180.1$ $
Pavalues$ $ 0.000$ $ 0.000$






















lnco2$ 0.127$ 0.100$ a0.086$ a0.149$$$$
$ (1.363)$ (0.783)$ (a1.226)$ (a1.535)$$$$
lnforest$ 0.209***$ 0.066$ 0.194***$ 0.058$$$$
$ (5.462)$ (1.071)$ (5.050)$ (0.945)$$$$
deforest$ a0.014$ 0.304***$ a0.006$ 0.312***$
$ (a0.250)$ (3.667)$ (a0.115)$ (3.598)$$$$
govern$ 0.784***$ 1.198***$ 0.544***$ 0.953***$
$ (3.883)$ (4.473)$ (2.938)$ (3.665)$$$$
lngdppc$ a0.492***$ a0.489***$ $ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
$ (a3.595)$ (a2.964)$ $ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
lninfant$ $ $ 0.241$ 0.124$$$$
$ $ $ (1.462)$ (0.633)$$$$
lnpop$ 0.320***$ 0.661***$ 0.564***$ 0.945***$
$ (2.648)$ (4.151)$ (5.822)$ (7.283)$$$$
fdiinflow$ 0.018$ 0.052***$ 0.020$ 0.055***$
$ (0.929)$ (3.111)$ (1.050)$ (3.196)$$$$
democracy$ 0.041***$ 0.006$ 0.048***$ 0.006$$$$
$ (2.953)$ (0.275)$ (3.491)$ (0.266)$$$$
xcolony$ a0.114$ a0.093$ a0.268$ a0.205$$$$
$ (a0.703)$ (a0.421)$ (a1.641)$ (a0.918)$$$$
χ2$ 276.8$ $ 272.7$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
R2$ $ 0.268$ $ 0.264$$$$
Adjusted$
R2$
$ 0.248$ $ 0.244$$$$
Pavalues$ 0.000$ 0.000$ 0.000$ 0.000$$$$





     





































        









































This& chapter& identifies& the& determinants& used& by& eight& major& mitigation&
finance&donors&to&allocate&mitigation&finance&across&developing&countries.&
It&also&compares&the&determinants&used&for&mitigation&finance&grants&and&
loans& and& discusses& the&GEF’s&mitigation& finance& and& European&Union’s&
(EU)& climate& finance&allocation& frameworks.&For& the& first& two&aims,&TwoQ
part& models& were& used& to& analyse& mitigation& finance& inflows& to& 180&
developing& countries& in& 1998Q2010& taken& from& the& OECD& Rio& Marker&
database.&The&findings&show&that&loans&tend&to&target&emission&reductions&
via& the&energy&sector&while&grants&are&given& to& the& forestry&sector.& In& the&
aid& commitment& phase& the& eight& donors’& determinants& are& more&
heterogeneous& than& in& the& disbursement& phase.& For& some& donors,& CO2&
emissions& are& more& sensitive& than& forestQrelated& variables.& While& some&
donors& reward& recipients’&performance&and& respond& to& recipients’&needs,&
the&others&have&stronger&national&interests,&e.g.&Japan&supports&its&trading&








A& joint& endeavour& of& bilateral& and& multilateral& donors& along& with&
numerous& multilateral& arrangements& and& donor& institutions& (Appendix&
4.1)& aims& to& mobilise& global& funds& including& Overseas& Development&





was& established& specifically& to& support& the& global& need& to& raise& and&
distribute&climate&finance&with&a&target&of&100&billion&US$&per&year&by&2020&
(Bodansky,& 2010b).& In& response& to& the& urgent& need& to& fill& the& climate&
finance&gap&until&the&GCF&becomes&fully&operational,&bilateral&donors&have&
increased& their& commitment& to& providing& ODA& as& fastQstart& climate&
finance& from& US$469.8& million& in& 1998& to& US$12.4& billion& in& 2010,& with&
Japan& the& largest& contributor& among& the& eight& major& mitigation& finance&
donors& (Figure& 4.1).& These& eight& major& donors& considered& in& this& study&
have&been&selected&based&on& the&amount&of&mitigation& finance& they&have&
disbursed&and&the&share&of&mitigation&finance&in&their&total&contribution&to&
development&aid,&as&shown&in&Figure&2.1.&Another&practical&consideration&









There& is& currently& a& lack& of& transparency& about& the& criteria& used& by&
bilateral& and& multilateral& donors& in& allocating& mitigation& finance.& The&






































calls& for& more& transparent& allocation& measurement,& reporting,& and&
verification&(MRV)&system&for&mitigation&finance&(Buchner&et(al.,&2011);&as&
yet,& little& is& known& about& how& each& donor& allocates& mitigation& finance&
across&developing&countries.&
&
To& the& author’s&knowledge& there& are&no&academic&peerQreviewed& studies&
that& analyse& individual& donors’& allocation& of& official& mitigation& finance&
and&cover&a&vast&coverage&of&180&developing&countries&and&countries&with&
economies& in& transition.& Chapter& 3& identifies& the& determinants& of&
mitigation&finance&more&broadly.&More&specific&data,&i.e.&types&of&financial&
instrument& (grant/loan)& and& the& strategies& of& individual& donor& countries&
would&allow&magnification&of& the&spatiality,& i.e.&across& individual&donors&








as& a& large& volume& of& bilateral& trade& and& exQcolonial& status& (Hicks& et( al.,&
2008b).& & Chapter& 3& shows& the& determinants& of& global& mitigation& finance&
inflow&across&developing&countries:&emissions,&increasing&carbon&intensity,&
carbon& sinks,& deforestation,& per& capita& income,& population,& and& foreign&
direct& investment& (FDI)& inflow.&However,& it& does& not& analyse& the& global&
allocation&of&mitigation&finance&by&individual&donor&country.&&
&
There& are& studies& that& more& specifically& analyse& individual& donors’&




environmental& aid& by& USAID,& US& foundations,& GEF& and& multilateral&
donors.& He& highlights& donors’& preferences& for& the& recipients’& local&
development&or&for&global&needs&and&finds&that&multilateral&donors&are&not&
more&humanitarian&than&bilateral&donors&in&allocating&environmental&aid.&
This& finding& contrasts& with& the& finding& of& Nunnenkamp& and& Thiele’s&
(2006)&study&of&overall&aid&allocation,&whereas&Hicks&et(al.&(2008)&show&that&
at& the& allocation& stage,& bilateral& green& aid& that& is& globally& beneficial& is&
allocated& to& developing& countries& with& lower& per& capita& income.& At& the&
selection& stage,& multilateral& grant& agencies& (MGAs)& and& multilateral&
development& banks& (MDBs)& allocate& environmental& aid& to& poorer&




Buntaineas& (2011)& analysis& of& the& Asian& Development& Bank& (ADB)’s&
allocation& of& environmental& aid& finds& that& the& Bank& considers& past&
environmental& performance& when& approving& environmentally& risky&
projects.& Other& studies& show& that& MDBs& tend& to& provide& more& loans& to&
developing& countries&with& higher& savings& and&higher&deforestation& rates&
compared& to& the& other& developing& countries& (Nielsen& && Tierney,& 2006).&
Exceptionally,& the& World& Bank& chooses& to& invest& mitigation& finance& in&
developing& countries& with& higher& CO2& emissions,& although& the& US,& the&
largest& financial& contributor& of& the& World& Bank,& allocates& its& bilateral&




of& allocation& of& environmental& aid,& but& little& is& known& about& mitigation&





The& first& compares& the& determinants& of& mitigation& finance& applied& by&
major& eight&mitigation& finance& donors,& namely& Japan,& Germany,& France,&
Spain,&Norway,&Denmark,&GEF,&and&EU&institutions&in&addition&to&bilateral&
mitigation& finance& from& EU& countries.& The& second& contrasts& the&






assessment& by& assessing& individual& donors& and& testing& variables,& which&




which& the& donor& country’s& private& companies& have& CDM& investment.& It&




Section& 4.2& describes& the& global& allocation& of&mitigation& finance& by& eight&
major& mitigation& finance& donors& based& on& their& selected& instruments,&
selected& agencies& and& preferred& regions& and& recipients.& Section& 4.3&
explains&the&conceptual&framework&used&for&the&study.&Sections&4.4&and&4.5&
show&the&determinants&used&by&the&eight&major&mitigation&finance&donors&
to&allocate&mitigation& finance&and& the&determinants&of&mitigation& finance&













under& the& focal&area&of& climate&change.&According& to&GEF,&all&projects& in&
this& focal& area& aim& to& support& developing& countries& and& economies& in&
transition&with&their&contribution&to&the&overall&objective&of&the&UNFCCC:&
…to(achieve([…](stabilization(of(greenhouse(gas(concentrations(in(the(atmosphere(at(
a( level( that( would( prevent( dangerous( anthropogenic( interference( with( the( climate(
system.( Such( a( level( should( be( achieved( within( a( time( frame( sufficient( to( allow(
ecosystems( to( adapt(naturally( to( climate( change,( to( ensure( that( food(production( is(
not( threatened( and( to( enable( economic( development( to( proceed( in( a( sustainable(
manner((Art.2).(
(
GEF’s& climate& finance&mainly& covers&mitigation,&with& a& small& amount& of&
adaptation&finance.&GEF&does&not&report&the&two&categories&separately,&but&
it&defines&them&as&follows:&&
Climate( Change( Mitigation,( [whose( aim( is]( to& reduce( or( avoid( greenhouse( gas(
emissions( in( the( areas( of( renewable( energy,( energy( efficiency( and( sustainable(







for& 180& developing& countries& from& 1998–2010& are& categorised& as& annual&




except& for& GEF’s& projectQlevel& data,& which& are& deflated& from& current&
US$& into& US$& constant& 2010& prices& using& Consumer& Price& Index& (CPI)&
US$&(2010=1).&GEF&website&offers&a&different&mechanism&to&characterise&the&






Japan’s& accumulated& mitigation& finance& from& 1998& to& 2010& reached& 20&
billion& US$,& more& than& all& other& donors’& mitigation& finance& combined&
(Figure& 3.2).& Germany’s& 10& billion& US$& takes& second& place& in& terms& of&
financing& emission& reduction& overseas.& Denmark,& Norway,& France& and&
Spain,& also& allocate& a& significant& share& of& their& foreign& aid& as&mitigation&
finance,& but& in& terms& of& absolute& value,& their& mitigation& finance& is&
insignificant.&Other&donors&such&as&the&UK,&South&Korea&and&the&European&
Bank&for&Reconstruction&and&Development&(EBRD)&are&important.&The&UK&
funds&many& individual&projects&whose& intervention& locations&cover&more&
than& one& country& or& have& global& coverage,& such& as& a& project& to& create& a&
global&emission&calculator&for&the&use&of&many&countries&(DECC,&2014).&In&




different& strategies& to& allocate& mitigation& finance.& Around& 79%& of&
mitigation& finance& provision& is& made& available& via& concessional& loans.&
According&to&the&OECD&glossary,&concessional&loans&are&usually&loaned&at&
lower& than& the&market& rate& and& their& concessionality& varies& according& to&




(Figures& 4.2,& 4.3)& provide&mitigation& finance& in& this& form&of& concessional&
loans.& Norway& and& Denmark& provide&mitigation& finance& in& the& form& of&
grants& without& obligation& to& repay.& Germany& and& Spain& maintain& a&
proportionate& balance& between& loans& and& grants.& Some& donors& may&
consider& mitigation& finance& an& environmental& and& economic& investment&
with&expected&financial&returns&or&other&unspecified&benefits.&Others&may&
view& it& as& a& financial& instrument& with& which& to& fund& nonQprofitable&

































Loans& are& mainly& channelled& through& development& banks& rather& than&
government& ministries.& The& Japan& Bank& for& International& Cooperation&
(JBIC)&and&Kreditanstalt&für&Wiederaufbau&(KFW)&deliver&more&than&60%&
of&Japan&and&Germany’s&mitigation&finance&(Table&4.1)&to&climate&projects,&
including& Japan’s& loan& to& support& the&Talimarjan&Thermal&Power&Station&
Extension&Project& in&Uzbekistan&(JICA,&2010).& In&contrast,&a&proportion&of&
Norway’s&mitigation& finance& is& invested& in& equity,& often& through&buying&
stocks&in&private&companies.&Less&than&1%&of&Norway’s&mitigation&finance&
is& in& the& form& of& equity& investment.& Although& mitigation& finance& ODA&
invested&in&equity&investment&is&insignificant,&this&instrument&has&received&
more& donor& attention& due& to& its& ability& to& catalyse& private& sector&
investment& in& renewable& energy& (DECC,& 2013).& Through& this& equity&
investment& instrument,& donors& buy& part& ownership& of& small& or&medium&
enterprises& and& influence& their& decisionQmaking& to& shift& its& nonQclimate&
friendly&operations&toward&climateQcompatibility&(ibid).&
&
Norway& intends& to& mobilise& the& private& sector& in& emerging& economies&
such&as&China,&India&and&Brazil&in&order&to&finance&climate&change&projects&
(Bracking&et(al.,&2010;&Bracking,&2012).&&Through&private&equity&investment&
and& by& acting& as& a& shareholder,& Norway& can& influence& companies& they&
invest&in&to&move&toward&more&sustainable&development&(Whitfield,&2012).&
As&a&new&ODA&scheme,&equity& investment&can&be&channelled& into&smallQ&
















6& 8& 5& 15& 4& 2& 2& 10&
1& JBIC& KFW& AFD& MIE& MFA& MFA& EDF& IBRD&
&
14387.7& 3234.9& 3734.6& 469.7& 1289.4& 304.4& 840.7& 1120.0&




MINEFI& MFA& NORAD& DANIDA& CEC& UNDP&
&
10259.5& 714.6& 45.6& 174.7& 488.8& 128.2& 286.6& 804.0&
& 40.3%& 14.9%& 1.2%& 21.9%& 27.0%& 29.6%& 25.4%& 35.6%&
3& MOFA& BMZ& MAE/FSP& ECON& NORFUND&
&
& UNEP&
& 819.8& 597.6& 12.0& 126.1& 32.4& & & 135.0&
&
3.2%& 12.5%& 0.3%& 15.8%& 1.8%& & & 6.0%&
Data&Source:&GEF&(2013);&OECD&(2012a)&
Notes:&Other&Japan’s&agencies,&other&ministries,&MAFF,&and&PRF&(not& included)&receive&an&insignificant&





Donors& allocate& a& significant& proportion& of& their& loans& to& the& emerging&
economies& of& India,& Indonesia,& China& and& Vietnam.& These& countries&
receive&more&than&50%&of&all&bilateral&mitigation&finance&commitment&(see&
Table& 4.2,& the& last& column).& Japan& and& France& primarily& allocate& their&
mitigation&finance&to&developing&countries&with&higher&per&capita&income&
(Tables&4.2&and&4.3).& It& is&possible&that&they&provide&concessional& loans&to&
stimulate& the& private& sector& by& executing& lessQprofitable& environmental&
projects,& which& can& be& interesting& from& the& perspective& of& the& private&
sector& if& there& is& considerable& financial& provision& at& lower& interest& rates&
than&market&interest&rates.&In&particular,&the&French&Development&Agency&




finance& climate& projects& in& developing& countries,& with& 30%& targeting&
private&development&agencies&(MAE,&2012).&&&
&
Unlike& Norway’s& usual& ODA& allocation& strategy,& when& it& comes& to&
mitigation& finance& the& country& does& not& prioritise& poorer& recipients& and&
allocates&only&45.4%&of&its&mitigation&finance&to&lowerQ&and&upperQmiddleQ








Donor! Japan! Germany! France! Spain! Norway! Denmark! EU! GEFcc! Bilateral*!
Total!
recipients!
123! 86! 49! 80! 76! 27!
!
89! 143! 155!
1! India! Bilateral! Indonesia! Tunisia! Bilateral! Egypt! Bilateral! China! India!
! 7879.4! 849.5! 733.9! 279.4! 524.3! 75.2! 291.1! 339.0! 8592.8!
! 30.9%! 17.7%! 19.3%! 35.0%! 28.9%! 17.4%! 25.8%! 15.0%! 21.2%!
2! Indonesia! China! China! Morocco! Brazil! Bilateral! Ukraine! Global! Indonesia!
! 4682.8! 475.5! 586.0! 138.2! 281.7! 69.3! 107.4! 174.0! 5667.3!
! 18.4%! 9.9%! 15.4%! 17.3%! 15.6%! 16.0%! 9.5%! 7.7%! 14.0%!
3! China! India! Morocco! Bilateral! Guyana! China! Tanzania! Mexico! China!
! 3278.8! 421.6! 446.3! 69.5! 248.7! 44.9! 49.2! 167.0! 4586.6!
! 12.9%! 8.8%! 11.7%! 8.7%! 13.7%! 10.4%! 4.4%! 7.4%! 11.3%!
4! Thailand! Brazil! Kenya! Nicaragua! Tanzania! Vietnam! Tunisia! Regional! Bilateral!
! 1604.0! 340.8! 282.2! 39.3! 105.1! 42.0! 45.3! 162.0! 3500.1!
! 6.3%! 7.1%! 7.4%! 4.9%! 5.8%! 9.7%! 4.0%! 7.2%! 8.6%!
5! Vietnam! Egypt! Mexico! Egypt! China! Philippines! Ethiopia! India! Vietnam!
! 1291.5! 251.9! 245.0! 18.5! 75.9! 33.4! 41.0! 141.0! 1667.7!
! 5.1%! 5.3%! 6.4%! 2.3%! 4.2%! 7.7%! 3.6%! 6.3%! 4.1%!
! Unspecified! ! Unspecified! ! ! ! ! ! !
! 15.5! ! 35.9! ! ! ! ! ! !
! 0.1%! ! 0.9%! ! ! ! ! ! !
Data!Source:!GEF!(2013);!OECD!(2012a)!!
Note:!*Includes!all!bilateral!donors.! ‘Unspecified’! is!used!where!a!project!concerns!any!combination!of!recipient!countries!from!different!regions!or!where!the!
recipient! country! is! unknown! at! the!moment! of! reporting! (for! example! for! some! aid! through!NGOs).! Projects! between! a! donor! and! two! or!more! recipient!







OECD’s!country!classification!based!on!income!level! Japan! !! Germany! France! Spain! Norway!!! US$! %! US$! %! US$! %! US$! %! US$! %!
Least!developed!countries! 1,036.8! 4.1%! 510.1! 10.6%! 214.9! 5.6%! 24.4! 3.1%! 298.5! 16.5%!
Other!low!income!countries! 2,607.8! 10.2%! 376.0! 7.9%! 423.2! 11.1%! 16.5! 2.1%! 24.3! 1.3%!
Lower!middle!income!countries! 20,412.6! 80.1%! 1676.5! 35.0%! 2,440.9! 64.2%! 556.2! 69.7%! 482.8! 26.7%!
Upper!middle!income!countries! 1,302.8! 5.1%! 1168.6! 24.4%! 689.5! 18.1%! 27.6! 3.5%! 338.4! 18.7%!
More!advanced!developing!countries! 0.1! 0.0%! !c!!!! 0.0%! !c!!!! 0.0%! !c!!!! 0.0%! !c!!!! 0.0%!
Part!I!unallocated!by!income! 125.1! 0.5%! 1058.6! 22.1%! 35.9! 0.9%! 173.1! 21.7%! 667.3! 36.8%!
Total! 25,485.2! 100%! 4,789.8! 100%! 3,804.3! 100%! 797.8! 100%! 1,811.3! 100.0%!
!
OECD’s!country!classification!based!on!income!level! Denmark! UK! ! EU! GEFcc!!! US$! %! US$! %! US$! %! US$! %!
Least!developed!countries! 49.6! 11.5%! 18.8! 1.2%! 241.1! 21.4%! 285.0! 16.1%!
Other!low!income!countries! 63.7! 14.7%! 3.6! 0.2%! 50.3! 4.5%! 105.0! 5.9%!
Lower!middle!income!countries! 201.1! 46.5%! 66! 4.3%! 306.7! 27.2%! 926.0! 52.2%!
Upper!middle!income!countries! 45.2! 10.4%! 6.9! 0.5%! 50.2! 4.5%! 450.0! 25.4%!
More!advanced!developing!countries! !c!!!! 0.0%! !c!!!! 0.0%! !c!!!! 0.0%! 5.8! 0.3%!
Part!I!unallocated!by!income! 73! 16.9%! 1,428.7! 93.7%! 478.8! 42.5%! 0.4! 0.0%!







This% section% discusses% a% mitigation% finance% allocation% framework%
adopted% from% the% aid% allocation% literature.% Hoeffler% and% Outram% (2011)%
categorise% aid% allocation% determinants% into% recipients’% needs,% recipients’%
merits%and%donors’%interests.%Recipients’%needs%include%recipients’%poverty%
and% development% progress;% recipients’% merits% are% measured% by% their%
governance% index% and% donors’% interests% by% donors’% economic,% trade% and%




of%mitigation% finance.% In% addition% to% these% three% components,%mitigation%
finance% also% addresses% the% need% to% mitigate% emissions% globally,% so%
mitigation% finance% has% four%main% elements:% global% needs% (x1),% recipients’%
merits%(x2),%recipientsK%needs%(x3)%and%donors’%interests%(x4)%(Eq.%1).%%
%
Mitigation(finance(=(f((x1,(x2,(x3,(x4)( ( ( ( ( ( (1)%
%
The%next%section%briefly%explains%these%tested%hypotheses%and%summarises%
the% findings% and% the% selected%measurements%with% the% aim% of% testing% the%











those% that% address% GHG% emission% level,% CO2% intensity,% carbon% sink% and%
deforestation% rate.% % These% strategies% are% operationalised,% measured% and%
tracked% in% the% effort% to% prevent% increased% national% aggregate% emission%
levels,%slowing%down%the%increasing%trend%of(CO2%intensity,%preserving%or%
enhancing%bioFcarbon% sinks% and% combating%deforestation.%To%understand%








H1C:( The( larger( the( carbon( sinks( of( a( developing( country,( the( greater( the(
likelihood( of( its( being( selected( to( receive(mitigation( finance( and( to( receive(more(
mitigation(finance(than(other(recipients.(
H1D:(The( higher( the( deforestation( rate( of( a( developing( country,( the( greater( the(
likelihood( of( its( being( selected( to( receive(mitigation( finance( and( to( receive(more(
mitigation(finance(than(other(recipients.(
(
In% the% previous% chapter% a% developing% country’s% emission% responsibility,%
measured% by% the% level% of% CO2% emissions% (lnco2),% is% used% to% represent% its%
total%greenhouse%gas%emissions;%its%total%forest%area%(lnforest)%represents%the%
size% of% its% carbon% storage% and% its% deforestation% rate% represents% its% loss% of%
carbon% sinks.%The% trend%of%CO2% intensity,% labelled% rci,( is% the% ratio% of%CO2%
emissions%generated%per%GDP% in% a%particular%year% against% its% value% from%
the%previous%period.%rci(is%tested%separately%due%to%the%limited%number%of%
observations.% Similarly,% Marine% Protected% Areas% (MPA),% labelled%marine,%




showed% these% variables% to% be% significant% determinants% of% mitigation%
finance.%
%
This% chapter% tests% whether% different% donors% weight% these% variables%




taking% environmental% responsibility% for% their% coal% consumption% and%













H3A:( The( lower( the( perNcapita( income( of( a( developing( country,( the( greater( the(
likelihood( of( its( being( selected( to( receive(mitigation( finance( and( to( receive(more(
mitigation(finance(than(other(recipients.((
%










Poorer% developing% countries% may% be% qualified% to% receive% mitigation%
finance% by% the% fact% that% richer% developing% countries% are% able% to% fund% or%
nationally%mobilise% public% and% private% funds% to%mitigate% climate% change%
without%foreign%aid.%Another%explanation%is%that%public%mitigation%finance%
is% partly% taken% from% development% aid,% whose% objective% is% to% promote%
recipients’% economic% development.% Thus,% as% part% of% development% aid,%
mitigation% finance% supposedly% still% conveys% a% development% mission,%
therefore,%economic%development%is%measured%by%log%of%per%capita%income%
and%social%development%by%the%infant%mortality%rate,% labelled% lngdppc(and%
lninfant.% Infant%mortality%rate% is%an% important%variable% that% is%expected% to%
positively%correlate%with%mitigation%finance.%The%inclusion%of%this%variable%
in% the% main% specification% has% been% explained% in% detail% in% the% previous%




likelihood( of( its( being( selected( to( receive(mitigation( finance( and( to( receive(more(
mitigation(finance(than(other(recipients.((
%
Examining% recipients’% merits% and% needs% are% not% the% main% aim% of% this%
chapter,% which% was% the% primary% focus% of% Chapter% 3.% The% average%
governance%index%from%WGI%is%taken%as%a%proxy%for%recipients’%merits,%with%
both%log%of%per%capita%income%and%infant%mortality%rate%are%included%in%the%






Examining% whether% donors’% interests% influence% the% allocation% of%
mitigation%finance%is%the%key%focus%and%contribution%of%this%chapter,%which%
adds% a% new%element% to% the% broader% study%of% the% allocation%of%mitigation%
finance.% A% limited% number% of% studies% assess% the% allocation% of% private%
mitigation%finance,%such%as%Winkelman%et(al.%(2011),%who%focus%on%mapping%
CDM%finance%across%developing%countries,%and%Dolšak%and%Crandall%(2013)%
who% assess% the% influence% of% bilateral% ties% on% the% allocation% of% CDM%
investment% across% developing% countries.% This% chapter% focuses% on% public%




This% framework% for% investigating% the% potential% influence% of% private%
investment%on%donors’%decisions%is%built%upon%the%assumption%that%besides%
achieving% the% normative% objectives% of% mitigation% finance,% donors%
potentially% benefit% politically% and% economically% from% mitigation% finance%
transactions% that% are% made% by% donor% countries’% private% companies% to%
improve% donors’% economic% performance.% Donors’% gross% national% income%
will% improve% if% the% private% companies% originated% and% registered% in% their%
homeland%make% a% considerable% return% on% investment.% Some% aid% studies%
show%that%donors’% interests%are%an%important%determinant%of%aid%(Alesina%
&% Dollar,% 2000;% Berthelemy,% 2006).% This% also% appears% to% be% the% case% for%
environmental% aid% (Figaj,% 2010;% Hicks( et( al.,% 2008).% The% previous% chapter%
examined% mitigation% finance% in% total% and% therefore% cannot% test% whether%
any% one% donor’s% contribution% is% affected% by% its% political% or% economic%
interests.% To% the% author’s% knowledge,% this% empirical% quantitative%
assessment% analysing% the% influence% of% private% investment% decision% on%







As% one% of% the% main% contributions% of% this% chapter,% aspects% of% donors’%
interests%are%tested%to%investigate:%%
H4A:(The(higher( the(volume(of( bilateral( trade(of( a(developing( country(with( the(
donor,(the(greater(the(likelihood(of(its(being(selected(for(mitigation(finance(by(the(
donor,( and( of( receiving( more( mitigation( finance( from( the( donor( than( other(
recipients.%
%
In% addition,% donors% may% benefit% by% targeting% their% CDM% partners% with%
mitigation%finance%to%expand%carbon%offset%venues%(Boyd%et(al.,%2007;%IFC,%
2011).(Therefore%it%is%possible%that:%




To% represent% donors’% geopolitical% interests,% this% chapter% also% includes%
dyadic% data% on% exFcolonial% status% and% the% distance% between% the% donor%
country’s% capital% city% and% each% recipient% developing% country,% following%
Hicks%et(al.Ks%(2008)%approach.(The%hypotheses%are:%












of% the%EU,%where% the%exFcolonial% status%of% any%other%EU%member% state% is%
used).%The%distance%variable% is% the% length% in%kilometres% from% the%donor’s%
capital%city%to%the%recipient’s%capital%city%(Mayer%&%Zignago,%2011).%Donors%
may%allocate%mitigation%finance%to%neighbouring%developing%countries%for%





Other% important% variables,% namely% population,% democracy% and% time%
dummies% are% included% as% control% variables.% In% the% case% of% GEF’s%
environmental%aid%and% the%EU’s%mitigation% finance,% the% log%of%mitigation%
finance%from%all%bilateral%donors%is%included%in%the%specification.%Villanger%
(2006)% notes% that%multilateral% aid% is% heavily% dependent% on% how% bilateral%
donors% allocate% their% aid.%Another% important% control% variable% factor% that%
will% improve% the% rigour%of% the% regression%model% is% a%donor’s% total%ODA.%
This%chapter%uses%the%set%of%variables%tested%in%the%previous%chapter%for%a%
consistent%comparative%analysis%(see%summary%Table%4.10%at%the%end%of%this%
chapter).% This% improvement% plan% will% be% included% when% this% chapter% is%
presented% as% a% standFalone% paper% for% publication.% % The% data% for% each%
variable% are% explained% further% in% Table% 4.4% and% the% data% sources% are%
presented%in%Appendix%4.2.%
%




!! ln !"!" + !! ln!"!!" + !! ln!"#!" + !!!"#!"# + !!" ln!!"# + !!!!"#!" +!!" ln!!" + !!"% % % % % % % (2)%
%
where%!!"#%is% the% value% of%mitigation% finance% from%donor% j% to% developing%
country%i%at%time%t.%!!"#%depends%on%sets%of%unilateral%and%bilateral%variables.%
The% unilateral% variables,%!"2!" ,!"!" ,!"!" ,!"#!" ,!"#$%!" , !"!" ,!!"!" ,!"#!"%
are%respectively%CO2%emission%level,%the%size%of%carbon%sinks,%deforestation%
rate,% governance% index,% per% capita% income,% infant% mortality% rate,%
population% size,% and% the% level% of% democracy% of% developing% country% i% at%
time%t.%These%variables%are%identical%with%the%set%of%variables%tested%in%the%
previous% chapter,% which% includes% a% unilateral% FDI% inflow% variable%
representing% donors’% economic% interests%more% generally.% In% this% chapter,%
FDI% inflow% is% replaced% by% a% set% of% bilateral% variables,% which% represent%











estimation% technique% of% OLS% regression% model% to% only% developing%








Variable++ Variable+label+ Obs+ Mean+ SD+ Min+ Max+
Grant%% binarygrantcommit% 2340% 0.435% 0.496% 0.000% 1.000%
Loan% binaryloancommit% 2340% 0.054% 0.227% 0.000% 1.000%
Japan% binaryjpncommit% 2340% 0.199% 0.399% 0.000% 1.000%
Germany% binarydeucommit% 2340% 0.091% 0.288% 0.000% 1.000%
France% binaryfracommit% 2340% 0.030% 0.172% 0.000% 1.000%
Spain% binaryespcommit% 2340% 0.110% 0.313% 0.000% 1.000%
Norway% binarynorcommit% 2340% 0.110% 0.313% 0.000% 1.000%
Denmark% binarydencommit% 2340% 0.033% 0.180% 0.000% 1.000%
EU% binaryeuccommit% 2340% 0.028% 0.166% 0.000% 1.000%
GEF%mitigation%finance% binarygefmcommit% 2340% 0.216% 0.412% 0.000% 1.000%
GEF%(all)% binarygefacommit% 2340% 0.336% 0.473% 0.000% 1.000%
Bilateral% binarybilatcommit% 2340% 0.436% 0.496% 0.000% 1.000%
Grant%% binarygrantdisburse% 2340% 0.422% 0.494% 0.000% 1.000%
Loan% binaryloandisburse% 2340% 0.063% 0.243% 0.000% 1.000%
Japan% binaryjpndisburse% 2340% 0.176% 0.381% 0.000% 1.000%
Germany% binarydeudisburse% 2340% 0.113% 0.317% 0.000% 1.000%
France% binaryfradisburse% 2340% 0.044% 0.204% 0.000% 1.000%
Spain% binaryespdisburse% 2340% 0.106% 0.308% 0.000% 1.000%
Norway% binarynordisburse% 2340% 0.092% 0.289% 0.000% 1.000%
Denmark% binarydendisburse% 2340% 0.040% 0.195% 0.000% 1.000%
EU% binaryeudisburse% 2340% 0.061% 0.240% 0.000% 1.000%
GEF%mitigation%finance% binarygefmdisburse% 2340% 0.336% 0.473% 0.000% 1.000%
Bilateral% binarybildisburse% 2340% 0.418% 0.493% 0.000% 1.000%
Grant%% lngrantcommit%
lnloancommit%
1019% 13.312% 2.472% 3.059% 19.456%
Loan% 127% 18.371% 1.537% 14.037% 21.685%
Japan% lnjpncommit% 465% 12.666% 3.705% 3.059% 21.616%
Germany% lndeucommit% 213% 14.773% 2.350% 8.478% 19.153%
France% lnfracommit% 71% 15.812% 2.503% 11.173% 19.737%
Spain% lnespcommit% 258% 12.002% 2.057% 6.538% 18.755%
Norway% lnnorcommit% 258% 13.074% 2.230% 4.439% 19.332%
Denmark% lndencommit% 78% 14.150% 1.579% 10.466% 17.890%
EU% lneuccommit% 66% 15.144% 1.574% 10.884% 18.361%
GEF%mitigation%finance% lngefmcommit% 506% 13.721% 1.765% 10.823% 17.710%
GEF%(all)% lngefacommit% 787% 14.231% 1.597% 9.210% 18.283%





987% 12.997% 2.128% 6.016% 19.414%
Loan% 148% 16.207% 2.451% 9.540% 20.706%
Japan% 413% 12.759% 3.235% 5.670% 20.592%
Germany% 265% 13.597% 2.045% 7.640% 18.257%
France% lnfradisburse% 102% 13.687% 2.539% 10.395% 19.318%
Spain% lnespdisburse% 249% 12.105% 2.118% 6.538% 18.737%
Norway% lnnordisburse% 215% 12.862% 2.090% 4.439% 19.290%
Denmark% lndendisburse% 93% 12.946% 1.575% 7.856% 17.516%
EU% lneudisburse% 143% 12.549% 1.791% 7.544% 17.098%
GEF%(all)% lngefmdisburse% 787% 14.448% 1.554% 9.903% 18.769%







lnco2% 1910% 8.601% 2.405% 2.686% 15.855%
rci% 739% 122.661% 119.408% 2.797% 1303.553%
lnforest% 1820% 6.956% 3.025% F1.204% 13.221%
marine% 1650% 4.432% 10.002% 0.000% 75.360%
deforest% 2244% 1.094% 0.618% 0.010% 2.320%
Policy%performance% govern% 1764% F0.306% 0.755% F2.480% 1.531%
Development%aspects% lngdppc% 1738% 7.197% 1.563% F0.036% 11.394%
lninfant% 2015% 3.379% 0.890% 0.742% 4.988%
Population% lnpop% 2158% 15.165% 2.238% 9.141% 21.014%
FDI%inflow% fdiinflow% 1976% 4.980% 8.298% F37.616% 167.383%
Democracy% democracy% 1658% 1.928% 6.407% F10.000% 10.000%
Japan% lnjpntrade% 1738% 7.218% 0.931% 0.303% 8.417%
Germany% lndeutrade% 1738% 6.847% 1.388% F0.421% 8.589%
France% lnfratrade% 1738% 7.296% 0.692% F0.583% 8.824%
Spain% lnesptrade% 1738% 7.189% 0.754% 0.083% 8.324%
Norway% lnnortrade% 1738% 6.801% 1.328% F1.045% 8.473%
Denmark% lndentrade% 1738% 7.158% 0.753% 0.313% 8.886%
Japan% jpncdm% 2340% 0.039% 0.193% 0.000% 1.000%
Germany% deucdm% 2340% 0.024% 0.153% 0.000% 1.000%
France% fracdm% 2340% 0.021% 0.142% 0.000% 1.000%
Spain% espcdm% 2340% 0.026% 0.159% 0.000% 1.000%
Norway% norcdm% 2340% 0.015% 0.123% 0.000% 1.000%
Denmark% dencdm% 2340% 0.013% 0.114% 0.000% 1.000%
DAC%
Japan%
dacxcolony% 2340% 0.589% 0.492% 0.000% 1.000%
jpnxcolony% 2249% 0.035% 0.183% 0.000% 1.000%
Germany% deuxcolony% 2249% 0.052% 0.222% 0.000% 1.000%
France% fraxcolony% 2249% 0.185% 0.388% 0.000% 1.000%
Spain% espxcolony% 2249% 0.127% 0.333% 0.000% 1.000%
Norway% norxcolony% 2249% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Denmark% denxcolony% 2249% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
EU% eucxcolony% 2249% 0.832% 0.374% 0.000% 1.000%
Japan% lnjpndistance% 2249% 9.127% 0.514% 7.053% 9.830%
Germany% lndeudistance% 2249% 8.748% 0.627% 6.585% 9.711%
France% lnfradistance% 2249% 8.762% 0.588% 6.873% 9.738%
Spain% lnespdistance% 2249% 8.739% 0.626% 6.210% 9.788%
Norway% lnnordistance% 2249% 8.825% 0.512% 7.104% 9.661%






This% section% highlights% the% determinants% that% influence% the% allocation% of%
mitigation%finance%by%eight%major%donors%(Japan,%Germany,%France,%Spain,%
Norway,%Denmark,%GEF,%and%EU%institutions).%ClistKs%(2011)%study%of%total%




heterogeneity% in% preferences% across% donors% where% the% determinants% of%
allocation%of%overall%ODA%and%environmental%aid%are%varied%across%donors.%
It% is% likely% that% this% heterogeneity% of% parameters% and%measurements% also%
occurs% in% the% allocation% of% mitigation% finance.% For% example,% donor% A,%
which% allocates% all% mitigation% finance% to% deforestation% projects,% uses% the%
size%of%carbon%sinks%and%deforestation%rates%as%determinants,%while%donor%
B,% which% allocates% all% mitigation% finance% to% energy% efficiency% projects,%
refers%to%CO2%emission%level%and%CO2%intensity.%%






Table% 4.5% shows% each%donor%weights% differently% the% determinants% –%
global% needs,% recipients’% performance% and% needs% and% donors’% interests% –%
indicating% that% the% eight%major%mitigation% finance% donors% have% different%
priorities% when% they% commit% to% allocating% mitigation% finance.% GEF%






that% bilateral% donors% make% their% decisions% based% on% developing%
countries’%CO2%emission% levels.%The% lnco2(determinant% is% significant,%at%
5%%(Table%4.5,%c9)%in%the%assessment%of%total%bilateral%mitigation%finance%
commitment,% showing% that% the% total% amount% of% mitigation% finance%




determined% by% developing% countries’% CO2% emission% levels.% For% eight%
major%mitigation% finance%donors,% lnco2% is% an% insignificant%determinant.%
This% lack% of% evidence% at% the% commitment% phase% is% consistent%with% the%
results% presented% in% the% previous% chapter,% which% find% inconsistent%
























lnco2% 0.197% 0.072% F0.049% 0.046% 0.196% 0.298% F0.320% F0.033% F0.063% 0.189**%%
% (1.556)% (0.558)% (F0.199)% (0.339)% (1.393)% (1.254)% (F1.000)% (F0.269)% (F0.417)% (1.977)%%%%
lnforest% 0.157***% 0.171***% 0.150% 0.042% 0.216***% F0.049% 0.112% 0.034% 0.064% 0.208***%
% (2.906)% (2.748)% (1.194)% (0.498)% (3.535)% (F0.524)% (0.809)% (0.550)% (1.096)% (5.144)%%%%
deforest% F0.029% 0.163% 0.389% F0.033% 0.012% 0.157% F0.066% 0.029% 0.127% F0.032%%%%
% (F0.347)% (1.430)% (1.627)% (F0.386)% (0.125)% (1.161)% (F0.399)% (0.279)% (1.534)% (F0.559)%%%%
govern% 0.557**% 1.206***% 1.123*% 0.881***% 1.232***% 2.096***% 0.519% 0.580*% 0.817***% 0.969***%
% (2.302)% (3.747)% (1.831)% (2.582)% (4.768)% (4.794)% (0.978)% (1.958)% (2.738)% (4.329)%%%%
lngdppc% F0.385**% F0.293*% 0.394% F0.110% F1.145***% F1.054***% 0.224% 0.022% F0.194% F0.437***%
% (F2.070)% (F1.852)% (1.260)% (F0.544)% (F6.486)% (F3.071)% (0.502)% (0.130)% (F0.934)% (F3.456)%%%%
lninfant% F0.172% 0.283% 0.843**% 0.413*% F0.422% 0.303% 0.420% 0.122% F0.005% 0.352*%%%
% (F0.709)% (1.270)% (2.198)% (1.895)% (F1.613)% (0.813)% (0.960)% (0.528)% (F0.022)% (1.926)%%%%
lnpop% 0.312**% 0.431**% 0.561*% 0.386**% 0.211% 0.376% 0.454% 0.427***% 0.345*% 0.227*%%%
% (2.030)% (2.400)% (1.744)% (2.048)% (1.171)% (1.227)% (1.015)% (2.613)% (1.727)% (1.830)%%%%
fdiinflow% F0.014% 0.017% 0.028% 0.046***% 0.020% F0.023% 0.035% F0.003% 0.008% 0.011%%%%
% (F0.737)% (0.962)% (1.023)% (3.362)% (1.318)% (F0.667)% (1.122)% (F0.168)% (0.355)% (0.523)%%%%
democracy% 0.051***% 0.022% F0.003% F0.004% F0.027% F0.108***% F0.050% F0.004% 0.017% 0.051***%
% (2.630)% (1.010)% (F0.062)% (F0.131)% (F1.348)% (F3.249)% (F1.381)% (F0.198)% (0.850)% (3.345)%%%%
lndyadtrade% 0.236% F0.013% F0.105% 0.347*% 0.224% F0.175% % % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% (1.467)% (F0.120)% (F0.218)% (1.650)% (1.480)% (F0.831)% % % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
dyadcdm% 1.292***% 0.579% 0.344% 1.026**% 0.124% 0.197% % % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% (3.101)% (1.310)% (0.414)% (2.326)% (0.272)% (0.286)% % % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
dyadxcolony% % F0.724% 1.355**% 3.878***% % % F0.017% F0.150% 0.065*% F0.418**%%
% % (F0.710)% (2.377)% (9.925)% % % (F0.032)% (F0.706)% (1.743)% (F2.351)%%%%
lndistance% F1.312***% F0.517***% F1.020***% F1.567***% F0.373% 1.785***% % % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% (F5.118)% (F2.582)% (F2.856)% (F7.439)% (F1.438)% (3.067)% % % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
lnbilcom% % % % % % % 0.092% 0.042% F0.071% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% % % % % % % (1.174)% (1.167)% (F0.302)% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
χ2% .% 130.8% 1246.5% 185.3% 150.2% 632.2% 1416.5% 76.5% 4038.9% 257.7%%%%
PFvalues% .% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%%%%










stage% the% coefficients% of% lnforest( are% positive% and% significant% for% Japan%
(c1),%Germany%(c2)%and%Norway%(c5)%at%1%.%%
At% the% allocation% stage% (Table% 4.6),% the% only% statistically% significant%
relationship% between% aid% and% lnco2% is% GEF% environmental% aid% F%
significant% at% 5%,% ceteris( paribus% (c17b).% The% CO2% emissions% variable%
appears% to%be% significant%and%explains% the%allocation%of% environmental%
aid% more% broadly.% Interestingly,% there% is% lack% of% evidence% that% this%
variable%determines%GEF’s%mitigation%finance%(c17a).%The%GEF%uses%the%
Global% Environment% Benefit% for% climate% change% (GBIcc)% formula% to%
allocate%mitigation% finance% across% developing% countries,%with% absolute%
GHG%emissions%as%one%of%the%determinants%of%its%allocation.%This%chapter%
does% not% particularly%measure%GHG% emissions,% instead,% similar% to% the%




Although% the% GHG% variable% has% substantial% weight% in% the% GBIcc%
formula,%it%is%possible%that%in%practice%other%factors,%such%as%institutional%
performance%and%project%performance,%also%have%a%strong% influence%on%
































lnco2% 0.341% 0.008% F1.437% 0.308% F0.053% F0.458% 0.223% 0.121% 0.176**% 0.108%%%%
% (1.113)% (0.033)% (F1.669)% (1.240)% (F0.240)% (F1.204)% (0.545)% (0.885)% (1.983)% (0.753)%%%%
lnforest% 0.034% F0.065% F0.776*% F0.021% 0.288**% F0.178% F0.107% F0.017% 0.107**% 0.073%%%%
% (0.299)% (F0.534)% (F1.822)% (F0.206)% (2.033)% (F0.968)% (F0.679)% (F0.295)% (2.467)% (1.143)%%%%
deforest% 0.494***% F0.110% 0.257% 0.008% F0.072% 0.494**% 0.332% F0.037% 0.077% 0.299***%
% (3.163)% (F0.733)% (0.233)% (0.038)% (F0.504)% (2.138)% (1.160)% (F0.438)% (1.143)% (3.285)%%%%
govern% 1.047*% 0.228% 0.180% F0.266% 0.565% F0.411% 0.592% 0.527*% 0.378*% 1.231***%
% (1.949)% (0.442)% (0.086)% (F0.554)% (0.824)% (F0.540)% (0.797)% (1.950)% (1.918)% (4.259)%%%%
lngdppc% F1.051**% 0.008% 2.263*% F0.843**% 0.079% 1.219**% F0.810% F0.111% F0.132% F0.483***%
% (F2.379)% (0.024)% (1.979)% (F2.493)% (0.231)% (2.042)% (F1.491)% (F0.621)% (F0.923)% (F2.593)%%%%
lninfant% F0.024% 0.189% 0.803% F0.427% 1.241***% 0.297% F0.371% F0.158% 0.004% F0.144%%%%
% (F0.051)% (0.402)% (0.520)% (F0.917)% (2.766)% (0.617)% (F0.398)% (F0.779)% (0.022)% (F0.571)%%%%
lnpop% 0.394% 0.348% 2.905**% F0.164% 0.191% 0.664% 0.124% 0.342*% 0.154% 0.647***%
% (1.040)% (1.062)% (2.709)% (F0.586)% (0.635)% (1.300)% (0.226)% (1.764)% (1.237)% (3.585)%%%%
fdiinflow% F0.007% 0.077% 0.042% F0.014% F0.005% 0.165*% 0.026% 0.052**% F0.004% 0.047***%
% (F0.163)% (1.556)% (0.559)% (F0.738)% (F0.180)% (1.711)% (0.416)% (2.312)% (F0.261)% (2.758)%%%%
democracy% 0.044% 0.012% 0.007% F0.093*% 0.016% F0.005% 0.020% 0.002% F0.009% 0.002%%%%
% (1.240)% (0.350)% (0.055)% (F1.954)% (0.425)% (F0.132)% (0.359)% (0.126)% (F0.684)% (0.111)%%%%
lndyadtrade% 0.361% 0.353% F0.255% 0.548% 0.079% 0.583% % % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% (1.458)% (1.543)% (F0.234)% (1.420)% (0.314)% (1.351)% % % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
dyadcdm% 0.877% 0.728% 0.543% 0.164% 1.518*% F1.198*% % % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% (1.574)% (1.204)% (0.268)% (0.332)% (1.876)% (F1.723)% % % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
dyadxcolony% % 0.790% 0.028% 0.524% % % 0.053% 0.061% F0.133% F0.141%%%%
% % (0.917)% (0.016)% (1.059)% % % (0.043)% (0.289)% (F0.843)% (F0.582)%%%%
lndistance% F0.914**% F0.229% 0.607% 0.121% F1.936***% 1.167% % % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% (F2.233)% (F0.610)% (0.522)% (0.333)% (F4.083)% (1.322)% % % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
lnbilcom% % % % % % % 0.019% 0.036% F0.010% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% % % % % % % (0.168)% (1.009)% (F0.342)% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
R2% 0.338% 0.442% 0.596% 0.323% 0.287% 0.342% 0.768% 0.455% 0.305% 0.272%%%%
Adjusted%R2% 0.296% 0.328% 0.085% 0.210% 0.171% 0.022% 0.520% 0.392% 0.267% 0.249%%%%
PFvalues% 0.000% 0.328% 0.085% 0.000% 0.000% 0.238% 0.520% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%%%%




Norway% is% the% only% donor% that% consistently% uses% lnforest% as% a% positive%
determinant% when% selecting% developing% countries% to% receive% its%








recipients% should% receive% (c17b).% Deforestation% rate% is% only% used% by%
Japan%and%Denmark%to%decide%the%amount%of%mitigation%finance%given%to%
recipients% –% their% coefficients% of%deforest(are% positive% and% significant% at%
1%%and%5%%respectively%(c10,%c15).%Some%donors%choose%to%allocate%their%






mitigation% finance% for% individual%bilateral%donors% than% for%multilateral%
donors% except% for% the% EU,% whose% coefficient% of% govern( is% statistically%
insignificant% (Table% 4.5,% c7).% Among% bilateral% donors,% it% appears% that%
Denmark’s% allocation% of%mitigation% finance% is%much%more% sensitive% to%
governance% than% Japan’s.% For% Denmark,% the% coefficient% of% the%
governance% variable% (govern)% (c6)% is% 2.096% and% significant% at% 1%.% This%
figure%is%much%greater%than%Japan’s%govern((c1), 0.557, significant%at%5%.%
This% diverging% view% of% the% importance% of% good% governance% as% the%
determinant% of% mitigation% finance% allocation% can% be% associated% with%
donors’%financial% instruments.%Figure%1B%shows%that%Japan’s%mitigation%
finance% is% primarily% loans,%while% Denmark% primarily% provides% grants.%
Compared% to% loans,% in% the% absence% of% good% governance% grants% can% be%
prone%to%corruption%(Knack,%2013;%Svensson,%2000a).%Although%studies%of%
overall%ODA% show% that% aid% is%more% effective% in% an% environment%with%







The% results% show% that% Japan,% Germany,% Norway% and% Denmark%
deliberately% support% developing% countries% with% a% lower% per% capita%
income.%Their%coefficients%of%lngdppc(are%negative%and%significant%(Table%
4.5,%c1,%c2,%c5,%c6).%On%the%other%hand,%France%and%Spain%tend%to%prioritise%
the% social% development% of% developing% countries% –% lninfant( is% positive%
and%significant%at%10%%(c3,%c4).%For%France%and%Spain%social%development%
is% more% important% than% economic% development;( lngdppc( is% not%
statistically%significant.%%
%
The% application% of% these% two% determinants% of% income% per% capita% and%
infant%mortality%varies%across%donors.%In%the%allocation%stage,%France%and%
Spain’s% lninfant% are% insignificant% (c12,% c13).% % France,% Norway% and%
Denmark’s% lngdppc% are% positive% (c12,% c14,% c15);% however,% Norway’s%
lngdppc( is% insignificant.% The% positive% coefficients% of% lngdppc( contradict%
the%negative%coefficients%of%all%bilateral%donors’%lngdppc(at%the%allocation%
stage% (c18).% Perhaps% this% variation% in% the% application% of% lngdppc( and%
lnifant( is%due% to% a% relatively%high% correlation%between%GDP%and% infant%




Governance% is% an% important% indicator% in% Japan’s% decisions% on% which%
recipients% to% give% more% mitigation% finance% to.% Its% coefficient% of%
governance% is% 1.047,% statistically% significant% at% 10%% (c10),%much%higher%
than%GEF%mitigation% finance% 0.527% (c17a)% and%GEF% environmental% aid%
0.378% (c17b)% (significant% at% 10%).% This% information% adds%more%detailed%
specificities%to%the%earlier%findings%on%the%two%financial%instruments.%At%




governance% as%more% important% in% the% allocation% of%mitigation% finance%







The% results% in% Table% 4.5% indicate% that% there% is% evidence% of% donors’%
intention% to% coFbenefit% economically% from% mitigation% finance%
transactions.% Japan%and%Spain% seem% interested% in%providing%mitigation%
finance% to% their%CDM%partners% rather% than%nonFCDM%partners,%with% a%
positive%and%significant%CDM%partner%variable%(dyadcdm)%at%1%%and%5%%
respectively% at% the% selection% stage% of% the% commitment% phase% (c1,% c4).%
This% is% clearer% in% the% case% of% Japan,% which% has% a% stronger% interest% in%
mobilising% the% private% sector% by% financing% climateFchange% projects%
(Whitley,% 2012).% Little% is% known% about% Spain’s%motives% to% have% public%
finance% inflow% following%private% sectors’% green% investments% in% Spain’s%
CDM%partners.%%
%
In%addition% to% the%donors’% interest% in% investing% in% their%CDM%partners,%
mitigation% finance%may%also% convey% their%political% agenda.%ExFcolonies%
and%neighbouring%countries%are%prioritised%for%mitigation%finance.%Like%
development% aid% more% broadly,% mitigation% finance% can% be% used% as% a%
political% instrument% to% strengthen% regional% cooperation.% France% and%
Spain% tend% to% choose% their% exFcolonies% as% recipients% –% the%dyadexcolony%
variable%is%positive,%significant%and%consistent%in%the%commitment%phase%








mitigation% finance% recipients.% These% countries% choose% developing%
countries% that% are% close% by;% lndistance% is% negative% and% significant.%
Generating% mitigation% finance% from% auction% revenues% from% the% EU%
Emissions%Trading%System%(ETS)%(Harmeling%et(al.,%2013,%p.%5),%Germany%
prioritises% developing% countries% within% the% EU% and% EU’s% and/or%
countries%bordering%Germany,%which%may%offer%EU%countries% stronger%




more% mitigation% finance% commitment% than% its% nonFtrading% partners%
(Table%4.6,% c10).%There% is%an%opportunity%here% for% Japan% to%promote% its%
new%clean%technologies%to%its%mitigation%finance%recipients%and%in%return,%
to% build% trade% relationships% and% receive%more% continuous% supplies% of%
raw%commodities%from%them.%Interestingly,%Norway%selects%developing%
countries% put% forward% by% Norway’s% private% investment% in% offsetting%
carbon% emissions% through% CDM.% Berthelemy’s% study% (2005,% cited% in%
Canavire%et(al.,%2005)%finds%the%country%tends%to%perform%as%an%altruistic%
donor% in% allocating% overall%ODA;%he% shows% that% its% aid% is% allocated% to%
developing% countries% with% no% strong% trade% relationship% indicating% its%
less% exportFrelated% selfFinterest.% The% consistent% statistically% significant%
estimation%of%the%relationship%between%Norway’s%mitigation%finance%and%
CDM% location% at% allocation% stage%of% the% commitment%phase% show% that%
Norway’s%mitigation% finance% is% influenced%by% the% location% selected% for%




countries% that% host% CDM% projects% funded% by% its% private% sector%
(significant%at%10%;%see%c14).%This%indicates%Norway’s%allocation%strategy%
to% strengthen% its% recipients’% capacity% to% effectively% join% the% carbon%
trading% in% the%near% future,%while%Denmark% counterbalances% its%private%
actors’%investment%by%providing%countries%other%than%CDM%destinations%
with% higher% volume% of% mitigation% finance% –% dyadcdm( is% negative% and%












have%become%an%essential%determinant%of%mitigation% finance% for% Japan,%
Norway%and%Denmark.%These%donors%select%developing%countries%with%
greater%emissions%as% their%recipients:% for%all% three,% lnco2% is%positive%and%
significant,%with%Norway%at%1%%(c23)%and%Japan’s%and%Denmark’s%at%5%%
(c19,% c24).% The% results% show% that% EU% tends% to% provide% grants% to%
developing% countries% with% fewer% emissions,% having% a% consistently%
negative%lnco2%(c25).%This%reflects%the%EU’s%consistent%implementation%of%
its%strategic%decision.% It%has%made%a%strategic%partnership%with%African,%






























lnco2% 0.366**% 0.129% 0.071% F0.102% 0.702***% 0.623**% F0.644**% F0.063% 0.094%%%%
% (2.402)% (0.926)% (0.286)% (F0.717)% (4.316)% (2.570)% (F2.322)% (F0.417)% (0.960)%%%%
lnforest% 0.147**% 0.198***% 0.502***% 0.055% 0.300***% F0.001% 0.154% 0.064% 0.251***%
% (2.484)% (3.602)% (4.085)% (0.662)% (3.753)% (F0.008)% (1.271)% (1.096)% (5.903)%%%%
deforest% 0.033% 0.489***% 0.615***% 0.063% 0.056% 0.092% F0.193% 0.127% 0.048%%%%
% (0.318)% (4.285)% (3.028)% (0.718)% (0.444)% (0.730)% (F1.501)% (1.534)% (0.732)%%%%
govern% 0.768***% 1.758***% 1.320**% 0.473% 1.260***% 2.382***% 0.207% 0.817***% 1.094***%
% (2.804)% (5.685)% (2.388)% (1.377)% (3.727)% (5.311)% (0.405)% (2.738)% (4.650)%%%%
lngdppc% F0.728***% F0.662***% 0.591**% 0.074% F1.651***% F1.655***% 0.148% F0.194% F0.341***%
% (F3.194)% (F3.684)% (2.197)% (0.366)% (F7.177)% (F4.391)% (0.401)% (F0.934)% (F2.629)%%%%
lninfant% F0.180% 0.409*% 1.212***% 0.366% 0.102% F0.126% F0.634% F0.005% 0.552***%
% (F0.683)% (1.724)% (3.165)% (1.600)% (0.328)% (F0.357)% (F1.573)% (F0.022)% (2.956)%%%%
lnpop% 0.123% 0.291% 0.480% 0.569***% F0.165% 0.041% 0.923**% 0.345*% 0.308**%%
% (0.681)% (1.640)% (1.492)% (2.909)% (F0.791)% (0.143)% (2.471)% (1.727)% (2.528)%%%%
fdiinflow% F0.026% F0.017% 0.048**% 0.037**% 0.001% F0.037% F0.006% 0.008% 0.006%%%%
% (F1.091)% (F0.845)% (2.358)% (2.518)% (0.036)% (F1.055)% (F0.156)% (0.355)% (0.432)%%%%
democracy% 0.058***% 0.016% F0.063*% 0.007% F0.017% F0.113***% F0.058*% 0.017% 0.038**%%
% (2.725)% (0.741)% (F1.672)% (0.273)% (F0.742)% (F3.220)% (F1.710)% (0.850)% (2.563)%%%%
lndyadtrade% 0.264% 0.051% 0.364% 0.245% 0.251% F0.013% % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% (1.602)% (0.484)% (0.924)% (1.139)% (1.434)% (F0.054)% % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
dyadcdm% 1.085***% 0.833% F0.125% 0.827**% 0.647% F0.185% % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% (2.709)% (1.467)% (F0.198)% (2.024)% (1.158)% (F0.276)% % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
dyadxcolony% % F2.030**% 1.571***% 3.546***% % % 0.355% F0.071% F0.407**%%
% % (F2.113)% (3.610)% (9.137)% % % (0.702)% (F0.302)% (F2.260)%%%%
lndistance% F1.421***% F0.457**% F1.456***% F1.467***% F0.089% 1.732***% % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% (F5.320)% (F2.357)% (F5.241)% (F6.713)% (F0.297)% (3.003)% % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
lnbildis% % % % % % % 0.030% 0.065*% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% % % % % % % (0.456)% (1.743)% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
χ2% 1549.0% 2015.1% 1076.3% 2821.5% 337.2% 320.2% .% 4038.9% 273.7%%%%
PFvalues% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% .% 0.000% 0.000%%%%









the% central% interest% of% Japan% (c19),% Germany% (c20),% France% (c21),% and%
Norway% (c23).% Germany’s% and% France’s% deforest( are% positive% and%





For% the% selection% stage,% I% use% disbursement% data,% governance% (govern)%
representing%the%institutional%performance%of%developing%countries.%The%
coefficients%of%govern%in%all%columns%in%Table%4.7,%except%in%c25,%show%the%
stable% signs% and% consistent% statistical% significance% compared% to% the%
results% of% this% determinant% of% mitigation% finance% using% commitment%
data%in%Table%4.5.%As%in%the%commitment%phase%of%the%selection%stage,%all%
the% donors% except% the% EU% (c7% and% c25)% apply% good% governance% as% a%




countries’% good% governance% more% than% other% donors:% its% govern%
coefficient,%at%2.382%(Table%4.7,%c24),%is%almost%threefold%that%of%Japan%at%
0.768% (c19).% This% demonstrates% Denmark’s% consistent% appreciation% of%
good%governance.%Japan%is%less%stringent%than%Denmark%in%using%policy%
performance% as% a% determinant% of% mitigation% finance,% but% is% more%










(c24)% are% negative% and% significant% at% 1%,% while% France% provides%
mitigation% finance% for% developing% countries% with% higher% per% capita%
income%(positive%and%significant%lngdppc(at%1%).%
%
There% are% two% possible% explanations% for% the% positive% correlation% of%




usually% has% a% high% negative% correlation%with% infant%mortality% rate% –% a%
country%with%high%per%capita%income%has%low%infant%mortality%–%in%some%
countries% it% is% possible% that% both% infant% mortality% (representing% social%
problems)%and%income%per%capita%are%high.%For%example,%a%small%part%of%
the% population% may% harness% and% benefit% from% a% large% part% of% the%
country’s%income%while%the%majority%of%the%population%still%lives%in%poor%
social% conditions.% Second,% both% coefficients% of% lngdppc(and% lninfant(are%
positive% potentially% because% of% the% existence% of% multicollinearity%
between% lngdppc(and% lninfant.(When% these% variables% are% tested% in% turn%
they% are% stable% and% significant% (see% Appendix% 4.4).% lninfant% is% still%
positive% and% significant% at% 5%% (c62),% and% without% lninfant,( lngdppc(
remains%positive%and%significant%at%5%%(c61).%
%
At% the% allocation% stage% only% Japan% and% GEF,% with% more% observations%
than% the% other% donors,% have% significant% and% positive% coefficients% for%
govern( (Table% 4.8,% c28,% c35).% The% number% of% observations% tends% to%
influence% statistical% significance% and% the% robustness% of% the% estimation.%






























lnco2% 0.366% 0.120% F0.506% 0.198% F0.172% F0.029% 1.026*% 0.138% 0.288**%%
% (1.262)% (0.702)% (F0.738)% (0.730)% (F0.482)% (F0.069)% (1.952)% (1.465)% (1.994)%%%%
lnforest% F0.006% F0.124% F0.822**% F0.021% 0.138% F0.064% 0.275% 0.104**% 0.088*%%%
% (F0.058)% (F1.460)% (F2.037)% (F0.211)% (1.017)% (F0.244)% (1.134)% (2.246)% (1.702)%%%%
deforest% 0.268**% F0.064% F1.056*% F0.057% 0.190% 0.105% F0.148% 0.063% 0.256***%
% (2.056)% (F0.447)% (F1.958)% (F0.251)% (0.979)% (0.434)% (F0.586)% (0.907)% (3.405)%%%%
govern% 0.962**% 0.240% F0.562% 0.273% 0.819% 0.466% 0.169% 0.441**% 1.086***%
% (2.048)% (0.618)% (F0.373)% (0.431)% (1.455)% (0.478)% (0.222)% (2.064)% (4.586)%%%%
lngdppc% F0.801**% F0.350% 1.771% F0.678*% 0.207% 0.123% F2.129**% F0.064% F0.733***%
% (F1.998)% (F1.429)% (1.431)% (F1.842)% (0.378)% (0.184)% (F2.581)% (F0.428)% (F3.905)%%%%
lninfant% 0.030% 0.022% F0.665% F0.495% 0.495% 0.553% F1.586*% 0.107% F0.375*%%%
% (0.063)% (0.059)% (F0.567)% (F0.940)% (1.279)% (1.501)% (F1.768)% (0.595)% (F1.749)%%%%
lnpop% 0.453% 0.371*% 1.727% 0.017% 0.295% 0.264% F1.150% 0.184% 0.380**%%
% (1.301)% (1.730)% (1.632)% (0.051)% (0.646)% (0.467)% (F1.642)% (1.425)% (2.047)%%%%
fdiinflow% 0.006% F0.020% 0.001% 0.005% 0.054% 0.018% F0.068% F0.004% 0.011%%%%
% (0.123)% (F0.472)% (0.034)% (0.152)% (1.227)% (0.220)% (F0.976)% (F0.222)% (0.510)%%%%
democracy% 0.090***% 0.001% F0.072% F0.101**% 0.037% F0.006% F0.068% F0.013% 0.010%%%%
% (2.973)% (0.041)% (F1.220)% (F2.006)% (0.858)% (F0.135)% (F1.111)% (F0.968)% (0.568)%%%%
lndyadtrade% 0.125% 0.090% F0.465% 0.041% 0.470% F0.167% % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% (0.689)% (0.446)% (F0.300)% (0.119)% (1.657)% (F0.406)% % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
dyadcdm% 0.183% 0.123% 0.724% 0.382% 1.433**% 0.471% % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% (0.350)% (0.263)% (0.632)% (0.881)% (2.032)% (0.667)% % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
dyadxcolony% % F1.216**% 1.217% 0.815% % 1.257% 0.845% F0.146% 0.017%%%%
% % (F2.053)% (0.850)% (1.587)% % (1.038)% (1.073)% (F0.916)% (0.080)%%%%
lndistance% F1.686***% F0.178% 0.271% F0.134% F0.834% % % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% (F4.085)% (F0.674)% (0.251)% (F0.365)% (F1.639)% % % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
lnbildis% % % % % % % F0.111% 0.026% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% % % % % % % (F0.921)% (0.759)% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
R2% 0.440% 0.318% 0.525% 0.310% 0.218% 0.170% 0.386% 0.297% 0.331%%%%
Adjusted%R2% 0.398% 0.219% 0.298% 0.201% 0.087% F0.112% 0.087% 0.260% 0.309%%%%
PFvalues% 0.000% 0.219% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% F0.112% 0.087% 0.000% 0.000%%%%









direction% as% its% private% investment% in% CDM% host% countries.% Spain’s%
dyadcdm( is% significant( at% 5%% (Table% 4.7,% c22).% Japan% also% persistently%




ExFcolonies% of% France% and% Spain% are% prioritised% to% receive% France% and%
Spain’s% mitigation% finance% (Table% 4.7,% c21,% c22).% However,% Spain%
expresses% a% stronger% preference% than% France,% with% Spain’s% beta%
coefficient% of% dyadexcolony( (3.546)(much% bigger% than% France’s% (1.571).%
Japan,% Germany,% France,% and% Spain% (c19F22)% also% prefer% to% choose%
neighbouring% countries% as% mitigation% finance% recipients.% Their%
coefficients%for% lndistance(are%negative%and%significant%at%1%,% indicating%
their%support%for%neighbouring%countries,%while%Denmark%(c33)%tends%to%
provide% mitigation% finance% to% countries% that% are% further% away% –%
lndistance(is%positive%(c24).%%
%
Some% results% of% estimation% from% the% allocation% stage% suffer% from% the%
small% number% of% observations% (See% N% in% Table% 4.8).% Nevertheless,%
Norway,% as% a% proFdevelopment% donor,% still% has% dyadcdm% positive% and%
significant%at%5%%(c32),% showing% its%persistence% in% following% its%private%












The% use% of% determinants% in% the% allocation% of%mitigation% finance% in% the%
commitment% and% disbursement% phases% tends% to% vary,% signalling% that%
there%is%a%gap%between%donors’%rhetoric%and%their%actual%allocation.%The%
statistical% significance% and% the% sensitivity% of% the% coefficients% of%
determinants% indicate% the% extent% of% donors’% consistency% in% using% the%
same% determinant% to% decide% on% their% allocation% when% they% make%




The% emission% variable,% lnco2,% draws% several% donors’% attention% more%
seriously%at%the%disbursement%stage.%Japan,%Norway%and%Denmark%use%it(
as% a% positive% determinant% when% making% actual% decisions% on% which%
country%receives%mitigation%finance%and%but%do%not%use%it%when%making%
provisional% commitment.% Their% coefficients% of% lnco2( are% positive% and%
statistically% significant% at% the% minimum% 5%% level% (Table% 4.7,% c19,% c23,%
c24)%but%statistically%insignificant%at%the%commitment%phase.%Potentially%
several%donors%avoid%using%lnco2(as%the%determinant%in%the%commitment%











have% room% to% adjust% their% determinants% of% allocation,% especially%when%
some% programmes% for% reducing% CO2% emissions% in% highFemitting%







significant% in% the% disbursement% phase% (Table% 4.8,% c34).% Support% for%
mitigation% action% in% nonFindustrialised% developing% countries% seems% to%
be% consistent% with% the% EU’s% Cotonou% Agreement% (EU,% 2010).% The%
aspiration% to% improve% the%economies%of%African%and%Caribbean%Pacific%
countries,%which%are%mainly%nonFindustrialised%and%less%developed,%also%
aligns%with%ODA%principles.%While%providing%mitigation%finance%to%poor%
countries% agrees% with% ODA% principles,% one% may% argue% that% the% EU’s%
















finance% to%poorer%developing%countries% is% less% than%at% the%commitment%
stage.% The% coefficient% of% Spain’s% lngdppc( in% Table% 4.6( (F0.843)% is% lower%





secondary% to% Spain’s% political% and% economic% agenda% to% support% exF
colonies,%neighbouring%countries%and%its%own%privateFsector%investment%





development% of% the% poor% is% no% longer% the% priority:% the% allocation% of%
privateFsector% investment% across% developing% countries% is% becoming% a%
stronger% influence% on% Norwegian% public% mitigation% finance.% The%






of% the%disbursement%phase% is% twice% as% sensitive% as% in% the% commitment%
phase%(c10).%The%negative%sign%suggests%that%its%neighbouring%countries%
offer% economic% and% political% opportunities% such% as% trade% cooperation%





distance% variable% in% the% allocation% of% its% disbursement.% Norway’s%




In% general,% the% heterogeneity% of% determinants% of% mitigation% finance%
distribution% across% developing% countries% is% more% apparent% in% the%




more%homogenous%determinants% in%use.% The% similarities% among%major%
mitigation%finance%donor%determinants%may%be%explained%by%a%herding%
effect% that% encourages% other% mitigation% finance% donors% to% invest% in%
multiFdonor%projects%to%mitigate%the%risk%of%project%failure%due%to%lack%of%







Donors% provide% grants%without% expecting% recipients% to% repay% them,% and%
loans%or%concessional%loans%for%repayment%after%a%certain%period;%the%latter%
have% low% interest% rates% and% an% additional% grace% payback% period% (OECD,%
2014).%%





mitigation% finance% is% not% included% due% to% its% different% categorisation% of%
data% (i.e.% GEF% uses% ‘project% approved’,% rather% than% ‘amount% committed’%
and% ‘amount% disbursed’).% Although% GEF% environmental% aid% data% taken%




Due% to% the% inherent% risk% of% mitigation% finance% becoming% a% perverse%
incentive% such% that% it% can% promote% recipients’% continuation% of% inefficient%
energy%consumption%practices% in%order% to%receive%mitigation% finance,% it% is%
also% possible% that% the% allocation% of% mitigation% finance% grants% and% loans%
have%different% sets% of% underlying%driving% factors.% For% example,% loans% are%




with% sizable% carbon% sinks% and% a% high% rate% of% deforestation% to% fund%





elements,% commitment% and% disbursement,% and% each% of% these% in% turn%
involves%two%stages,%selection%and%allocation.%The%first%aim%of%this%section%is%








is% determined% by% two% different% climateFrelated% variables.% Mitigation%
finance% grants% (hereafter% ‘grants’)% tend% to% be% determined% by% lnforest,% a%
variable%that%represents%recipient%countries’%capacity%for%mitigating%global%




determinant%becomes% insignificant% in% the%allocation%of%mitigation% finance%
grant%(c38)%and%mitigation%finance%disbursement%(c39,%c40).%The%emissions%
variable% (lnco2)( seems% to% be% an% insignificant% determinant% of% grant%




Developing% countries% with% larger% forested% areas% tend% to% receive% bigger%
grants.%lnforest(is%positive%and%significant%at%1%%(c37).%In%the%same%phase%at%
the% allocation% stage,% similar% results% indicate% that% mitigation% finance%
recipients% with% larger% forest% areas% tend% to% receive% bigger% grants,% with%
lnforest(positive%and%significant%at%1%%(c38).% In%the%disbursement%phase%of%
grant% allocation,% lnforest( (significant% at% 1%)% seems% to% be% applied% more%
consistently%as%a%determinant%of%mitigation%finance%(c39,%c40).%
%
Developing% countries’% deforestation% rate% is% not% rated% as% important%
determinant%in%the%allocation%of%mitigation%finance%grants.%There%is%lack%of%
evidence%that%the%severity%of%problem%related%to%deforestation%is%addressed%




qualify% for% a% larger% amount% of% mitigation% finance.% On% the% other% hand,%
MPAs% as% an% alternative% sink% are% a% significant% determinant% of% grants.%
Developing% countries% with% larger% percentage% of% MPAs% from% their% total%
territorial%waters%tend%to%receive%grants%–%marine%is%positive%and%significant%
at%1%%(Appendix%4.3,%Table%4.12,% c53F56).%MPAs%which% is%associated%with%





% Grant% % % % Loan% % % %

















lnco2% 0.157*% F0.070% 0.068% 0.065% 0.445***% 0.700*% 0.658***% 0.563%%%%
% (1.683)% (F0.545)% (0.694)% (0.525)% (3.004)% (1.828)% (3.626)% (1.645)%%%%
lnforest% 0.221***% 0.169***% 0.304***% 0.135***% F0.027% F0.010% F0.069% 0.116%%%%
% (5.416)% (3.000)% (6.906)% (3.033)% (F0.403)% (F0.158)% (F1.155)% (0.759)%%%%
deforest% F0.039% 0.113% 0.019% 0.085% 0.556***% F0.200% 0.560***% F0.140%%%%
% (F0.670)% (1.495)% (0.291)% (1.423)% (3.892)% (F1.332)% (4.904)% (F0.573)%%%%
govern% 0.999***% 1.008***% 1.102***% 0.839***% 0.703**% F0.235% 0.995***% 1.265%%%%
% (4.479)% (4.006)% (4.671)% (3.975)% (2.011)% (F0.405)% (2.877)% (1.285)%%%%
lngdppc% F0.421***% F0.349**% F0.336**% F0.475***% F0.554***% F0.933*% F1.084***% F0.985**%%
% (F3.379)% (F2.129)% (F2.574)% (F3.004)% (F3.007)% (F1.935)% (F4.316)% (F2.078)%%%%
lninfant% 0.341*% F0.173% 0.470**% F0.359**% 0.136% F0.670% 0.114% F1.341***%
% (1.879)% (F0.807)% (2.523)% (F2.036)% (0.477)% (F1.530)% (0.346)% (F3.304)%%%%
lnpop% 0.234*% 0.482***% 0.257**% 0.352**% 0.412**% F0.356% 0.158% 0.139%%%%
% (1.916)% (2.930)% (2.083)% (2.218)% (2.085)% (F0.759)% (0.673)% (0.358)%%%%
fdiinflow% 0.012% 0.037**% 0.008% 0.023% 0.046***% F0.098% 0.011% F0.016%%%%
% (0.563)% (2.377)% (0.514)% (1.166)% (3.292)% (F1.649)% (0.444)% (F0.336)%%%%
democracy% 0.045***% F0.012% 0.031**% F0.001% 0.044% F0.001% 0.066***% 0.009%%%%
% (2.997)% (F0.634)% (2.040)% (F0.088)% (1.643)% (F0.039)% (2.770)% (0.234)%%%%
xcolony% F0.393**% F0.190% F0.296% F0.122% 0.122% 0.159% F0.153% 0.790%%%%
% (F2.211)% (F0.911)% (F1.630)% (F0.688)% (0.405)% (0.512)% (F0.529)% (1.533)%%%%
 χ2% 255.5% % 294.9% % 135.6% % 1234.0% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
R2% % 0.220% % 0.270% % 0.603% % 0.520%%%%
Adjusted%
R2%
% 0.196% % 0.246% % 0.487% % 0.426%%%%
PFvalues% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%%%%
N% 1064% 624% 1064% 597% 1064% 85% 1064% 111%%%%








becomes% a% condition% for% developing% countries% to% receive% grants% and% to%
receive%more%grants.%Donors%pledge%their%commitment%to%giving%grants%to%






more% mitigation% grants% to% developing% countries% with% higher% perFcapita%
income%–%i.e.%the%sensitivity%of%the%coefficients%of%the%lngdppc(variable%of%the%
mitigation%grant%is%less%than%at%both%the%selection%and%the%allocation%stage%





stages% of% both% the% commitment% and% disbursement% phases% F% lninfant% is%
positive% and% significant% at% 1%% (Table% 4.9,% c37,% c39).%Unexpectedly,% in% the%
disbursement% phase% of% the% allocation% stage,% lninfant( becomes% a% negative%
parameter%for%grants.%Perhaps%at%this%stage%social%development%comes%after%
the% principal% objective% of% mitigating% emissions,% and% therefore% recipients%










aid% per% capita.% The% allocation% of% mitigation% finance% overall% shows% that%
democratic% countries% are% given% preferential% treatment:% they% tend% to% be%
selected%as%grant%recipients%at%both%the%commitment%and%the%disbursement%
stage,% with% democracy( significant% and% positive% at% 1%.% Democracy% as% a%
parameter% of% mitigation% finance% allocation% is% consistent% with% good%





developing% countries% with% a% sizable% quantity% of% emissions.% In% the%
commitment% phase% of% the% selection% stage,% developing% countries% with% a%
higher% level% of% emissions% consistently% tend% to% receive% loans.% lnco2( is%
positive% and% significant% at% 5%% (Table% 4.9,% c41),% indicating% that% recipients%
with% larger% emissions% are% more% likely% to% receive% loans.% However,% the%
statistical%significance%of%lnco2((10%)%is%not%as%strong%as%it%is%at%the%selection%
stage.% When% the% trend% of% carbon% intensity,% rci,( is% included,% lnco2( in% the%
selection% stage% (c41,% c43)% remains% statistically% significant% (Appendix% 4.3,%
Table% 4.11,% c49,% c51).% A% robustness% check% using% HSM% shows% a% stronger%
relationship% between% lnco2( and% mitigation% finance% loan% than% grant%
(Appendix%4.3,%Table%4.14,%c66Fc67).%In%all%estimations%of%mitigation%finance%












An% interesting% finding% is% that% there% is% no% evidence% that% donors% provide%
loans% to% developing% countries% with% larger% forest% areas% –% i.e.% lnforest( is%
insignificant% in% all% cases% of% loans% (Table% 4.9,% c41Fc44).% However,%
deforestation% rate% appears% to% be% a% strong% determinant% in% qualifying%
developing% countries% as% mitigation% finance% borrowers,% with% deforest%
positive% and% significant% at% 1%% in% the% commitment% and% disbursement%
phases%(c41,%c43).%The%commercial%opportunities%provided%by%reforestation%
projects% as% opposed% to% deforestation% are% less% obvious;% in% fact% many%
deforestation% activities% are% the% negative% externalities% of% the% commercial%
activities%of%the%coal%extraction%and%palm%oil%industries%(Abood%et(al.,%2014).%
Public% finance% like%ODA% can%play% a% role% in% funding% initiatives% to% restore%




developing% countries.% The% coefficients% of% lngdppc( of% mitigation% loans% in%
columns%43%and%44%are%more%sensitive%than%those%of%mitigation%grants%(c39%
and%c40).%Poorer%developing%countries%potentially% lack%of%capital%and%can%
often% need% capital% lending% to% address% an% increasingly% pressing% climate%
change% issue% that% may% also% impair% the% national% economy,% such% as%
continuous%floods%and%prolonged%drought.%Although%mitigation%loans%can%










decisions% about% allocating%mitigation% loans% to% developing% countries.% It% is%
possible% that% the% selection% of% developing% countries% receiving% mitigation%
finance%largely%depends%on%developing%countries’%economic%activity%rather%




loans% is% higher% than% that% of% committed% loans.% In% Table% 4.9% there% are% 111%
observations% of% the% former% and% only% 85% of% the% latter.%One% explanation% is%
that% some% financial% disbursement% is% recorded% without% recorded%
commitment.% In% some% of% Japan’s% projects% the% amount% committed% is% not%
recorded%but%sizable%disbursed%amounts%are.%Economic%stability%is%a%major%
concern% if% a% recipient% country% is% not% given% sufficient% time% to% anticipate% a%
large% sum% of% foreign% financial% inflow,% where% this% practice% happens%
frequently.%
%
There% is% a% carefully% systematic% selection% of% financial% instrument% to% avoid%
rewarding% developing% countries% with% higher% emissions% with% grants.%
Instead,% they% tend% to% receive% loans.% Grants% are% directed% to% developing%
countries% with% sizable% forest% areas% or% higher% deforestation% rates,%
conceivably% to% reduce% their% emissions% through% improved% forestry%
management.%The%consequence% is% that% the%allocation%of%public%mitigation%
finance% may% deviate% from% the% original% intention% to% respond% to% the%
Copenhagen% Accord’s% article% 7,% which% aims% to% promote% development%







More% consideration% is% given% to% recipients’% performance% when% providing%
grants% than% when% offering% loans.% Perhaps% loans% are% offered% more%
generously% in% the% commitment% phase,% since% donors% charge% interest% rates%
and% require% paybacks.% The% coefficient% of%govern% for% loans% is% positive% and%
significant% at% 5%% (0.703)% (Table% 4.9,% c41)% in% the% commitment% phase,% less%
than%for%grants%(0.999)%(c37).+In%the%disbursement%stage,%govern%has%similar%




LoanForiented% donors% tend% to% use% progress% in% social% development% as% a%
negative%determinant%of%the%distribution%of%loans.%%Nevertheless,%they%pay%
considerable%attention%to%the%economic%aspect%of%recipients’%needs.%Poorer%
developing% countries% with% lower% per% capita% income% tend% to% be% more%
successful%at%attracting%loans,%as% lngdppc(is%negative%and%significant%at%1%%
at% the% selection% stage% of% the% commitment%phase% (c41).%However,% lninfant,(
significant%at%1%,%seems%to%be%a%negative%determinant%of% the%provision%of%
loans% at% the% allocation% stage% (c44).% Donors% may% avoid% giving% loans% to%
recipients% with% severe% social% development% problems,% which% can% be%
associated%with%a%greater%possibility%of%defaulting%on%repayments.%
%
From%understanding% the%determinants%of%mitigation% finance% instruments,%
this%study%shows%donors%in%overall%are%more%interested%in%providing%loans%








This% section% discusses% the% resource% allocation% frameworks% used% by%
GEF%and%the%EU%to%distribute%their%mitigation%finance.%The%emphasis%is%on%
analysing%specific%features,%criteria%and%parameters%of%their%frameworks%for%






operate%guide%GEF’s%decisions% about%which%developing% countries% should%
receive% climate% finance.% GEF% does% not% specify% the% amount% of% funding%
designated% for% mitigation% and% adaptation.% A% review% of% the% GEF% by%
Nakhooda% (2013)%notes% that% so% far% its% climate% finance%primarily% supports%
efforts% to% promote% the% uptake% of% energyFefficient% and% lowFcarbon%
technologies.% A% quarter% of% the% GEF% funding% portfolio% is% allocated% to%
strengthening%the%institutional%capacity%of%recipient%countries.%Therefore%in%
this% chapter,%GEF’s% climate% finance% is% referred% as%mitigation% finance.%The%
STAR% framework% generates% a% country% score% of% three% elements% with%
different%weights,%as%seen%in%Eq.%(3).%
%!"#$%&'!!"#$% = !"#!.!×!"#!.!×!"#!!.!"% % % % % (3)%
%
The% GPI% (GEF% Performance% Index),% which% represents% a% country’s%
performance% based% on% the%GEF% evaluation% system,% has% slightly% a% higher%
weight% than% the% GBI% (Global% Benefit% Index).% Performance% is% almost% as%
important% as% the% potential% environmental% global% impact% of% a% developing%







determined% and% considered% after% a% series% of% consultations% with% GEF%
Council%members%who%have% the% right% to%put% forward%motions% to%update%
and% change% them% (GEF,% 2005b).%This%discussion% is% relevant% to% reviews%of%




namely% biodiversity% (GBIbd),% land% degradation% (GBIld),% and% climate%
change%(GBIcc).%The%latter%is%calculated%as%shown%in%Eq.%(4)%!"#!! = 0.95 !"!!""#× (!"!/!"#)!""#(!"!/!"!)!""# + 0.05 !"!""#× !"!""#!!"""!"!"""!!""# % (4)%
%
The%GBIcc% score% indicates%a% country’s% contribution% to%emission% reduction%
by%controlling%emission%levels%and%preserving%bioFcarbon%sinks%or%forests.%
More% generally,% the% higher% the%GBIcc% score% a% country% has,% the% higher% its%
potential% for% receiving% GEF’s% mitigation% finance% grants% and% receiving%
larger%sums.%%
%
GHG%emissions%and%trend%of%CO2%intensity% !"!!""#× (!"!/!"#)!""#(!"!/!"#)!""# %have%a%
large%share%in%GBIcc.%This%component%comprises%95%%of%total%GBIcc%in%two%
parts.% The% first% part% of%GBIcc% prioritises% developing% countries%with% large%
carbon% emissions% (represented% by%GHG2007,% consisting% of% CO2,% CH4,%N2O,%
HFCs,%PFCs,%SF6,%all%measured%in%tons%of%CO2e);%the%larger%the%2007%GHG%
emissions%emitted%by%a%developing%country,%the%more%the%country%qualifies%
to% receive% more% GEF% mitigation% finance.% The% second% part% incentivises% a%





demonstrate% a% significant% reduction% of% CO2% intensity% in% 2007% against% its%
1990%CO2%intensity.%For%example,%if%in%2007%country%A%is%able%to%reduce%its%
1990%CO2% intensity% by% half,% it%will% double% its% 2007%GHG% emissions% score%
and%increases%its%GBIcc%score.%
%
A% small%weighting% of% 5%% is% given% to% the%GBIcc’s% second% element,%which%
measures% a% developing% country’s% mitigation% potential% via% forestry.% This%
second% element% !!!""#× !"!""#!!"""!"!"""!!""# !also% consists% of% two% parts% and% has% a%
logic%similar%to%that%of%the%first%element%of%GBIcc.%The%first%part%prioritises%
developing% countries%with%vast% forest% cover% (FC)%or%natural% carbon% sinks%
that% keep% CO2% emissions% from% being% released% into% the% atmosphere.% The%
second%part% incentivises%the%country%to%reduce%its%deforestation%rate.%GEF%
uses% the% average% of% the% annual% 1990F2000%deforestation% rate% (DF)% against%
that% of% 2000F2005.% Although% GEF% incentives% countries% with% forest% or%
natural% environmental% capacity% to% reduce% emissions,% the% 5%% weighting%
given%to%this%second%part%of%the%equation%can%only%increase%a%country’s%GEF%




(3).% %This% thesis% tests% lnco2,(rci,( lnforest%and%deforest(to(represent% the%GBIcc%
elements%!"!!""#,%(!"!/!"#)!""#(!"!/!"#)!""#,%!"!""#%and%!"!""#!!"""!"!"!!!!""#,%respectively.%In%these%
chapters% these% elements% are% not% weighted% and% CO2% intensity% (rci)% is%
calculated% in% a% slightly%different%way.% It% is%measured%by% a% country’s%CO2%
intensity% compared% to% its%previous%year’s% record.% Instead%of%using% 2005’s%
forest%cover%data,%!"!""#,%%and%the%ratio%of%the%changing%deforestation%rate%
from%1990%to%2000%divided%by%the%changing%deforestation%rate%from%2000%to%




measures% average% annual% change% of% forest% from% the% FAO% forest% data% in%
1990,% 2000,% 2005,% and% 2010.% One% of% considerations% is% due% to% a% lack% of%
scientific%ground%which%year%is%acceptable%for%use%as%the%base%year.%%
%
GEF% weighs% and% values% heavily% emissionsFrelated% than% forestFrelated%
components,% implying% that% GEF% assumes% that% mitigation% via% energy%
efficiency% is% more% effective% and% produces% greater% global% benefit% than%
mitigation%by%reducing%deforestation%and%forest%degradation.%GEF%assigns%




Secondly,% GEF% uses% a% base% year,% i.e.% 2007% for% GHG% and% 2005% for% FC,%
abstracting% from% the% variation% over% time.%One%may% argue% that% emissions%
vary% considerably% according% to% economic% activity% (Peters% et( al.,% 2012).%
However,% for% forestFrelated% components% a% base% year% may% not% have% a%
substantial%effect%as% it%varies%much%less% (with%a% tendency%to%decline)% than%






Performance,% the% other% element% of% STAR,% is% measured% using% the% GEF%
Performance%Index%(GPI).%GPI%consists%of%three%weighted%components:%the%
portfolio%performance% indicator% (PPI),%which%carries% the% least%weight,% the%






!"# = 0.65 !"#$% + 0.15 !"# + 0.2 !!" % % % % % (5)%
%
CEPIA,% the% largest% weighted% component% (see% Eq.% 5),% is% taken% from% the%




two% categories;% the% institutional% context% and% environmental% themes.% The%
institutional%context%covers%access%to%information,%public%participation,%the%
quality% and% effectiveness% of% the% EA% system,% crossFsectoral% coordination,%
and% accountability% (ibid).% The% latter% category% centres% on% policy,%
implementation% and% enforcement% with% nine% environmental% themes:% air%
pollution,%water%pollution,%waste,%freshwater%resources,%marine%and%coastal%
resources,% ecosystem% and% biodiversity,% commercial% renewable% resources,%
nonFrenewable% resources,%and%climate%change% (ibid).%The%measurement%of%
each%CPIA%criterion% ranges% from%1% to%6% (the%highest%and%most%desirable).%
The%CPIA%document%(WB,%2011)%explains%the%conditions%to%be%met%for%each%




BFI,% the%broad% framework% indicator% is% taken% from%the%World%Bank’s% IDA%
Resource% Allocation% Index% (IRAI20).% It% is% the% average% of% five% CPIA%
indicators%under%the%heading%Public%Sector%Management%and%Institutions,%
which% consists% of% property% rights% and% ruleFbased% governance,% quality% of%
budget%and%financial%management,%effectiveness%of% revenue%mobilisation,%








The% underlying% assumption% when% using% BFI% is% that% it% can% generate% a%
measurement%which%can%be%used%as%a%benchmark%to%compare%developing%
countries% according% to% its% public% sector% management% and% institutional%
performance.% The% data% are% gathered% annually% and% reviewed% by% an%




All% projects% funded% by% the% GEF% are% evaluated% twice,% once% during%
implementation% and% again% as% the% end% of% the% project% approaches.% The%
component% PPI% shown% in% Eq.% (6)% consists% of% two% weighted% elements%
resulting% from% this% evaluation% process:% progress% ratings% of% project%
implementation% reports% (PIR)% and% terminal% evaluation% reports% (TER),%
whose% results% provide% a% better% indication% of% the% overall% achievement% of%
project’s%objective%and%hence%are%given%a%slightly%higher%weight%compared%
to% the% results%of%PIR,%which%provide%only%a%partial%picture%of% the%project’%
achievement.%%
%!!" = 0.4 !"# + 0.6 !"# % % % % % % % (6)%
%
Both% PIR% and% TER% elements% are% specific% project% features,% which% are%
important%to%motivate%project%managers%to%deliver%good%results.%However%
the% total% contribution% of% these% two% elements% is%weighted%much% less% than%
macro%performance%indicators.%Eq.%(5)%shows%that%a%country’s%performance%
is%determined%largely%by%macro%indicators%(CEPIA%and%BFI),%while%overall%




performance% index% (GPI).% It% is% possible% that% this% project% performance%
component% has% little% weighting% due% to% the% element% of% subjectivity% in%




Broader% measurements% of% country’s% performance% indicators% (BFI)%
potentially% have% any% link% and% direct% relevance% to% a% country’s% project%
performance.% In% the% latter% case,% when% a% developing% countries’% general%
policy% performance% is% good% but% it% fails% to% demonstrate% good% project%
performance,%based%on%the%GEF%performance%index%this%country%is%likely%to%
qualify% and% be% prioritised% for% aid% from%GEF,% although% the% score%will% be%
slightly%negatively%affected%by%the%low%project%performance%score.%%
%
With% a% weighting% of% only% 20%% for% performance% (PPI),% GEF% may% not%
sufficiently% incentivise% recipient% governments’% national% authorities% to%
perform% well% in% delivering% projects.% There% is% a% conceivable% danger% of%
having%a%series%of%projects%with%poor%performance,%as%project%performance%




With% this%negative%value,% the% lower% the%GDP%per%capita%of%a%country,% the%
higher%the%GDPI%score%of%the%country,%and%this%country%with%higher%GDPI%
score%will% be% eligible% for% a% higher% allocation% of% funding% inflow% from% the%
GEF.% It% is% intentionally% set% to% shift% resources% from% richer% to% poorer%
countries%(GEF,%2010,%p.%22);%the%drawback%of%the%GDP%Index%is%that%it%does%
not%capture%the%vulnerability%of%smallFisland%developing%countries,%which%





for%why% F0.04% is%a%preferable%value%of% the%exponential%power%of% the%GDP%
index%than,%for%example,%F0.1%and%F0.01.%
%
There% is% an% additional% drawback% from% the% GEF’s% higherFlevel% body’s%
reliance%on%project% reports%written%by% local%or% regional%project%managers.%
Using%project%reports%as%a%criteria%of%aid%allocation%may%create%a%tendency%
for%managers%to%overstate%the%results%in%hopes%of%receiving%more%funding,%
such% as% by% claiming% both% crossFcutting% mitigation% and% adaptation%
objectives% when% a% project% is% not% intended% to% accommodate% both.% If% the%
result%of% the%assessment% is%heavily%dependant%only%on%the%project%reports%
the% results% of% the% assessment%may% not% represent% the% real% performance% of%
the%projects.%
%
In% general% there% are% two%main% concerns% related% to% the%GEF% STAR.% First,%
with% its% little%weighting% for%performance,% the% system%does%not% encourage%
project% managers% to% work% towards% better% performance.% It% has% a% lack% of%
determinant% that% is%able% to% incentivise% for%both%project%managers%and% the%
country% to% adhere% to% the% global% objective% of% GEF% to% mitigating% climate%






Secondly,% the% transparency%of%GEF%STAR% is% limited.%GEF%STAR%explains%
the% PPI% assessment% process% and% how% GEF% normatively% allocates% its%





to% verify% the% GEF’s% resource% allocation% to% developing% countries% by%
replicating% the% calculation% of% the% GEF% STAR% score% for% each% developing%
country.%%
%
These% two% concerns% add% to% a% possibility% of% GEF% moving% away% from%
implementing%GEF%STAR.%Marcoux%and%Tierney% (2011)%make%an%analysis%
using% principalFagent% theory% to% analyse% the% implication% of% ways% and%
actions% from% GEF’s% institutional% arrangement.% As% a% mitigation% finance%
grantFgiver,% GEF% and% its% strategic% actions,% including% the% allocation% of% its%
resources,% depend% on% its% collective% principals% (the% GEF% Council),% which%
approve% both% policies% and% individual% projects.% Marcoux% and% Tierney%
(2011)%observe%that%the%outcomes%of%its%arrangement%remain%puzzling%and%
intriguing.%To%date%there%is%a%lack%of%evidence%on%whether%the%GEF%Council%
fully% adheres% to% the% GEF% STAR% when% it% approves% projects.% There% is% a%
possibility% that% the% actual% allocation% of%GEF% resources% deviating% from% its%
normative% guidance% (GEF% STAR).% It% is% possible% for% donors,% using% their%
control% over% their% financial% resource% disbursement,% to% influence% the%GEF%
Council% to% approve% projects% based% on% donors’% preferences,%which%might%






In% 2000,% the% EU% established% a% comprehensive% formal% partnership%
agreement%with%developing%countries%and% in%particular%with% the%African,%
Carribean% and% Pacific% (ACP)% countries% through% the% soFcalled% Cotonou%





2013,% the% CONCORD% Cotonou% working% group% convened% to% discuss% a%
necessary% step% towards% the% ratification%of% the%new%Economic%Partnership%
Agreement% following% on% from% its% predecessor,% the% Cotonou% agreement.%
Some%African%countries% taking%part% in% this%agreement,%namely%Botswana,%
Burundi,%Cameroon,%the%Comoros,%Ivory%Coast,%Fiji,%Ghana,%Haiti,%Kenya,%
Lesotho,%Mozambique,%Namibia,% Rwanda,% Swaziland,% Tanzania,%Uganda%
and%Zambia%need%to%take%necessary%action%before%%October%1%2014%in%order%




Most% of% the% articles% relating% to% climate% change%were% only% added% in% 2010,%
including% article% 32a,% which% explains% the% EU’s% approach% to% addressing%
climate% change% (see% Appendix% 4.4).% The% agreement% does% not% have% a%
resource% allocation% formula% as% the% GEF’s% GBIcc.% Instead,% the% Cotonou%







small% island%ACP%countries.%This%preamble% indicates% that% the%EU’s%prime%
concern% related% to% climate% change% has% been% inserted% into% the% agreement%







The% results% of% the% empirical% assessment% in% this% chapter,% presented% in%
section% 4.4,% reflect% some% of% the% features% of% the% EU’s% commitment% in% the%
Cotonou%Agreement%and%explain%the%extent%of%the%EU’s%actual%allocation%of%
resources%against%the%normative%statement%expressed%in%the%Agreement.%As%
stated% in% the% Agreement,% the% EU% commits% to% prioritising% nonFindustrial%
ACP%countries%as%its%recipients.%Presumably%nonFindustrial%countries%have%
low% carbon% emissions,% the% EU% commitment% to% support% and% to% prioritise%
ACP%countries%is%reflected%by%the%negative%and%statistically%significant%CO2%
emissions% (lnco2)% of% the% EU% mitigation% finance% (Table% 4.7,% c25).% The%
evidence%presented% in% this% thesis%verifies% that% ‘nonFindustrial’% features%as%
one% of% the% determinants% of% the% EU’s% selection% criteria.% The% result% of% the%
EU’s%disbursement%at%the%allocation%stage%(Table%4.8,%c34)%also%reveals%that%
among% nonFindustrial% ACP% countries,% CO2% emissions% are% used% to%
determine% which% ACP% countries% qualify% to% receive% more% EU% mitigation%
finance.%
%
Article% 32a% of% the% Cotonou% Agreement% specifies% the% determinants% to% be%
used% for% EU% resource% allocation.% First,% the% EU% selects% ACP% countries% as%
recipients,% hence% other% developing% countries%may% have% limited% access% to%
EU%aid.%Second,%the%EU%recognises%the%competing%objectives%and%financial%
constraints% to% funding% climate% change% and% other% development% projects%
which% may% threaten% the% achievement% of% the% MDGs.% This% will% further%
restrict% the% allocation% of% funding% to% climate%projects%whose% objectives%do%




countries% in% the%global%carbon%market% (ibid,(Art.%32c).%The%climate%change%





the% agriculture,% water% management,% infrastructure,% forestry,% weather%
forecasting,%and%clean%energy%sectors.%%
%
The% annexes% explain% several% features% of% the% EU’s% financing% mechanism,%
including% further% details% of% EU% resource% allocation.% Annex% IV,% Article% 3%
states%that%EU%resource%allocation%criteria%consider%and%include%recipients’%
needs%and%performance.%The%needs%are%measured%by% ’…per(capita( income,(
population( size,( social( indicators( and( level( of( indebtedness( and( vulnerability( to(
exogenous(shocks‘%(Art%3.1a).%Recipients’%performance%is%measured%by:%
%
’…governance,( progress( in( implementing( institutional( reforms,( country(
performance( in( the( use( of( resources,( effective( implementation( of( current(
operations,( poverty( alleviation( or( reduction,( progress( towards( achieving(
the( Millennium( Development( Goals,( sustainable( development( measures(
and(macroeconomic(and(sectoral(policy(performance‘((Art%3.1b).%
%
Annex% II,% art.% 1.3% clarifies% the%availability%of% two% financing% instruments%–%
loans% and% grants% –% and% the% reduction% of% 3%% interest% of% loan% for% private%
sector%development%in%certain%country%groups%(Annex%II%art%2.7a).%The%EU%
allows% its% aid% to%be% invested%as% equity% in% the%private% sector,% including% in%
financial% institutions% (art.2.1ai).% Here,% the% EU’s% aid% may% be% directed%
towards% stimulating% and% mobilising% a% larger% scale% of% financing% that% is%
primarily%driven%by%and%originates%from%the%private%sector.%There%are%also%
eligibility% criteria% for% additional% resources% in% the% case% of% shortFterm%
fluctuations%in%export%earnings%(Annex%II,%art.%9),%as%for%all%EU%aid.%
%
Both% the% GEF% and% the% EU’s% allocation% frameworks% serve% as% guiding%





no% reference% to%which%datasets%are%used% for% the%assessment%of% recipients’%
needs%and%performance%and%how%they%are%assessed.%In%the%case%of%GEF,%the%
weighting%assigned%to%each%component%tends%to%reduce%the%subjectivity%of%




To% sum% up,% Table% 4.10% recapitulates% all% the% donors’% mitigation% finance%
determinants,%based%on%their%official%statements%and%the%empirical%analysis%
presented% here% and% in% Chapter% 3.% A% comparison% of% these% allocation%
frameworks%shows%that%some%donors%choose%determinants%on%the%basis%of%
strategy% and% their% belief% about% what% constitute% effective% measures% for%






























































































































































































































Emissions! lnco2! ! ! ! +! ! ! ! ! +! +! +! ! ! ! :! ! ! ! +! ! ! +!
Carbon!intensity! rci! +! +! +! +! ! ! ! ! +! ! ! ! !! !! !! !! ! !! !! !! !! +!
Carbon!storage!! lnforest! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! ! ! ! ! ! +! +! +! ! +!
Deforestation! deforest! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! ! ! ! ! +! +! ! +! +! +!
Performance! govern! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! ! ! ! ! +! +! +! +! +! +!
Income!per!capita! lngdppc! :! :! ! :! :! :! :! :! :! :! :! :! ! ! ! :! :! ! ! ! ! :!
Infant!mortality! lninfant! ! ! +! :! +! ! +! :! ! ! ! :! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Population! lnpop! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! ! ! ! ! ! +! ! +! +! ! +! ! !
FDI!inflow! fdiinflow! ! +! ! ! ! +! ! ! +! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Democracy! democracy! +! ! +! ! ! ! ! ! ! +! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Colonial!status! xcolony! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Volume!of!trade! lndyadtrade! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! ! !! !! !! !! !
CDM!partner! dyadcdm! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! ! !! !! !! !! !






































































































































































































































































Emissions! lnco2! ! ! +! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! +! ! ! ! +! !
Carbon!intensity! rci! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
Carbon!storage!! lnforest! +! ! +! ! +! ! +! ! ! :! +! ! ! ! ! ! +! +! +! +! ! ! ! !
Deforestation! deforest! +! ! +! ! ! ! +! ! +! ! +! ! ! ! ! ! ! :! :! ! ! +! ! !
Performance! govern! +! +! +! +! +! ! +! ! +! ! +! ! +! ! +! ! +! ! +! ! +! ! +! !
Income! per!
capita!
lngdppc! ! :! :! :! ! ! :! ! ! :! +! ! ! :! ! :! :! ! :! ! :! +! :! !
Infant!mortality! lninfant! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! +! ! +! ! +! ! ! ! ! +! ! ! ! ! ! !
Population! lnpop! +! ! +! ! +! ! +! +! +! +! ! ! +! ! +! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
FDI!inflow! fdiinflow! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! +! ! +! ! +! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Democracy! democracy! +! ! +! +! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! :! ! :! ! ! ! ! :! ! :! !
Colonial!status! xcolony! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! +! +! ! +! ! +! ! +! +! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Volume!of!trade! lndyadtrade! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! :! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! +! ! ! ! !
CDM!partner! dyadcdm! +! ! +! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! +! ! +! ! ! +! ! +! ! :! ! !






Several' bilateral' and'multilateral' donors' have' responded'promptly'
to' the' challenge' of' mitigating' climate' change' through' their' strategic'
allocation'of'mitigation'finance'across'developing'countries.'These'donors'
use' different' sets' of' criteria,' reflecting' their' standpoints' on' how' climate'
change' should' be' addressed.' Loans' have' been' targeted' at' developing'




with' their' efforts' to'mitigate' emissions' by' providing'mitigation' finance,'
they' also' respond' to' their' recipients’' performance' and' needs.' Some'
bilateral' donors' allocate' mitigation' finance' to' recipients' with' good'
governance' and' lower' per' capita' income;' only' a' few' donors,' such' as'
France,'tend'to'give'mitigation'finance'to'developing'countries'with'a'high'
infant' mortality' rate.' Donors’' economic' and' political' interests,' such' as'
Japan’s' tendency' to' choose' trading'partners' and'neighbouring' countries'
as' recipients,' still' influence' their'mitigation' finance' allocation' decisions.'
Even'Norway,'which' is' known' for' its' generosity,' is' inclined' to' give' its'




this' chapter' is' limited' to' explaining' whether' current' donors’' allocation'
practices' effectively' address' global' climate' change.' There' is' an' urgent'
need'to'assess'the'effectiveness'of'mitigation'finance'at'the'national'level,'
such' as' through' a' study' that' investigates' how' the' projects’' objectives'




important' study' could' evaluate' the' outcomes' of' climate' change'projects'
compared'to'their'stated'objectives.'It'is'also'important'to'clarify'the'extent'
to' which' each' related' sector,' e.g.' the' energy' and' forestry' sectors,' can'
contribute' to' global' emission'mitigation.' Last,' it' is' important' to' analyse'
the'achievement'of'public'mitigation'finance'in'scaling'up'and'improving'










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































! Grant! ! ! ! Loan! ! ! !

















lnco2! 0.101! M0.114! M0.253**! M0.016! 0.358*! 0.496! 0.499**! 0.539!!!!
! (0.753)! (M0.729)! (M1.973)! (M0.124)! (1.910)! (1.234)! (2.401)! (1.413)!!!!
rci! M0.121! 0.455! M0.368! 0.584! 2.478***! M1.552! 0.401! M0.205!!!!
! (M0.138)! (0.390)! (M0.418)! (0.718)! (2.698)! (M0.593)! (0.348)! (M0.100)!!!!
lnforest! 0.184***! 0.132**! 0.208***! 0.120***! 0.025! M0.002! M0.054! 0.126!!!!
! (3.605)! (2.060)! (3.925)! (2.590)! (0.361)! (M0.024)! (M0.902)! (0.812)!!!!
deforest! 0.011! 0.189**! 0.130! 0.123*! 0.697***! M0.340**! 0.652***! M0.099!!!!
! (0.149)! (2.048)! (1.548)! (1.713)! (4.403)! (M2.268)! (5.475)! (M0.373)!!!!
lngdppc! 0.951***! 0.879***! 0.887***! 0.685***! 0.632*! 0.254! 1.040***! 1.343!!!!
! (3.376)! (3.065)! (3.078)! (2.832)! (1.848)! (0.383)! (3.046)! (1.247)!!!!
lninfant! M0.470***! M0.474**! M0.176! M0.544***! M0.531**! M1.061**! M1.074***! M0.986**!!
! (M2.713)! (M2.457)! (M1.020)! (M3.459)! (M2.355)! (M2.161)! (M4.089)! (M2.065)!!!!
lnpop! 0.503**! M0.088! 0.685***! M0.322*! 0.157! M0.756*! 0.161! M1.301***!
! (2.436)! (M0.375)! (3.407)! (M1.732)! (0.491)! (M1.753)! (0.481)! (M3.138)!!!!
govern! 0.305*! 0.583***! 0.729***! 0.420**! 0.505**! M0.146! 0.238! 0.143!!!!
! (1.761)! (2.922)! (4.475)! (2.569)! (2.089)! (M0.295)! (0.898)! (0.333)!!!!
fdiinflow! 0.016! 0.054**! 0.033! 0.020! 0.083***! M0.087! 0.025! M0.020!!!!
! (0.799)! (2.455)! (1.534)! (0.831)! (3.761)! (M1.360)! (0.740)! (M0.405)!!!!
democracy! 0.069***! 0.011! 0.059***! 0.012! 0.054*! M0.025! 0.064***! 0.008!!!!
! (3.815)! (0.498)! (3.197)! (0.768)! (1.827)! (M0.896)! (2.597)! (0.194)!!!!
xcolony! M0.422**! M0.107! M0.351*! 0.051! 0.130! 0.077! M0.005! 0.779!!!!
! (M2.072)! (M0.473)! (M1.716)! (0.278)! (0.405)! (0.234)! (M0.016)! (1.468)!!!!
χ2! 191.7! ! 198.7! ! 109.5! ! 141.3! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
R2! ! 0.256! ! 0.312! ! 0.603! ! 0.518!!!!
Adjusted!
R2!
! 0.226! ! 0.284! ! 0.476! ! 0.415!!!!
PMvalues! 0.000! 0.000! 0.000! 0.000! 0.000! 0.000! 0.000! 0.000!!!!
N! 762! 488! 762! 480! 762! 79! 762! 109!!!!
Note:!HeteroscedasticityMcorrected!tMstatistics!in!parentheses.!*,!**!and!***!denote!significance!at!the!10%;!5%!and!1%!
level!respectively.!!
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cdmesp( M0.125( M0.068( M0.032!!!(
! (M0.198)! (M0.114)! (M0.049)!!!!
dyadxcolony( 1.571***( 1.839***( 1.565***(
( (3.610)( (4.209)( (3.807)!!!(
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! (1.866)! (M0.343)! (1.090)! (0.371)! (2.388)! (2.300)! (1.993)!!!! (2.018)!!!!
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deforest! 0.001! 0.103! 0.045! 0.085! 0.258***! M0.068! 0.302***! M0.005!!!!
! (0.031)! (1.159)! (0.868)! (1.062)! (3.002)! (M0.446)! (3.029)!!!! (M0.016)!!!!
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lnpop! 0.623***! 1.135***! 0.107! 0.956***! 0.337! M0.166! 0.056!!!! 1.427!!!!
! (3.508)! (4.395)! (0.879)! (3.103)! (1.479)! (M0.285)! (0.223)!!!! (1.443)!!!!
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! (0.301)! (2.142)! (0.134)! (0.890)! (2.646)! (M1.537)! (0.225)!!!! (M0.335)!!!!
democracy! 0.025**! M0.006! 0.017! 0.002! 0.030*! 0.009! 0.037**!! 0.022!!!!
! (2.036)! (M0.285)! (1.331)! (0.099)! (1.889)! (0.379)! (1.969)!!!! (0.429)!!!!
xcolony! M0.232! M0.249! M0.173! M0.166! 0.061! 0.183! M0.164!!!! 0.761!!!!
! (M1.429)! (M1.050)! (M1.008)! (M0.557)! (0.338)! (0.556)! (M0.573)!!!! (1.197)!!!!
reddplus! 0.489***! ! 0.611***! ! M0.117! ! 0.116!!!! !
! (2.830)! ! (3.143)! ! (M0.600)! ! (0.436)!!!! !
Rho!(ρ)! ! 0.253! ! 0.288! ! 0.539! ! 0.319!!!!
χ2! ! 243.0! ! 187.4! ! 352.1! ! 287.7!!!!
PMvalues! ! 0.000! ! 0.000! ! 0.000! ! 0.000!!!!













and( a( threat( to( the( achievement( of( the( Millennium( Development( Goals( requiring(
adequate,(predictable(and(timely(financial(support.(For(these(reasons,(and(in(accordance(
with( the( provisions( of(Article( 32,( and( particularly( of( point( (a)( of( paragraph( 2( thereof,(
cooperation(shall:(!
1) recognise( the( vulnerability( of(ACP(States( and( in( particular( of( small( islands( and( lowO
lying( ACP( States( to( climateOrelated( phenomena( such( as( coastal( erosion,( cyclones,(
flooding( and( environmentally( induced( displacements,( and( in( particular( of( least(
developed( and( landlocked(ACP( States( to( increasing( floods,( drought,( deforestation( and(
desertification;!
2) strengthen( and( support( policies( and( programmes( to( mitigate( and( adapt( to( the(









c) assisting( ACP( states( to( adapt( to( climate( change( in( relevant( sectors( such( as(
agriculture,(water(management(and(infrastructure,(including(through(transfer(and(
adoption(of(relevant(and(environmentally(sound(technologies;(!
d) promoting( disaster( risk( reduction,( reflecting( that( an( increasing( proportion( of(
disasters(are(related(to(climate(change;(!
e) providing(financial(and(technical(support(for(mitigation(action(of(ACP(states(in(line(
with( their( poverty( reduction( and( sustainable( development( objectives,( including(
reducing( emissions( from( deforestation( and( forest( degradation( and( reducing(
emissions(in(the(agricultural(sector;(!
f) improving( weather( and( climate( information( and( forecasting( and( early( warning(
systems;(and(!


























































! ! ! Abstract!
This#chapter#analyses#two#main#issues#surrounding#the#use#of#official#mitigation#
finance# taken#from#ODA.#The# frameworks#of# the#analyses#are# largely#adopted#
from# an# institutional# analysis# and# development# framework.# The# first# part#
discusses#what# qualities# or# aspects# of#mitigation# finance# act# as# incentives# for#
mitigating# GHG# emissions# in# developing# countries.# It# particularly# considers#
whether#mitigation#finance#offers#a#perverse#incentive.#The#second#analyses#the#
foreseeable#arrangement#of#mitigation# finance#as#a#new# international# financial#
category,#particularly#exploring#whether#mitigation#finance#is#only#temporarily#
reliant# on#ODA# as# its# source# of# funding# or#will# become# a# permanent# part# of#
ODA.#This#chapter#also#offers#insights#into#the#policy#implications#of#mitigation#
finance# allocation# across# developing# countries# and# the# development# of#
mitigation# finance# as# an# institution.# Greater# understanding# of# the# policy#










taken# from# ODA,# is# determined# by# a# number# of# factors# representing# the#
objectives# of# mitigation# finance,# ODA# and# the# political# and# economic#
interests#of#donors# i.e.# those#supporting#exQcolonies#and#CDM#and#regional#
partners.# To# a# limited# extent#mitigation# finance# shares# the# ODA’s# aims# of#
promoting# local# development# and# halving# poverty,# but# it#mainly# carries# a#
global# mission# to# reduce# GHG# emissions,# which# benefits# countries# and#
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people# globally.# The# global#mission# of#mitigation# finance# and# its# unsettled#
institutional#arrangement,#which#relies#on#ODA#–#whose#intended#objectives#
are# local# and# national# development# –# add# tremendous# complexity# to# its#




behind# its# allocation# enhance# cooperation# between# developed# and#
developing# countries# to# collectively# mitigate# emissions# and# pursue# lowQ
carbon#pathways.#Uniquely,#unlike#poverty#aid,#whose#effectiveness#depends#
on#the#recipient#country’s#policy#performance#(Collier#&#Dollar,#2002),#global#
mitigation# finance# is# rather# ineffective# if# the#world# collectively#depends#on#
the#cooperation#of#a#few#countries#and#donors#and#the#resulting#reduction#in#




on# and# act# together# to# limit# global# warming# to# around# 2°C# above# preQ
industrial# levels# (Stewart# et( al.,# 2009,# pp.# 35–41).# If# some# countries# and#
mitigation# finance# recipients# reduce# their# emission# levels# while# others#
continue# polluting# irresponsibly,# mitigation# finance# will# only# temporarily#
and# partially# mitigate# the# emissions# of# a# few# keen# countries# but# overall,#
global# emissions# will# surpass# the# targeted# levels.# Collective# action# is# a#
condition#of#mitigation#finance#achieving#its#intended#outcome#of#mitigating#
global# emissions,# and# it# can# easily# fail# due# to# a# free# rider# problem#where#
some#countries#without#any#effort#earn#benefits# from#some#other#countries’#
action# (Parks#&#Roberts,#2010,#p.#147).#Therefore,# the#effectiveness#of#global#





Mitigation# finance#can#be#an#attractive# incentive# to#developing#countries# to#
pursue# lowQcarbon# pathways.# It# offers# considerable# potential# financial#
inflows# and# future# investment# opportunities# in# sectors# such# as# renewable#
energy# and# transportation.# Although# in# 2009# the# amount# of# mitigation#
finance# was# still# relatively# small# at# approximately# 0.8%# of# total# ODA,# as#
discussed# in# Chapter# 2,# the# 2009# Copenhagen# Accord# has# set# a# longQterm#
global#annual#target#for#climate#finance#of#US$100#billion#by#2020#(Buchner,#
Brown#&#CorfeeQMorlot,# 2011,#p.# 56).# This# amount# includes#mitigation# and#
adaptation# finance# from# various# potential# sources,# including# the# private#
sector.#Following#this#formal#written#commitment#there#have#been#deliberate#
attempts#to#mobilise#and#track#global#private#and#public#financial#resources#
to# achieve# this# target# (Clapp# et( al.,# 2012;# VanKerkhoff# et( al.,# 2011).# For#
developing#countries# that#are#potential# recipients#of#mitigation# finance,# this#
global# financial# target# of# US$100# billion# increases# the# attractiveness# of#
participating# in# mitigating# global# emissions.# The# financial# inflow# for# a#
developing#country#that#receives#both#mitigation#and#adaptation#finance#and#
is#prepared#to#join#the#global#carbon#market#is#potentially#very#large#(Bosetti#




Naturally,# in# the# absence# of# mitigation# finance# there# is# little# incentive# for#
developing#countries#to#voluntarily#commit#to#mitigating#climate#change#and#
pursue# lowQcarbon# pathways.# Although# Mathiesen# et( al.# (2011)# show# that#
countries# may# harvest# socioeconomic# benefits# if# they# run# wholly# on#





et( al.,# 2004;# Pielke# Jr.,# 2009).#While# developing# countries’# development# and#
economic# growth# mainly# rely# on# fossilQfuel# technologies# they# have# to#
continue# polluting# to# reach# their# economic# goals,# and# hence# there# is# a#
conceivable# tradeQoff# between# mitigating# emissions# and# development# via#
fossilQfuelled# economic# growth# (Stern,# 2008b).# When# fossil# fuel# is# still# the#
major# source# of# energy,# without# incentives# for# emission# mitigation,#
developing# countries# may# be# reluctant# to# agree# to# reduce# their# emissions#
since#this#would#slow#down#their#economic#performance.#
#
The# nonQcooperation# of# large# polluting# countries# nullifies# other# countries’#
mitigation# efforts.# Some# developed# countries# (Annex# I# parties# to# the#
UNFCCC)#have# committed# to# emission# targets# as# an# expression# of# bearing#
responsibility# for# their# historical# emissions.# Some# of# these# countries# have#
committed#to#a#binding#agreement#to#reduce#their#emission#levels.#They#also#
provide#mitigation#finance#for#developing#countries#to#prepare#them#to# join#
the# global# carbon# market# and# to# reduce# their# emissions.# However,# as#
previously# discussed,# global# emission# mitigation# that# relies# only# on#
industrialised# countries# is# inadequate.# Without# the# participation# of# all#






The#nonQparticipation#of# large#emitters# threatens# the#national#security#of#all#
countries#with# effects# such# as#potential#damage# from#extreme#weather# and#
other# disastrous# natural# events# caused# by# the# negative# impacts# of# climate#
change.# These# threats# tend# to# incentivise# countries# that# are# engaged# in#
reducing# their# emissions# and# helping# others# to# do# so# to# encourage# other#
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countries# to# follow# their# lead# and# collectively# commit# to# a# legallyQbinding#
target.# To# foster# cooperation# in# global# mitigation# action,# donors# and#
countries# that# have# made# considerable# mitigation# efforts# are# inclined# to#
prioritise# the# climate# change# agenda# and# to# allocate# ODA# as# mitigation#
finance.# This# policy# contains# the# danger# that# mitigation# finance# may#




distant# countries# (Chatterjee,# 2004)# with# extended# trade# and# political#
benefits,# providing#mitigation# finance#may# be# seen# as# a# reaction# to# future#
threats#arising#from#the#negative#impacts#of#climate#change,#and#to#result#in#
global# public# goods# that# benefit# not# only# the# donors# but# everyone# else# on#
earth.#One#can#argue# that#donor#countries#may#also#gain#economic#benefits#
by# providing# poverty# aid# such# as# through# enhanced# trading# conditions#
(Javed,# 2008),# but#normally# the# economic#benefit# of#poverty# aid# is# between#
the# donors# and# the# recipients,# and# to# some# extent# the# donor# countries’#
companies#when#the#donor#has#intentionally#maximised#the#economic#return#
from# aid# transactions# such# as# by# imposing# a# condition# that# the# recipient#
makes#specific#procurements#from#such#companies#(Scholl,#2009).#Mitigation#
finance#and#its#global#mission#have#more#relevance#for#global#development,#
since# the# former# is# expected# to# result# in# global# GHG# emission# reduction.#




their# emissions# via# offsetting# their# carbon# and# mitigating# emissions# in#






of# global# collective# action# to# mitigate# emissions# is# limited.# Many# of# the#
negotiations#that# it#has#hosted#have#ended#in#deadlock.#Perhaps#there# is#no#
conceivable# incentive# for# participating# in# mitigation# global# emissions#
(Bodansky,#2010b).#The#Kyoto#Protocol,#the#UNFCCC’s#product,#clarifies#the#
responsible#parties,# those# that#have# to# take#or#pay# for# such,#but# these# legal#
conventions# do# not# specify# how# much# and# under# what# conditions# this#
should# be# carried# out# (Page,# 2008).# Even# though# the# Convention# and# the#
Protocol# regulate# and# limit# the# emissions# of# Annex# I# countries,# UNFCCC#
does#not#have#the#legitimate#power,#such#as#that#of#the#International#Court#of#
Justice#or#the#World#Trade#Organisation,#to#impose#sanctions#on#parties#that#




binding#agreement.#There# is# an# imbalance#of# economic#and#political#power#
between# large# and# small# and# between# rich# and# poor# countries:# some# rich#
countries# have# more# funding,# which# enables# them# to# employ# more#
delegations#and#wellQtrained#negotiators.#With#greater#knowledge#and#more#
negotiators,# powerful# countries# can# intimidate# poor# and# small# developing#
countries# with# few# negotiators;# rich# countries# and# those# with# significant#










climate# research# (Parks#&# Roberts,# 2010,# p.# 147).# Large# polluting# countries#
that#have#insufficient#information#about#the#cost#of#not#participating,#or#have#
sufficient# information# but# lack# motivation,# may# avoid# their# responsibility#
due# to# a# higher# incentive# to# continue# with# high# fossilQfuelled# economic#
growth#(Gibson#et(al.,#2005).#Additionally,#as#there#is#no#systematic#method#of#
guaranteeing# the# delivery# of# donors’# commitments# there# is# a# considerable#
gap#between#commitments#and#actual#disbursement,#as#shown#in#Chapter#2.#






for# reducing# global# poverty# (Buchner# et( al.,# 2011,# p.# 14).#However,# in# 2009#
only# 5# out# of# the# 23# DAC# donors# –# Norway,# Denmark,# Finland,# the#
Netherlands# and# Luxembourg# –# had# surpassed# this# target# (OECD,# 2009b).##
Most#donors#give# less# than# the# 0.7%#ODA# target,# and#moreover# a# share#of#
what# they# do# give# is# designated# as# mitigation# finance.# If# this# continues,#
mitigation# finance# will# negatively# affect# the# amount# of# poverty# reduction#




To# the# author’s# knowledge,# to# date# no# peerQreviewed# paper# conceptually#
analyses# global# mitigation# finance# using# an# institutional# analysis# and#
development# (IAD)# framework#used#by# aid# scholars# to# analyse#ODA#more#
broadly.# The# present# analysis# centres# on# global# mitigation# finance# as# an#
instrument# that# can# effectively# contribute# to# solving# the# global# mitigation#
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problem# and# act# as# a# new# category# of# international# development# finance.##
This# discussion# frames# the# three# earlier# empirical# chapters# and# identifies#
their# relevance# to# the# broader# picture# of# the# global# effort# to# mitigate# the#
world’s#GHG#emissions.##
#
The# chapter# addresses# two#main#questions.#The# first# asks#what#qualities#or#
aspects#of#mitigation#finance#act#as#incentives#for#mitigating#GHG#emissions#
in#developing#countries.#It#particularly#considers#whether#mitigation#finance#





To#answer# these# two#questions,# the# chapter# is# organised# into# four# sections:#
the# first#explains# the# IAD#framework#that#underlies# the#study#of#mitigation#
finance#allocation,#and#its#assumptions.#The#second#section#addresses#the#first#
question# by# reflecting# on# positive# and# normative# aspects# of# mitigation#
finance# as# an# incentive# for# mitigating# GHG# emissions# in# developing#




development# of#mitigation# finance# so# that# both# developed# and# developing#





widely# used# to# analyse# various# aspects# of# foreign# aid# (Gibson# et( al.,# 2005).#
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The# IAD# framework# is# useful# for# analysing# the# institutional# aspects# of#
mitigation#finance#surrounding#and#influencing#decisions#about#its#allocation#




this#chapter.#First,# the#multidisciplinary#approach#of# the# IAD#framework# to#
analysing#general#foreign#aid#is#transferable#to#examining#mitigation#finance,#
a# multidisciplinary# subject# whose# building# blocks# are# climate# and#
environmental# science,# economics,# the# political# and# social# sciences# and#
financial#and#business#management.#
#
Second,# the# design# of# the# IAD# framework# allows# observation# of# an#
arrangement,# like# an# organisation# or# scheme# that# is# part# of# a# continual#
process.#Like# foreign#aid,#mitigation# finance# is# administered#by#and#within#
the#context#of#multiQlevel#organisations;#i.e.#operational#activities#at#different#
project#levels,#policyQmaking#and#national#and#international#levels#(Gibson#et#
al.,# 2005,# p.# 24).# Lastly,# mitigation# finance# is# the# result# of# an# interactive#
process#between#developed#and#developing#countries.##
#
The# IAD# framework,# shown# in# Figure# 5.1# below,# brings# together# and#
establishes# connections# between# all# the# elements# studied# and# discussed# in#
this# thesis.# Understanding# each# element# of# the# framework# is# useful# when#
scrutinising# the# arrangement# of# institutional# elements# –# the# context,# action#
arena,# incentives,# evaluation# criteria,# interactions# and# outcomes# –# and# the#























mitigation# finance#–#was# introduced# in#Chapter# 1.#The# second#element,# the#
attributes#of# the#mitigation# finance# community,# is# explained# throughout#all#
the# main# chapters# in# this# thesis.# They# are# qualities# that# differentiate#
mitigation#finance#from#other#types#of#official#aid,#such#as#the#definition#and#
objectives#of#mitigation# finance# that#differentiate# it# from#adaptation# finance#
and#poverty#aid.#
#
The# stated# rulesQinQuse,# as# the# third# subQcomponent# of# the# context# of#
mitigation#finance,#are#explained#in#the#introductory#chapter#and#throughout#
Chapters# 2,# 3# and# 4,# the#main# empirical# chapters# of# this# thesis.# Chapter# 2#
reports# the# rules,# such#as# the# coding# rules,#used#and#agreed#by#OECD#and#




















disbursed# amounts# of# mitigation# finance.# The# empirical# assessments#
conducted# in#Chapters# 3# and# 4# aim# to# clarify# the# inexplicit# allocation# rules#
and# criteria# used# by# donors# overall# and# by# individual# bilateral# donors# to#
allocate#their#mitigation#finance.#The#last#part#of#Chapter#4#discusses#in#detail#
the# allocation# rules# and# criteria# that# the# GEF# and# EU# use# to# allocate# their#
mitigation#finance.#
#




actor.# Chapter# 2# introduced# the# actors# that# provide#mitigation# finance# and#
tests#several#variables#that#represent#their#characteristics#to#understand#how#
these# determine# the# amount# of# mitigation# finance# supplied# and# the#
frequency# at# which# the# countries# concerned# report# their# allocation# of# it.#
Chapter# 3# discussed# who# receives# mitigation# finance# and# which# of# the#
characteristics#of#these#recipient#actors#determines#whether#they#will#receive#
it# from# DAC# donors# –# and# if# they# do# receive# it,# which# characteristics#
determine# the# amount# that# they# receive.# Chapter# 4# analysed# how# each#
donor’s# allocation# of# mitigation# finance# is# influenced# by# the# recipients’#
characteristics.# All# three# chapters# aim# to# enhance# understanding# of#
mitigation# finance#actors#and# the# characteristics#or# situations# that# influence#
their#action#and#behaviour.#
#
Under# the# assumption# of# rational# behaviour,# each# actor,#whether# donor# or#
recipient,# makes# a# decision# based# on# its# rational# preference# to# pursue# the#
normative#goals#of#mitigation#finance#as#well#as#to#maximise#its#gains#guided#




the# complex# network# within# which# many# mitigation# finance# subQactors#
influence#national#and#international#policymaking.##
#
The# economic# model# of# rational# behaviour# is# an# appropriate# tool# for#
institutional# analysis,# such#as# that#of# the# allocation#of#mitigation# finance,# if#
the#object#of#the#analysis#meets#two#conditions.#First,#the#model#is#a#relevant#
tool# for# institutional# analysis# when# perceived# incentives# for# a# particular#
situation# are# not# clearly# captured,# thoroughly# investigated# and# explained#
(see#Figure#5.1).#The#allocation#of#mitigation#finance#fulfils#this#first#condition,#
as# the# incentives# for# providing# or# receiving#mitigation# finance# are# not# yet#
clear.# Knowing# the# clear# perceived# incentives# of# actors# will# elucidate# the#
patterns#of# interaction#among#donors#and#recipients# that#affect# the#effect#of#
mitigation# finance# on# the# reduction# of# global#GHG# emissions.#Considering#
that#mitigation#finance#has#only#recently#been#provided#by#donor#countries,#
it# may# be# too# early# for# comprehensive# and# rigorous# evaluations# of# the#
outcomes#of# the# interventions# that# it#has# funded.#Many#projects# funded#by#
mitigation# finance# are# still# in# their# early# stages,# and# at# this# point# seeking#
evidence# that#mitigation# finance#has# reduced#emission# levels# in#developing#
countries#may#be#premature.##
#
The# evaluation# criteria# for#mitigation# finance# set# by#donors# and# evaluators#
will# also# influence# global# GHG# emission# reduction# as# the# outcome# of#




would# presumably# be# used# if# mitigation# finance# is# to# be# allocated# most#








of# an# institution# when# the# object# of# analysis# comprises# symmetrical#
information,# wellQordered# preferences# and# unlimited# capacity# to# calculate#
costs# and# benefits# to#maximise# expected# returns# (Gibson# et( al.,# 2005).# This#
would#best#describe#a# condition#of#an# ideal#world,#but# is# rare# in# the#actual#
world.# Hence,# like# many# empirical# studies# that# study# realQworld# cases,#
analysis# of# the# allocation# of# mitigation# finance# may# not# meet# the# second#
condition#of#the#economic#model#of#rational#behaviour.#As#discussed#earlier#
in# this# chapter,# it# is# likely# that# there# is# an# asymmetry# of# power# and#
knowledge# among# climate# mitigation# actors,# notably# between# donors# and#
recipients#but#also#between#large#and#small#poor#developing#countries.#There#
is# also# limited# capacity# for# calculating# the# costs# and# benefits# of#mitigating#
emissions.#Many# researchers# face# limitations# to# acquiring# information# and#




The# previous# chapters# are# essential# elements# of# the# IAD# framework# in# the#
context# of# mitigation# finance.# They# feed# into# the# two# main# institutional#
analyses# in# this# chapter,# which# aims# at# improving# understanding# of# the#
effectiveness# of# mitigation# finance# allocation.# The# first# analysis# focuses# on#









corresponding# to# the# actions# of# a# party# (Gibson# et( al.,# 2005).# Mitigation#
finance# can# be# an# incentive# that# steers# the# recipient# country’s# decision# to#
follow# the# donors’# intended# actions# such# as# when# donors# can# impose# a#





As# an# environmental,# economic,# development# and# political# instrument,#






Normatively,# the# donor# should# allocate# mitigation# finance#
effectively,# to# the# right# place# at# the# right# time,# to# developing# countries#
with# high# GHG# emissions,# hence# addressing# largeQscale# emission#
reduction#or# large# areas#of# forest# or# any#other# form#of# carbon# sinks# that#
absorb#and#store#a#large#quantity#of#carbon#emissions.##
#
Following# the# donor’s# allocation,# the# recipient# country# should# spend# its#
mitigation#finance#wisely#and#responsibly.#The#responsibility#of#recipient#
governments# covers# activities# such# as# regulating# the# administrative#
aspects# of#mitigation# finance# such# as# the# rationalisation# of# spending#per#
item,# controlling# effectively# the# use# of# mitigation# finance# for# climate#
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mitigation# projects# and# activities# and# informing# the# donor# of# how# it# is#
being#used#and#the#outcomes#of#funded#projects.##
#
Empirical# studies#of# foreign#aid# show# that#donors# like#Australia,#France,#
Italy,#Japan#and#the#US#are#influenced#by#their#own#political#interests,#such#
as#supporting#exQcolonies#and#allies,# in# the#allocation#of#aid#(Berthélemy,#
2006).# These#positive# evaluations# of# foreign# aid# indicate# that#donors# can#





As#with# foreign#aid,#mitigation# finance#has# two# inherently# contradictory#
attributes# which# can#make# it# a# perverse# incentive# and,# as# (Moyo,# 2009)#
calls# it,# ‘dismal# relief’.# The# main# objectives# of# mitigation# finance# are# to#
reduce#developing#countries’#GHG#emissions#and#improve#their#economic#
development,# but# donors# can# use# it# as# an# economic# and# political#
instrument.#The#recipient#government#can#also#utilise#mitigation#finance#to#
improve# its# economy# and# shift# its# development# activities# toward# a# lowQ
carbon#economy.#When#mitigation#finance#is#given#in#the#form#of#budget#
support,# its#recipients#can#misuse#it# to# increase#their#national#reserves#by#
not#spending#it# immediately;# in#the#worst#case#it#can#be#appropriated#for#












of# transboundary# pollution# and# simultaneously# satisfy# a# region’s#
collective#needs.#Lahiri#and#Beladi#(2007,#pp.#85–103)#explain#theoretically#
how# aid# provision# stimulates# competition# for# pollution# abatement#
between# neighbouring# countries.# Foreign# aid# has# been# shown# to# be# an#
effective# tool# for# rewarding# developing# countries# that# are# willing# to#
mitigate# transboundary# pollution.# Lahiri# and# Beladi# explain# that#
competition# for# foreign# aid# among# aidQreceiving# countries# eventually#
reduces#regional#pollution.#It#cannot#be#denied#that#within#the#normative#
objective# of# mitigating# pollution# it# is# in# the# donors’# interests# to# protect#
themselves# from# the# threats# inherent# in# the# collective# problem# of#
pollution.# In# this# instance,# the# donor# aims# to# protect# its# own# citizens’#
health#from#being#affected#by#pollution#from#neighbouring#countries.#This#
competitionQbased# aid# policy# has# the# potential# to# facilitate# a# mutual#
donorQrecipient# relationship# with# reciprocal# benefits# and# to# solve# the#
collective#problem.#
#
One# should#be#aware# that# the#outcome#of# collective# regional# action#may#
differ# from# global# collective# action# to# mitigate# GHG# emissions.# Sandler#
(2004,#pp.#212–234)#argues# that# two#global#pollution#problems#caused#by#
different# emission# substances# may# involve# different# levels# of# challenge.#
The# world# has# made# considerable# advances# in# curbing# ozoneQdepleting#
substances#(chlorofluorocarbons#and#bromideQbased#substances),#but#little#
has#been#achieved#in#mitigating#GHGs#(ibid).#Two#reasons#for#this#are#the#
greater# cost# than# benefit# of# mitigating# GHG# emissions# and# the# uneven#




to# benefit# from# warming# temperatures# boosting# the# yields# of# certain#
varieties# of# crops# (ibid).# Whereas# the# benefit# of# mitigating# depleting#
substance# is# greater# than# its# costs# and# negative# impacts,# such# as# skin#





Its# allocation# steers# developing# countries’# policies# in# directions# less#
relevant# to# the#objective#of# the# aid# such# as#promoting# ideology,# fighting#
terrorism,# expanding# the# donors’# volume# of# trade# and# creating#
opportunities#for#recipients’#military#expansion#(Clist,#2011;#Fleck#&#Kilby,#
2010;# Khilji# &# Zampelli,# 1994;# SuwaQEisenmann# &# Verdier,# 2007).##
Mitigation# finance# as# foreign# aid# may# be# influenced# by# these# positive#
values.# There# are# links# between# climate# change# and# international# trade#
such#as# increased# competitiveness#and# the# creation#of# trade#barriers# and#
opportunities# (Brack# et( al.,# 2000).# When# donors# perceive# certain#








agent# problem# is# likely# to# persist# due# to# several# factors:# first,# there# are#




national# and# operational# levels# such# as# between# project# managers# and#
officers.##
Figure# 5.2# illustrates# how# recipients,# as# implementing# agencies# which#
maybe#have#different#policy#preferences# to# those#of# the#donors,#have# the#
power# to# drift# away# from# the#donors’# original# intent.#As# an# illustration,#
the#donors’#original#intent#may#lie#on#point#X,#which#addresses#mitigating#
climate# change# and# improving# the# wellbeing# of# poor# people# relatively#
equally.# Donors# may# also# have# a# standard# of# transparency,# whereas# in#






















project,# an# objective# is# set# at# point# X.# To# limit# potential# change# to# the#
intended# outcome# the# donors# may# introduce# a# set# of# procedural#




















Pre and post- procedural 





postQprocedural# constraint# to# limit# the# discretion# of# the# recipient#




entities# operating# in# the# recipient# country.# Although# the# implementing#
entity#has#very#limited#political#power,#it#has#considerable#administrative#
power#to#allocate#resources,#including#planning#the#budget#and#regulating#
spending# (Hix,# 2005).#With# this# it# is# possible# that# the# entity,#which#may#





issues# within# the# framework# of# classical# public# choice# theory:# in# many#
cases#midQlevel#officers#of#an#implementing#entity#maximise#the#budget#to#
increase# their# salaries# and# can# reveal# or# retain# information# that# protects#
the# pursuit# of# their# own# interests.# As# shown# in# Figure# 5.2,# when# the#
personal# aspirations# of# midQlevel# officers# are# in# favour# of# proQpoor#
policies,# in#other#words,# the#officers#perceive#mitigating#global#emissions#


















In# general# numerous# rules# are# introduced# to# control# the# social#
behaviour#of#the#actors#in#the#delivery#of#mitigation#finance.#There#may#be#
considerable# effort# on# the# donor’s# part# to# encourage# other# countries# to#
formulate#and#agree#upon#measures#and#safeguarding#policies# to#ensure#
that# the# mitigation# finance# will# have# the# intended# outcome.# Perhaps#
donors#are#pressurised#by# future# risk#of#exposure# to#negative# impacts#of#
climate# change.# In# addition,# under# the# Kyoto# Protocol# regime# donors#
experienced#an#imbalance#in#the#responsibility#for#mitigating#emissions#as#
developing#countries#were#not# legally#bound#to# targets#while# the#donors#
made#their#first#step#to#commit#to#legally#binding#targets#under#the#Kyoto#
Protocol.# In# the# face# of# these# natural# and# institutional# pressures# formal#
and# defined# rules,# principles# and# implementation# guidelines# are#
necessary,# such# as# the#Bali#Road#Map,# nationally# appropriate#mitigation#
actions# (NAMAs)# and# guidelines# for# land# use,# landQuse# change# and#
forestry# (LULUCF).# These# safeguards# and# standards# were# designed# to#
narrow#bureaucratic#drift#in#mitigation#finance#distribution#caused#by#the#





Pressure# for# more# institutional# gatekeeping# might# also# come# from# the#
aspirations#of#the#citizens#of#donor#countries.#Compared#to#other#forms#of#
aid,#mitigation#finance#has#the#unique#purpose#of#benefiting#all#people#on#






Of# all# types# of# aid,# climate# change# is# the# only# category#which# recipients#
and#donors#are#both#obliged#to#consistently#record,#code#and#report#their#
funded# projects# according# to# criteria# specified# by# international# treaties#
(Tirpak# et( al.,# 2010).# Mitigation# finance# also# has# more# institutional#
gatekeepers.#A#growing#number#of# independent#monitoring#bodies# such#
as# the# World# Resource# Institute# (WRI),# the# Overseas# Development#




climate# change#projects# tend# to#be#absent# in# the# implementation#of#most#
other# aid# projects.# Although# climate# and# mitigation# finance# include# all#
these# precautionary# attributes# there# is# no# guarantee# that# they# will#
eliminate# its# potential# for# perversity.#With# or# without# such# frameworks#







outcome# is# that# when# development# agencies# have# not# adopted#
environmentallyQfriendly#regulations,#their#officials#may#have#an#incentive#
to# act# in# ways# that# are# harmful# to# environment.# For# these# agencies,#
receiving#more#mitigation#finance#tends#to#intensify#nonQenvironmentallyQ
friendly# development# activities# that# eventually# lead# to# environmental#
degradation#(Duraiappah,#1998).#Development#agencies’#existing#technical#
and#internal#policies,#i.e.#concomitant#accounting#procedures#and#policies#
were#established#before# the#appearance#of#mitigation# finance.# If# they#are#
not# adjusted# to# lowQcarbon# based# policies# there# is# a# danger# that# the#
increasing#number#of#development#activities#funded#by#mitigation#finance#




One# such# example# is# international# development# agency# policy# that#
contradicts# mitigation# finance# objectives.# It# is# common# to# provide# staff#
with# a# stipend# if# they# have# to# travel# more# than# 50# km# for# a# meeting.#
Reflecting#public#choice#theory#(Vaubel,#1986),#officers#pursue#policies#that#
maximise# their# income#and#hence#officers#will# choose#a#meeting# location#
well# beyond# this# distance# to# obtain# the# stipend.#With# this# arrangement,#
they#and#all#the#other#meeting#participants#have#to#travel#longer#distances,#
producing#more#GHG#emissions.#So#it#is#possible#that#more#climate#change#
projects# in# developing# countries# without# a# green# reform# of# the# internal#
policy# of# their# development# institutions#will# increase# rather# than# reduce#
GHG# emissions.# There# is# also# concern# about# the# growing# numbers# of#
delegates# at# international# climate# change# negotiations# and#meetings;# for#
instance#more# than#40,000#people# registered# for#COP#15# in#Copenhagen,#
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creating# massive# logistical# problems# (Bodansky,# 2010b).# International#
activities# addressing# climate# change# tend# to# be# harmful# to# the#




Developing# countries’# dependence# on# incoming# mitigation# finance# may#
also# lead#to# increased#emission# levels#when#the#amount#given#by#donors#
increases# with# the# higher# emissions# they# generate.# Recipients# may#
therefore# delay# the# implementation# of# mitigation# measures# and#
committing# to# legally# binding# targets.#When# there# is# no# penalty# for# no#
commitment,# it# is# possible# that# they# will# merely# state# that# they# are#
committed# to# reducing#emissions#but#postpone# its# implementation.#Thus#
mitigation# finance# can# become# a# perverse# incentive# when# it# appears# to#
reward# recipients#with#more# emissions#with#more# funding,# leading# to# a#
dependency#problem.##
#
As# explained,# considerable# efforts# have# been# made# to# make# mitigation#
finance# less#perverse.#The#degree#of# influence#of# institutional#boundaries#
on# the# behaviour# of# public# officials# call# for# scientific# and# academic#











for# large# developing# countries# to# involve# themselves# in# global# emission#
mitigation.#For#example,#mitigation#finance#inflow#to#China#is#minimal#at#
less# than# 0.0001%# of# its# GDP# (see# Figure# 5.3).# Considering# the# scale# of#
China’s# domestic# emissions# they# can# only# be# reduced# if# its# government#
decides#to#pursue#lowQcarbon#economic#growth.#China’s#ratification#of#the#
Kyoto#Protocol#on#August#30#2002#coincidentally#followed#an#increase# in#
donors’# commitment# to# provide# China# with# mitigation# finance# (Figure#
5.3).#Recently,#due#to#the#potential#of#negative#impact#of#climate#change#on#
China’s#longQterm#economic#growth,#its#government#has#started#pursuing#




incentive,# but# China# and# other# major# economies# have# gradually# shown#
willingness#to#formulate#and#implement#domestic#policies#to#reduce#their#
emissions.#China#and#India#have#adopted#carbon#intensity#targets#because#


























































Existing# mitigation# finance# is# mainly# used# as# seed# money# to# set# up#
national#mitigation# finance# institutions# and#mobilise# private# funding# for#
emission# reductions# on# a# large# scale# (Ong#&# Inance,# 2013).# For# example#
mitigation#finance#is#given#to#Indonesia#to#support#the#establishment#of#a#
nationallyQmanaged# climate# change# trust# fund# (UNDP# Indonesia,# 2012)#





movements# to# propel# its# largeQscale# sustainable# provision# of# climate#
finance# form# private# sources# (Bracking# &# Ganho,# 2011).# The# targeted#
communities# are# global# financial# markets,# global# private# corporations,#
NGOs# and# global# business# leaders,# which# are# expected# to# incorporate#




as# climate# finance,# including# mitigation# finance,# and# formally# counting#
and#tracking#it.#This#increasing#financial#mobility#is#an#attractive#feature#of#











et( al.,# 2010).# However,# in# 2012#mitigation# finance#was# still# primarily# being#
sourced# from#ODA# (Nakhooda# et( al.,# 2013).# This# section# gives# five# reasons#
why# the# transitory# mitigation# finance# arrangement# has# the# potential# to#
become#a#permanent#arrangement#attached#to#ODA.##
#
The# first# reason# is# the# dual# benefits# of# mitigation# finance# as# the# result# of#
mainstreaming# it# into# the# global# development# agenda# (Klein# et( al.,# 2005),#
Donors# can# argue# that# its# successful# outcome# will# result# in# development#
benefits# such# as# improving# income# and# creating# job# opportunities# in#
developing# countries.# Thus# mitigation# finance# delivers# a# dual# objective,#
making# it# acceptable# for# donors# to# use# ODA# as# mitigation# finance# whose#
outcome# is#aligned#with#ODA’s# traditional#objectives#of#alleviating#poverty#
and#improving#the#economies#of#developing#countries.#Opposing#the#idea#of#
mainstreaming,# Gupta# (2009)# argues# that# in# certain# political# circumstances#
such#as#difficulties#with# integration#of#development# and# climate#mitigation#
activities#by#developing#countries#unfamiliar#with#climate#change#issues#this#





of# ODA# for# mitigation# finance.# Adopting# a# policy# and# making# decisions#
require#a#minimum#twoQthirds#majority#vote# (Depledge,#2005,#p.#98).#When#
the#supply#side# is# inhibited#by#various#political#motives,# the#supply#will#be#
scarce# and# in# the# urgent# situation,# the# donors# will# be# inclined# to# use#
whatever# resources# are# available.# ODA# seems# to# be# an# accessible# funding#








in# 2009,# the# GCF# has# not# made# significant# progress# in# fundraising# and#
distributing# climate# finance# across# developing# countries.# Its# projected#







include# their# mitigation# finance# contribution# as# part# of# their# ODA.# As#
mentioned#earlier,#only#a#handful#of#donors#have#exceeded#the#0.7%#target.#
By#including#mitigation#finance,#donors#can#demonstrate#their#ODA#growth#
and#create# the# impression# that# they#have# fulfilled# the#0.7%#target.#Concrete#
evidence# of# this# is# provided# in# the# form# of# the#Global( Energy(Efficiency( and(
Renewable( Energy( Fund( (GEEREF),# a# financial# instrument# formalised# as# a#
public#private#partnership# (PPP)#whose# funding#provision#and#allocation# is#
categorised#as#ODA#(EU,#2006).#
#






mitigation# finance,# and# climate# finance# in# general,# through# newlyQcreated#
institutions# or# nationallyQmanaged# organisations# such# as# trust# funds# and#
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green# social# enterprises# (Karmali,# 2013).# However,# there# are# considerable#
capacity# issues# including# inexperienced# funding# management# and#
asymmetric# information# and# understanding# related# to# climate# change# and#
technical# knowledge# (Gupta,# 2009).# The# hesitation# about# using# current#











steps.# Similarly,# in# the# forestry# sector# forestry# programs# can# generate#
considerable# certified# emission# reductions# (CER)# in# the# CDM# market.#
However,# the# lack# of# credibility# of# its# mechanism# for# enforcing#
implementation# is#still#a#major# issue.#Currently# there# is# little#assurance# that#
investment#in#climate#projects#will#be#profitable#in#the#long#term.#
#
Considerable# efforts# have# been# made# to# mobilise# mitigation# finance# and#
other# climate# finance# from# sources# other# than# ODA,# yet# some# of# the#
challenges#outlined#above,#such#as#limited#resources#for#funding,#the#unmet#
overall# ODA# target,# the# absence# of# funding# transfer# mechanisms# that# are#
larger# and# faster# than# ODA,# risks# and# uncertainty,# and# slow# international#
policy# negotiations# maintain# the# existing# institutional# arrangements# for#
meeting# the# pressing# need# for# mitigation# finance# transfers.# With# private#




remain# an# important# source# of# mitigation# finance# and# continue# to# be# a#
financial# instrument# catalysing# various# financial# sources# with# the# aim# of#




Mitigation# finance# is# still# predominantly# donorQdriven.# Although#
commitments#to#taking#action#on#climate#problems#have#recently#intensified#




Mitigation# finance# has# gradually# allowed# developed# and# developing#
countries# to# jointly# tackle# the# boundaries# and# the# technical# and# financial#
barriers# to# mitigating# developing# countries’# national# emission# levels.#
Developing# countries# have# slowly# begun# to# collaborate# in# mitigation#
projects,#but#it#is#too#early#to#claim#that#mitigation#finance#has#taken#the#form#
of# global# collective# action.# Currently# developing# countries# mainly# host#





preQrequisite# for# global# collective# mitigation# action.# Miller# (1992)# explains#
that#collective#action#requires#the#input#of#several#actors#for#the#desired#joint#
outcome.# In# the# case# of# mitigation# finance,# the# input# or# provision# of# the#
finance# is# still# insignificant# and# heavily# relies# on# just# a# few# donors.# The#
global# structure# of# mitigation# finance# that# governs# its# provision# and#
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allocation# is# still# tenuous# and# fragmented.# Reliance# on# this# small# group# of#
donors# will# have# major# consequences# for# the# continuation# of# this# global#
collective# effort# if# the#major# donors# are# affected# by# serious# challenges# that#
force#them#to#cut#their#global#climate#budgets,#such#as#an#economic#crisis.#
#
Reliance# on# a# small# group# of# donors# for# mitigation# finance# threatens# the#
reduction# of# global# emissions# in# the# long# term# due# to# imbalanced#
responsibilities# that# tend# to# be# unsustainable.# This# heavy# reliance# also#
demonstrates# that# the# UNFCCC# negotiations# have# not# yet# resulted# in# a#
system# that# works# on# equitable# principles,# sharing# responsibility# between#
countries# according# to# the# quantity# of# their# emissions# (UNFCCC# art.# 1).# In#
current# practice# there# is# an# imbalance# between# the# economic# and# political#




not# party# to# the#Kyoto# Protocol# and#up# to# 2010,# it#made# a# relatively# small#
contribution#to#the#global#pool#of#mitigation#finance.#The#equitable#principle#
stated# in# the# UNFCCC# art.# 1# is# the# key# to# unlocking# the# possibility# of#
mitigation#finance#and#pave#the#way#for#global#collective#action,#yet#much#of#
the#emphasis#on#equitable#global#collective#action#remains#rhetorical,#and#it#is#
politically# difficult# to# operationalise,# agree# and# implement.# This# raises#
questions# about#how# long# the# current# system#will# be# able# to# accommodate#
the#imbalance#of#power,#responsibility#and#contribution.##
#
The# equitable# principle# in# the# mitigation# of# global# emissions# and#
responsibility# for# financing# it# will# remain# disputed# and# unresolved# if# (1)#
there# is# a# lack# of# agreement# about# whether# historical# emissions# are# to# be#
counted# as# part# of# developed# countries’# responsibility;# (2)# methods# for#
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quantifying# and# converting# responsibility# for# emissions# into# tradable#
commodities#are#still# in#dispute;#(3)#major#private#companies#remain#absent#
from#UNFCCC#negotiations;# and# (4)# there# is#no# system# to# facilitate#private#
companies’# commitment# to# targets# for# emission# reduction# and# directly#
contribute# to# the# global# pool# of# mitigation# finance# and# to# report# their#
progress.##
#
The# future#of#mitigation# finance#depends#on# the# contribution# and# financial#
supply#of#not#only#developed#countries#but#all#the#countries#on#Earth.#With#
the# vision# of# mitigation# action# as# a# pool# of# joint# contributions# from# both#
developed# and# developing# countries,# this# thesis# has# made# fundamental#
inquiries#and#asked#several#challenging#questions,#the#answers#to#which#are#
expected# to# improve# global# collective# understanding# of# how# mitigation#
finance# is# allocated# to#developing#countries#where# there# is# an# imbalance#of#
power,# responsibility# and# contributions# between# them# and# developed#
countries.#At#this#early#stage#in#the#development#of#global#mitigation#finance,#
this#research#has#been#able#to#identify#key#determinants#of#mitigation#finance#
provision# and# allocation# that# were# unclear# to# many# countries.# These#
determinants#represent#the#criteria#set#by#a#small#group#of#donors#to#respond#
to# global# collective# mitigation# action,# which# symbolise# their# strategic#
direction# in# responding# to# multidimensional# challenges# of# mitigating#
emissions#and,#to#a#lesser#extent,#to#alleviate#poverty#in#developing#countries,#
as# well# as# enhancing# global# action# in# mitigating# carbon# emissions.# This#
thesis’s# findings# have# contributed# to# uncover# some# of# unreported#






To# promote# further# cooperation# between# developed# and# developing#
countries,#there#are#still#plenty#of#tasks#for#the#academic#community#to#help#










Theoretical# studies# of# mitigation# finance# are# still# limited# in# number.#
Much#policy#discussion#is#devoted#to#prescribing#how#it#should#be#allocated#
more# effectively.# This# chapter’s# reflective# approach# has# shown# how# a#
discussion# based# on# institutional# theories# helps# to# clarify# how# mitigation#
finance# can# become# a# perverse# incentive.# It# is# possible# that# developing#
countries# are# perversely# incentivised# to# postpone# adopting# policies# that#
support# national# emission# reduction# programmes# in# order# to# continue#
receiving#mitigation#finance.#Hence#an#increase#in#the#level#of#emissions#in#a#
developing# country# that# is# followed# by# an# increasing# inflow# of#mitigation#
finance#may#not#result#in#an#immediate#decrease#in#its#emissions.#
#
Mitigation# finance# has# the# potential# to# be# permanently# reliant# on# ODA# if#
international# climate# negotiations# do# not# result# in# a# solid# global# collective#
agreement#on#how#to#finance#the#mitigation#of#GHG#emissions#in#developing#
countries.#As#long#as#only#a#limited#amount#of#mitigation#finance#is#sourced#













In$ the$ past$ decade$ donors$ have$ reacted$ promptly$ to$ unprecedented$
global$ environmental$ distress$ by$ directing$ part$ of$ their$ ODA$ towards$ the$
mitigation$ of$ climate$ challenges.$ The$ increasing$ share$ of$ODA$ allocated$ to$
financing$climate$projects$ in$developing$countries$globalises$ the$benefits$of$




For( both( individual( donors( in( rich( countries( and( for( their( governments,(
foreign( aid( has( always( been( viewed( as( a( moral( issue.( Yet( the( benefits( and(
virtues(of(aid(have(always(been(contested(and(challenged.(
$$




this$uncertain$situation,$ this$ thesis$has$tested$for$the$ influence$of$numerous$
factors$ representing$ donors’$ and$ recipients’$ characteristics$ regarding$
mitigation$ finance$ provision$ and$ allocation.$ The$ findings$ show$ that$ its$
provision$ is$ influenced$ by$ donors’$ emission$ levels,$ CO2$intensity$ per$GDP,$
commitment$ to$ the$ Kyoto$ Protocol,$ good$ governance,$ political$ view,$
domestic$environmental$spending$and$size$of$population,$while$its$allocation$







foreign$ aid$ is$ allocated$ as$ mitigation$ finance,$ a$ pragmatic$ compromise$ is$
made$so$that$this$relatively$new$type$of$foreign$aid$accommodates$both$local$
and$ global$ development.$ Hence$ there$ are$ expectations$ that$ foreign$ aid$
produces$ outcomes$ with$ shared$ global$ benefits.$ In$ traditional$ ODA,$ good$
governance$is$an$important$major$condition$of$aid’s$effectiveness$in$reducing$
poverty$(Collier$&$Dollar,$2002).$For$mitigation$finance,$governance$alone$is$
rather$ insufficient.$ To$meet$ the$ collective$ expectation$of$ fewer$global$GHG$
emissions,$developed$and$developing$countries$must$mitigate$their$national$
emissions$ simultaneously.$ If$ mitigation$ finance$ is$ successful$ in$ reducing$




The$ challenges$ to$ be$ faced$ if$ mitigation$ finance$ is$ to$ meet$ its$ intended$
outcome$ are$ greater$ than$ those$ of$ traditional$ODA.$With$ its$ expected$ goal$
conditional$upon$ the$success$of$global$collective$action$ there$are$additional$
informal$ challenges$ inherent$ in$ incentivising$ developing$ countries$ to$
participate$in$such$global$collective$action.$As$a$relatively$new$and$growing$




act$ as$ a$ catalyst$ to$ solutions$ to$ the$ pressing$ global$ need$ to$ respond$ to$ the$
changing$climate.$$$
$




the$ success$ of$ ODA$ after$ World$ War$ II$ in$ delivering$ the$ Marshall$ Plan,$
which$ resulted$ in$ Europe’s$ fast$ physical$ and$ economic$ recovery,$ the$
provision$and$allocation$of$ODA$have$been$determined$by$a$changing$set$of$
determinants$ representing$ the$ evolution$ of$ the$ development$ paradigm.$
Foreign$ aid$ has$ supported$ projects$ in$ different$ contexts$ such$ as$
infrastructure$ development$ and$ human$ resource$ capacity\building$ during$
the$ financial$ push$ paradigm$ of$ the$ 1960s,$ income$ redistribution$ together$
with$ support$ for$ social$development,$health$ care$and$education$during$ the$





Development$has$ recently$ entered$a$new$phase$ in$which$ climate$ change$ is$
perceived$ as$ a$ potential$ threat$ to$ development$ and$ therefore$ measures$ to$









more$ important$ to$ foreign$ aid?$ Whose$ interests$ are$ becoming$ more$
dominant,$the$donors’$or$the$recipients’?$Perhaps$there$are$no$direct$answers$
to$ these$ challenging$ and$ fundamental$ questions.$ To$ open$ the$ way$ to$
answering$ them$ in$ detail,$ this$ thesis$ has$ examined$ the$ allocation$ and$
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and$ allocation$ of$ mitigation$ finance$ and$ the$ characteristics$ of$ donors$ and$
recipient$developing$countries.$Chapters$2,$3,$and$4$empirically$studied$the$
determinants$ of$ the$ provision$ and$ allocation$ of$ mitigation$ finance$ across$
donors$ and$ developing$ countries.$ Conceptual$ discussion$ elucidated$ the$





A$ great$ number$ of$ empirical$ studies$ have$ tested$ whether$ the$ normative$
objective$ of$ aid$ \$ to$ alleviate$ poverty$ \$ is$ used$ as$ the$ determinant$ of$
development$ aid$ allocation.$ Contributing$ to$ this$ body$ of$ literature,$ the$
empirical$ studies$ in$ this$ thesis$ follow$ the$ intention$ of$ studies$ on$ aid$more$
broadly$by$ testing$whether$ the$objective$of$mitigation$ finance$ \$ to$mitigate$
GHG$ emissions$ in$ developing$ countries$ is$ used$ as$ the$ determinant$ of$ the$
allocation$of$mitigation$finance.$There$is$an$argument$that$as$the$normative$
objective$of$mitigation$finance$this$may$divert$ODA$from$the$broader$initial$
objective$of$ foreign$aid:$ the$alleviation$of$poverty.$The$empirical$ studies$ in$
this$thesis$have$shown$how$both$the$specific$objective$of$mitigation$finance$
and$the$general$normative$objectives$of$foreign$aid$influence$the$allocation$of$
mitigation$ finance$ across$ developing$ countries.$ This$ evidence$ is$ used$ as$ a$
point$ of$ departure$ from$which$ to$ discuss$ the$ theory$ of$ aid$ allocation$ and$




Chapter$ 2$ has$ demonstrated$ how$ donors’$ domestic$ performance$ on$
environmental$ issues$ tends$ to$ influence$ the$ share$ of$ mitigation$ finance$ in$
their$total$aid$provision.$There$is$competition$for$financial$resources$between$
domestic$ and$ overseas$ environmental$ spending,$ with$ higher$ share$ of$
environmental$spending$in$total$of$donor’s$domestic$expenditure$negatively$
affecting$the$share$of$mitigation$finance$in$donor’s$aid$provision.$Conversely,$
donors’$ regulatory$ quality,$ control$ of$ corruption,$ voice,$ accountability$ and$
rule$ of$ law$positively$ influence$ the$ share$ of$mitigation$ finance$ in$ total$ aid$
provision,$ while$ political$ stability,$ government$ effectiveness$ and$ level$ of$
income$per$capita$have$no$ relevance$ in$determining$a$donor’s$provision$of$
mitigation$ finance.$ $Chapter$3$has$ shown$ that$ there$are$ strong$associations$











that$ there$ is$ a$ lack$ of$ emphasis$ on$ sharing$ the$ benefits$ of$ aid.$ Once$ it$ is$
received,$aid$is$assumed$to$be$the$domestic$property$of$the$recipients.$In$the$
assessment$of$general$aid$there$is$a$lack$of$recognition$of$the$importance$of$






a$ set$ of$ variables$ representing$ a$ set$ of$ donors$ and$ developing$ countries’$
characteristics,$ including$ attributes$ related$ to$ climate$ change,$ namely$





its$ global$ benefit,$ which$ has$ the$ potential$ for$ diverting$ ODA$ from$ this$
objective$ of$ ODA$ (Michaelowa$ &$ Michaelowa,$ 2007a).$ Chapter$ has$ 5$
evaluated$this$possible$divergence$of$the$normative$objectives$of$foreign$aid.$
Most$ aid$ studies$ show$how$ recipients’$ needs,$ recipients’$ performance,$ and$
donors’$ interests$ influence$ aid$ allocation.$ Chapter$ 5$ analyses$ the$ changing$
and$additional$roles$of$mitigation$finance$in$fulfilling$its$normative$objective.$
The$ increasing$ amount$ of$ ODA$ includes$mitigation$ finance$ as$ a$ new$ sub\
category$of$ODA$with$a$distinct$objective.$Previously,$donors’$interests$were$
moving$ closer$ toward$ meeting$ the$ recipients’$ needs$ (McGillivray,$ 2003).$
With$the$addition$of$global$needs$it$ is$possible$that$the$direction$of$donors’$
interests$ is$moving$ away$ from$meeting$ recipients’$ needs$ towards$meeting$
global$needs.$
(
The$ findings$ of$ this$ thesis,$ and$ particularly$ those$ discussed$ in$ Chapters$ 3$
and$4,$show$evidence$of$the$influence$of$recipients’$needs$and$global$needs$
on$ mitigation$ finance$ allocation.$ These$ empirical$ findings$ provide$ the$
explanation$ that$donors’$allocations$are$ shared$between$meeting$ the$global$
normative$ objective$ and$ supporting$ recipients’$ needs.$ Chapter$ 4$ has$
demonstrated$ the$ significant$ influence$ of$ the$ interests$ of$ several$ donors$ in$
their$ allocation$ of$mitigation$ finance.$ These$ donors$ are$ inclined$ to$ allocate$
mitigation$finance$to$countries$in$which$their$CDM$investments$are$located,$
expanding$ their$ own$ access$ to$ territory$ on$ which$ to$ offset$ their$ GHG$
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emissions.$ Although$ there$ are$ early$ indications$ of$ this$ pattern$ shifting$ to$
support$ the$ global$ objective,$ overall,$ donors$ have$ considered$ recipients’$
development$ needs.$ Chapter$ 3$ has$ shown$ that$ infant$ mortality$ is$ still$ a$
positive$ significant$ influence$ on$ total$ ODA$ allocation,$ and$ that$ countries$
with$lower$per$capita$income$receive$larger$amounts$of$mitigation$finance.$In$
sum,$the$increase$in$mitigation$finance$has$indicated$the$possibility$of$ODA’s$
response$ to$ local$ needs$ being$ diverted$ to$ mitigation$ finance’s$ response$ to$




different$ types$ of$ GHGs$ and$ of$ financial$ instruments.$ Gases$ with$ greater$
global$warming$potential$(GWP)$are$more$sensitive$parameters$of$mitigation$
finance$ allocation.$ Loans$ are$ given$ to$ fund$ climate$ projects$ in$ countries$
producing$substantial$CO2$emissions,$while$grants$are$ targeted$at$countries$
with$ large$ forested$ areas.$ Donors$ use$ different$ measures$ and$ financial$





alignment$ with$ recipients’$ needs,$ donors$ and$ their$ foreign$ aid$ have$ to$
persuade$recipients$ to$take$ joint$responsibility$for$mitigating$emissions$and$
performing$well$ in$ their$ execution$ of$ projects$ aimed$ at$meeting$ the$ global$
normative$objective.$ If$ the$ incentive$ is$unclear,$ recipients’$commitment$will$
vary$ according$ to$ how$ mitigation$ finance$ is$ used$ as$ an$ incentive$ in$
international$ climate$ change$ negotiations,$ but$ will$ also$ depend$ on$ other$
unpredictable$ factors.$ There$ is$ a$ danger$ that$ spontaneous$ pledges$ of$
mitigation$ finance,$ without$ first$ thoroughly$ identifying$ which$ countries$
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should$be$prioritised$ to$ receive$mitigation$ finance,$will$ lead$ to$ an$ inherent$
problem$ of$ the$ incentivisation$ of$ recipients$ to$ maintain$ or$ increase$ their$
emissions$ and$ damage$ the$ global$ environment$ further.$ This$ thesis$
contributes$ to$ the$ conceptual$ development$ of$ foreign$ aid$ allocation$ and$ to$




Providing$ and$ allocating$ mitigation$ finance$ to$ support$ developing$
countries’$ emission$ reduction$ has$ socioeconomic,$ institutional,$
environmental,$ moral$ and$ political$ consequences.$ Below$ are$ some$ of$ the$




A$ prolonged$ and$ heavy$ concentration$ of$ mitigation$ finance$ in$
developing$countries$with$substantial$emissions$would$crowd$out$foreign$
aid$ for$ poor$ countries$ and$ widen$ the$ disparity$ between$ their$ incomes.$
When$ reducing$ emissions$ is$ prioritised$ over$ alleviating$ poverty,$ for$
instance$ to$ improve$ efficiency$ in$ the$ energy$ sector,$ a$ large$ amount$ of$
mitigation$ finance$ is$ allocated$ to$ large$ companies$ and$ businesses$ in$
developing$countries.$Although$these$companies$may$receive$only$loans,$
rather$ than$ grants,$ this$ financial$ capital$ will$ be$ concentrated$ amongst$









this$ negative$ socioeconomic$ consequence,$ particularly$ for$ donors$ who$
have$ not$ yet$ met$ the$ target$ of$ 0.7%$ of$ GNI$ as$ aid.$ In$ the$ context$ of$
building$an$agenda$for$a$global$development$assistance$and$climate$fund,$
the$OECD$ and$ the$GCF$ have$ brought$ the$ donors$ and$ some$ developing$
countries$ together.$ They$ can$ facilitate$ a$ discussion$ to$ set$ a$ cap$ of$ the$
proportion$of$climate$mitigation$finance$in$total$ODA.$Rather$than$being$










provided$ generic$ guidance$ on$ this$matter;$ however,$ there$ is$ insufficient$













climate$ project$ is$ US$100$ billion$ per$ year.$ Currently$ the$ volume$ of$
mitigation$finance$is$still$well$below$this$amount,$and$a$considerable$effort$
is$ required$ to$mobilise$ sources$ of$ finance$ to$ raise$ the$ supply$ and$ to$ set$
policies$that$make$it$more$elastic$in$terms$of$its$transaction$cost$so$that$it$
reaches$the$US$100$billion$as$the$global$need$or$global$ financial$demand$
in$mitigating$ carbon$ emissions.$ The$ supply$ curve$ becomes$more$ elastic$
when$ there$ are$more$ funding$ options$ for$mitigation$ finance.$ It$ is$ likely$
that$ the$ transaction$cost$elasticity$of$mitigation$finance$will$be$greater$ in$
the$ long$ run$ because$ more$ donors$ from$ different$ sectors$ (private$ and$
NGOs)$contribute$to$the$global$pool$of$mitigation$finance.$$The$transaction$
cost$of$delivering$mitigation$finance$is$also$likely$to$drop$if$more$donors$
can$ finance$ and$ co\finance$ larger\scale$ projects$ in$ developing$ countries$




Managing$ demand$ and$ spending$ US$100$ billion$ per$ year$ effectively$
depends$ on$ the$ recipients’$ ability$ and$ capacity.$ They$ must$ build$ their$
capacity$ to$ disburse$ and$ distribute$ received$ funding$ to$ the$ areas$ that$





effective$ spending$ must$ be$ supported$ by$ effective$ planning$ that$ is$
coherent$with$ national$ development$ priorities$ and$ the$ national$ financial$
management$system$and$translated$into$the$efficient$execution$of$the$plan.$$
$
The$ 2009$ Copenhagen$ Accord$ states$ the$ amount$ needed$ globally$ is$
US$100$ billion$ per$ year.$ This$ target$ is$ not$ yet$ supported$ by$ global$ and$
national$assessment$of$the$ability$and$capacity$of$the$majority$of$countries$
to$ effectively$ spend$ and$ efficiently$ utilise$ mitigation$ finance$ in$ the$
execution$ of$ climate\related$ projects.$ Nevertheless$ the$ Accord$ does$ not$
prescribe$how$to$achieve$this$financial$need.$Currently$recipients’$demand$
falls$below$the$amount$of$mitigation$finance$that$donors$are$able$to$supply.$
This$ difference$ in$ the$ amount$ of$mitigation$ finance$ provided$ by$ donors$
and$the$amount$that$can$be$managed$by$the$recipients$remains$one$of$the$
reasons$why$ there$ is$ a$ disbursement\commitment$ gap$ in$ the$ practice$ of$
mitigation$ finance$ transfer.$ Another$ explanation$ for$ the$ disbursement\
commitment$ gap$ reflected$ in$ Figure$ 2.2$ is$ existing$ donors’$ rhetoric.$
Pledging$financial$commitment$may$help$donors$to$promote$their$position$
as$generous$countries$and$free$up$deadlocks$in$international$negotiations$






commitment,$ not$ only$ in$ terms$ of$ the$ absolute$ amount$ but$ also$ the$
parameters$of$its$allocation.$This$is$reflected$in$the$estimations$in$Chapter$





the$ only$ significant$ determinant$ in$ the$ actual$ allocation$ of$ mitigation$
finance$provision.$
$
With$ an$ innovative$ approach$ to$ building$ the$ capacity$ of$ developing$
countries$to$spend$mitigation$finance$promptly$and$effectively$and$better$
time$management$ in$ the$ international$ financial$ outflows$ and$ inflows$by$
donors$ and$ recipients,$ the$ gap$ between$ the$ commitment$ and$
disbursement$ of$mitigation$ finance$ can$ be$ narrowed.$However,$ the$ gap$
will$widen$ if$ the$global$ climate$worsens$and$ the$ increase$ in$demand$ for$
mitigation$ finance$ accelerates$much$ faster$ than$ the$ supply$ of$mitigation$






foreign$ aid$ may$ no$ longer$ be$ seen$ as$ a$ charitable$ endeavour$ but$ as$ a$
financial$ instrument$ for$ preparing$ the$ world$ for$ mitigating$ future$
environmental$ shocks$ and$ enhancing$ global$ environmental$ security$
Donors$may$have$also$economic$interests$in$providing$mitigation$finance,$
although$ there$ is$no$evidence$of$ this$yet.$When$developed$countries$ are$
able$ to$ offset$ their$ emission$ reduction$ at$ home$ with$ the$ reduction$ of$
emissions$in$overseas$countries,$which$offers$cheaper$per$unit$of$emission$





There$ might$ be$ a$ considerable$ moral$ challenge$ inherent$ in$ the$ choice$
between$ providing$ mitigation$ finance$ grants$ to$ richer$ developing$
countries$that$have$the$necessary$environmental$resources$to$ease$climate$
change,$such$as$vast$forest$areas,$and$providing$them$to$poorer$countries$
with$ less$ natural$ capacity.$ Another$ moral$ challenge$ is$ present$ when$
donors$ continuously$ provide$ grants$ for$ developing$ countries$ with$
environmental$ resources,$ i.e.$ forestry$ and$ natural$ capacity$ to$ reduce$
emissions,$there$is$a$danger$of$creating$a$dependency$in$these$countries$on$
international$ finance.$This$policy$may$also$ incentivise$recipient$countries$




When$ recipients$ are$ unable$ to$ spend$mitigation$ finance$ effectively,$
development$ activities$ are$ increasing$ together$ with$ emission$ levels,$
therefore$when$mitigation$finance$is$ineffectively$spent,$the$large$amount$
of$mitigation$finance$given$tends$to$increase$the$intensity$of$development$
activities$ that$ lead$ to$ a$ rapid$ increase$ in$ emissions$ in$ the$ short$ term.$
Examples$ include$ delaying$ low\carbon$ institutional$ reform$ and$ putting$
policies$ to$ accelerate$ low\carbon$programmes$ on$hold.$ Since$ there$ is$ no$
accurate$way$of$ calculating$by$how$much$each$mitigation$ finance$dollar$
will$reduce$emissions$across$developing$countries$in$the$next$5,$10,$and$20$
years,$ it$ is$ not$ possible$ to$ estimate$ how$ long$ the$ steady$ increase$ in$
emissions$will$continue.$
$
Although$ donors$ use$ different$ financial$ instruments$ and$ start$ with$




on$ CF6$ and$with$ large$GWP,$ developing$ countries’$ increasing$ emission$
levels$are$unavoidable.$Mitigation$finance$regardless$its$effectiveness$will$




There$ is$ an$ urgent$ need$ for$ a$ new$ legally$ binding$ climate\change$
agreement$ ratified$by$more$of$ the$world’s$ countries$ than$ the$number$of$
countries$which$ratified$the$Kyoto$Protocol.$To$support$this$exigency,$the$





the$ source$ of$ its$ supply$ is$ limited,$ and$ there$ is$ a$ clear$ need$ to$ find$
alternative$sources$such$as$private$loans$and$the$carbon$market.$When$the$
amount$of$mitigation$finance$is$limited$and$it$is$administered$with$lack$of$
transparency$ and$ equitable$ decisions$ about$ its$ provision$ and$ allocation,$
there$is$a$limit$to$how$far$mitigation$finance$can$support$progress$towards$




The$ provision$ and$ allocation$ of$ mitigation$ finance$ represent$ several$
donor$ countries’$ readiness$ to$ mitigate$ global$ emissions.$ Recipients$ of$




and$ whether$ their$ economic$ and$ political$ attributes$ meet$ the$ donors’$
interests.$The$expected$collective$returns$from$mitigation$finance$are$not$yet$
being$ experienced.$ The$ uneven$ effects$ of$ climate$ change$ across$ countries$
means$that$some$pay$less$attention$than$others$to$the$problems$that$it$brings.$




in$ the$ private$ sector$ to$ contribute$ to$ the$ supply$ of$mitigation$ finance,$ and$






evaluate$ the$ progress$ of$ mitigation$ finance$ in$ reducing$ emissions$ and$ its$
contribution$ to$ the$broader$aim$of$development$aid$ to$alleviate$poverty.$ In$
addition,$ it$ is$ crucial$ to$ measure$ the$ extent$ to$ which$ mitigation$ finance$
crowds$out$the$provision$of$development$aid.$Mitigation$finance$is$working$
towards$ a$ greener$ Earth.$However,$ along$ the$way$ numerous$ international$
and$national$challenges$may$disrupt$its$provision$and$allocation$to$meet$the$
global$ aim$of$mitigating$GHG$emissions.$There$ is$ an$ enormous$number$of$
tasks$that$require$all$countries$and$humankind$to$cooperate$and$act$together$
to$resolve$the$multilevel$and$multidimensional$challenges$of$climate$change$
without$compromising$the$importance$of$local$and$national$development.$
$
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